Earlier I made reference to the possibility of renewed terrorist activity in the Arabian Peninsula because of the merger between the al-Qaeda affiliates in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The release of a new most wanted list from Saudi Arabia and subsequent release of an Interpol orange notice for these men led me to believe that terrorist activity in Saudi Arabia or Yemen was imminent. It now turns out that this was indeed the case.
Reading media reports from Middle East outlets is akin to watching a monkey try to swallow a hand grenade – you know its going to be ugly, but you can’t look away. This was certainly the case on February 17. According to press reports, Yemeni authorities claimed to have disrupted a terrorist plot to destroy oil fields and tourist spots by the newly resurrected al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Furthermore, the media also reported that former Guantanamo Bay inmate Mohammed al-Awfi, aka Abu Harith, surrendered to Yemeni authorities two weeks after issuing a video tape claiming he had rejoined al-Qaeda.
Al-Awfi’s surrender is rather curious. First, the man leaves Saudi Arabia to rejoin al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula after his release from Guantanamo and the Saudi deradicalization program, and second he surrenders a mere two weeks after having rejoined al-Qaeda. This action begs the question, did al-Awfi’s surrender lead to the disruption of the plot or did he surrender because of its discovery?
It is possible that al-Awfi was planted by Saudi intelligence upon receiving intel that al-Qaeda was attempting a comeback in Riyadh’s backyard. In fact, Yemeni foreign minister Aby Bakr al-Qirbi publicly stated that al-Qaeda was under control in Yemen. Al-Qirbi would further state that al-Qaeda was, “under security control and censorship” leading one to believe that al-Awfi’s surrender was indeed part of a plan to infiltrate al-Qaeda.
When discussing Yemen it is important to understand that the government has used jihadists in the past to adversaries of the ruing regime. In this case, long time President Ali Abdullah Saleh has used jihadists to target his adversaries in the al-Zaydi tribe in Northern Yemen. What may have happened in this case is the government of Yemen grew worried since the militants that they (sometimes) employ were planning on targeting the lifeblood of Yemen - oil. Regardless of the surrender of a top militant the dynamics of the Arabian Peninsula remain the same. Thus far the Saudis have only brought seven of their list of 85 home. What we have seen in the past month is only the tip of the iceberg.
Monday, March 9, 2009
Tuesday, February 10, 2009
Urgent: Something is cooking in Riyadh
On February 3, 2009, Saudi Arabia issued a list of 83 individuals wanted for terrorist activities. This was followed by Interpol issuing an orange notice for these individuals on February 10th. This is an unprecedented security alert and should be taken quite seriously. It is not typical for a nation to issue a list of 83 wanted individuals all at once unless Riyadh has intelligence that a terrorist attack is imminent. It appears as if the Kingdom issued this list because the intelligence they possess is sketchy, yet reliable, and the Saudis are hoping to get lucky by nabbing a few of these individuals and gleaning more actionable intelligence.
Back in April of 2008 I warned that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula would work with the al-Qaeda affiliate in Yemen in an attempt to move weapons and personnel across the border for future terrorist attacks when the opportunity presented itself. The recent news of two former Guantanamo inmates rejoining al-Qaeda in Yemen coming on the heels of all this activity cannot be coincidental. It’s time we all watch Saudi Arabia very closely in the coming days and weeks.
Back in April of 2008 I warned that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula would work with the al-Qaeda affiliate in Yemen in an attempt to move weapons and personnel across the border for future terrorist attacks when the opportunity presented itself. The recent news of two former Guantanamo inmates rejoining al-Qaeda in Yemen coming on the heels of all this activity cannot be coincidental. It’s time we all watch Saudi Arabia very closely in the coming days and weeks.
Saturday, January 31, 2009
2009: Predictions and Possibilities
The following is based upon trends that are I expect to take place in the coming year. I will discuss possible outcomes of current trends and offer a few predictions. Most topics will be discussed by country located in the Middle East, but not every country or movement will be covered.
Middle East
Israel-Palestine
Since the Israeli air raids on Gaza are dominating the headlines we can start with the Eastern Mediterranean. Israel has had a temporary cease fire with Hamas controlled Gaza for the last 16 months; however rocket attacks originating from Gaza has forced the Israeli government to respond. In contrast to the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah-Hamas war, Israel only has one front to deal with and thus little incentive to stop the current operation. Although Israel engaged in a ground invasion of the Gaza Strip, the goals of the operation have not been clearly and thus success cannot be determined. The likely outcome is that Hamas will be hurt but not completely destroyed. In the West Bank we can expect to see the Fatah movement gain strength at the expense of Hamas. Hamas is a terrorist group without any experience governing and it shows in this current crisis. Israel will continue along the status quo with a few interventions by western politicians trying to bring peace. The wildcard for Israel in 2009 will be Hezbollah; it is very possible another war with the Lebanese terror group could breakout.
Syria-Lebanon
Syria has been working with the Europeans and Turkey to hammer out a peace deal with Israel. As I have argued before, Syria has lost its most recent patron – Iran – and now must look to other avenues for economic growth. For this to work Syria must drop the rogue regime act, recognize Lebanon as an independent nation, and reign in terrorist groups (i.e. Hezbollah) that operate under Syria’s watch. Once this is accomplished a peace deal with Israel is a very real possibility in the next two to three years.
The biggest challenge for Syria is Hezbollah. Hezbollah has grown significantly and has proven it can intimidate the Lebanese government and threaten Israel conventionally. The onus is on Damascus to weaken Hezbollah to the point that is cannot threaten the Lebanese government or Israel. In the middle of all this is Lebanon. Lebanon is a country fractured by warfare from a variety of sectarian groups and only knows order when a third party intervenes. Previously that third party had been the Syrians, but that changed with the March 14th democratic movement. Unfortunately, the existence of Hezbollah and the devastation that resulted from the 2006 war with Israel has brought nothing but trouble for this experiment in democracy. For Lebanon to become a stable nation it will take the dismantling of Hezbollah and substantial outside assistance. Since this is unlikely to happen in the coming year Lebanon will be forced to continue limping along. Syria’s fortunes on the other hand are completely dependent upon third party diplomacy and the resolution of the Israeli political mess.
Turkey
Since the removal of Saddam Hussein, Turkey has managed to spread its influence in Iraq, Syria, and even Iran. Turkey has also opened the door towards reconciliation with Albania – a very sensitive topic as the U.S. congress recently found out. The reasoning behind Turkey’s diplomatic initiatives are two-fold, one is looking for alternative oil and natural gas avenues for supplying Europe to break the Russian monopoly on hydrocarbons, and two Turkey looks for any way it can to piss off the Russians despite the two nations being trading partners. Look for Turkey to come out of the global financial crisis stronger and more relevant in the Middle East and Europe.
Iraq
Throughout history the one factor that has started more wars than other is simple geography. Therefore it is no coincidence that Iraq, considered the birthplace of civilization, will be a powerful nation. In the past, wars over this piece of real estate came down to simple location. Iraq was a source of water and all major trade routes went through this area. Today water is still an important resource, but coupled with large oil reserves and other natural resources Iraq stands poised to once again become the regional power player in the ME.
The last five years in Iraq have seen shifting political loyalties with the numerous tribes throwing their lot in with whoever had the most money or guns. But as the U.S. surge went on the Iraqi government has managed to consolidate power through numerous backroom deals. The Iraqi security forces have also gained from the political progress and have become largely self reliant. Perhaps the issue that is most pressing in the U.S. – Iraqi relationship is the future role that the U.S. military will play. On the ground the Iraqis are steady improving militarily, but are still lacking a meaningful air force and have only recently begun training for casualty evacuation. What does look promising is the potential sales of the M-1 Abrams main battle tank to the Iraqi military. If the U.S. is not directly involved in security operations the sales of equipment may prove to be the decisive factor for the central government of Iraq to hold the country together.
Iraq has seen great improvement both on the economic and security fronts, but still has room for improvement. Unemployment is high and security operations are still ongoing in parts of the nation. While al-Qaeda has had its presence in Iraq diminished significantly, the organization still poses a threat. But these challenges can be overcome. The high price of oil this summer together with the increased production out of Iraq has helped boost the popularity of the government. The Prime Minister has personally walked around Baghdad handing out money on several occasions. Gestures such as this will only help to solidify the position of the government. The high price of oil may have been a positive for Iraq but the country still must meet the challenge of diversifying its economy and fostering foreign investment if it is to live up to the countries potential of being a regional powerhouse.
Iran
Iran is in bad shape economically. Inflation is around 20 percent, unemployment is in the double digits, and 18 percent of the population lives in extreme poverty. The Iranian nuclear program has increased these problems by bringing international sanctions against Iranian banks and its wealthiest citizens. Additional problems include government sponsored gas subsidies in the face of high oil prices. Now that oil prices have fallen, Iran has been forced to rewrite its budget for 2009. Iran may be a top exporter of petroleum, but is also a major importer of refined products such as gasoline. In other words, Iran is increasingly vulnerable to international pressure and possibly revolution.
With Iran as isolated as it is and with international sanctions steadily increasing over the nuclear program one would think that military action is inevitable when in fact the opposite is true. Israel has made statements that it will not allow Iran to construct a nuclear weapon and will use force to stop it, but it lacks the military capability to do so. A U.S. led operation is really the only possibility should a military confrontation with Iran take place. The Pentagon has stated that it could destroy the Iranian military in three days, but the U.S. does not see Iran as much of a threat and thus will not make a move in the near future. Even without military action taken against it and new elections coming in the spring, 2009 will be a very bad year for Tehran.
Saudi Arabia
The rapid increase and subsequent decrease in oil prices has not hurt the Saudi Kingdom. In fact, the low oil prices are working to keep Saudi Arabia’s main rival – Iran – weak. Currently the Saudi’s have a cash reserve of about one trillion U.S. dollars and is looking to put that money to use in areas such as expanding oil production or supporting Chechen rebels against Russia. If the Saudi’s are able to expand their proven oil reserves and construct new storage facilities the country will have the ability to cut oil prices overnight to hurt Iran. The biggest challenge for Riyadh in the coming year is to keep Russian adventures in the Middle East in check. The House of Saud enjoys their current situation and don’t want the Russians mucking things up. All in all expect Saudi Arabia to have a good 2009.
Arab Gulf States (sans Saudi Arabia)
The Arab Gulf States are comprised of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, U.A.E., Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. Saudi Arabia was considered separate because of the size of its economy and importance globally. In the case of the remaining states all have small populations and large incomes thanks to large petroleum reserves and a steady stream of foreign investment. It is unlikely that any major changes will take place in any of these nations and should continue to be safe for business development and other investment.
Yemen
The country of Yemen is in trouble. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has made a return thanks to the release of members from Guantanamo. Because of the complexity of Yemen a full analysis will follow.
Middle East
Israel-Palestine
Since the Israeli air raids on Gaza are dominating the headlines we can start with the Eastern Mediterranean. Israel has had a temporary cease fire with Hamas controlled Gaza for the last 16 months; however rocket attacks originating from Gaza has forced the Israeli government to respond. In contrast to the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah-Hamas war, Israel only has one front to deal with and thus little incentive to stop the current operation. Although Israel engaged in a ground invasion of the Gaza Strip, the goals of the operation have not been clearly and thus success cannot be determined. The likely outcome is that Hamas will be hurt but not completely destroyed. In the West Bank we can expect to see the Fatah movement gain strength at the expense of Hamas. Hamas is a terrorist group without any experience governing and it shows in this current crisis. Israel will continue along the status quo with a few interventions by western politicians trying to bring peace. The wildcard for Israel in 2009 will be Hezbollah; it is very possible another war with the Lebanese terror group could breakout.
Syria-Lebanon
Syria has been working with the Europeans and Turkey to hammer out a peace deal with Israel. As I have argued before, Syria has lost its most recent patron – Iran – and now must look to other avenues for economic growth. For this to work Syria must drop the rogue regime act, recognize Lebanon as an independent nation, and reign in terrorist groups (i.e. Hezbollah) that operate under Syria’s watch. Once this is accomplished a peace deal with Israel is a very real possibility in the next two to three years.
The biggest challenge for Syria is Hezbollah. Hezbollah has grown significantly and has proven it can intimidate the Lebanese government and threaten Israel conventionally. The onus is on Damascus to weaken Hezbollah to the point that is cannot threaten the Lebanese government or Israel. In the middle of all this is Lebanon. Lebanon is a country fractured by warfare from a variety of sectarian groups and only knows order when a third party intervenes. Previously that third party had been the Syrians, but that changed with the March 14th democratic movement. Unfortunately, the existence of Hezbollah and the devastation that resulted from the 2006 war with Israel has brought nothing but trouble for this experiment in democracy. For Lebanon to become a stable nation it will take the dismantling of Hezbollah and substantial outside assistance. Since this is unlikely to happen in the coming year Lebanon will be forced to continue limping along. Syria’s fortunes on the other hand are completely dependent upon third party diplomacy and the resolution of the Israeli political mess.
Turkey
Since the removal of Saddam Hussein, Turkey has managed to spread its influence in Iraq, Syria, and even Iran. Turkey has also opened the door towards reconciliation with Albania – a very sensitive topic as the U.S. congress recently found out. The reasoning behind Turkey’s diplomatic initiatives are two-fold, one is looking for alternative oil and natural gas avenues for supplying Europe to break the Russian monopoly on hydrocarbons, and two Turkey looks for any way it can to piss off the Russians despite the two nations being trading partners. Look for Turkey to come out of the global financial crisis stronger and more relevant in the Middle East and Europe.
Iraq
Throughout history the one factor that has started more wars than other is simple geography. Therefore it is no coincidence that Iraq, considered the birthplace of civilization, will be a powerful nation. In the past, wars over this piece of real estate came down to simple location. Iraq was a source of water and all major trade routes went through this area. Today water is still an important resource, but coupled with large oil reserves and other natural resources Iraq stands poised to once again become the regional power player in the ME.
The last five years in Iraq have seen shifting political loyalties with the numerous tribes throwing their lot in with whoever had the most money or guns. But as the U.S. surge went on the Iraqi government has managed to consolidate power through numerous backroom deals. The Iraqi security forces have also gained from the political progress and have become largely self reliant. Perhaps the issue that is most pressing in the U.S. – Iraqi relationship is the future role that the U.S. military will play. On the ground the Iraqis are steady improving militarily, but are still lacking a meaningful air force and have only recently begun training for casualty evacuation. What does look promising is the potential sales of the M-1 Abrams main battle tank to the Iraqi military. If the U.S. is not directly involved in security operations the sales of equipment may prove to be the decisive factor for the central government of Iraq to hold the country together.
Iraq has seen great improvement both on the economic and security fronts, but still has room for improvement. Unemployment is high and security operations are still ongoing in parts of the nation. While al-Qaeda has had its presence in Iraq diminished significantly, the organization still poses a threat. But these challenges can be overcome. The high price of oil this summer together with the increased production out of Iraq has helped boost the popularity of the government. The Prime Minister has personally walked around Baghdad handing out money on several occasions. Gestures such as this will only help to solidify the position of the government. The high price of oil may have been a positive for Iraq but the country still must meet the challenge of diversifying its economy and fostering foreign investment if it is to live up to the countries potential of being a regional powerhouse.
Iran
Iran is in bad shape economically. Inflation is around 20 percent, unemployment is in the double digits, and 18 percent of the population lives in extreme poverty. The Iranian nuclear program has increased these problems by bringing international sanctions against Iranian banks and its wealthiest citizens. Additional problems include government sponsored gas subsidies in the face of high oil prices. Now that oil prices have fallen, Iran has been forced to rewrite its budget for 2009. Iran may be a top exporter of petroleum, but is also a major importer of refined products such as gasoline. In other words, Iran is increasingly vulnerable to international pressure and possibly revolution.
With Iran as isolated as it is and with international sanctions steadily increasing over the nuclear program one would think that military action is inevitable when in fact the opposite is true. Israel has made statements that it will not allow Iran to construct a nuclear weapon and will use force to stop it, but it lacks the military capability to do so. A U.S. led operation is really the only possibility should a military confrontation with Iran take place. The Pentagon has stated that it could destroy the Iranian military in three days, but the U.S. does not see Iran as much of a threat and thus will not make a move in the near future. Even without military action taken against it and new elections coming in the spring, 2009 will be a very bad year for Tehran.
Saudi Arabia
The rapid increase and subsequent decrease in oil prices has not hurt the Saudi Kingdom. In fact, the low oil prices are working to keep Saudi Arabia’s main rival – Iran – weak. Currently the Saudi’s have a cash reserve of about one trillion U.S. dollars and is looking to put that money to use in areas such as expanding oil production or supporting Chechen rebels against Russia. If the Saudi’s are able to expand their proven oil reserves and construct new storage facilities the country will have the ability to cut oil prices overnight to hurt Iran. The biggest challenge for Riyadh in the coming year is to keep Russian adventures in the Middle East in check. The House of Saud enjoys their current situation and don’t want the Russians mucking things up. All in all expect Saudi Arabia to have a good 2009.
Arab Gulf States (sans Saudi Arabia)
The Arab Gulf States are comprised of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, U.A.E., Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. Saudi Arabia was considered separate because of the size of its economy and importance globally. In the case of the remaining states all have small populations and large incomes thanks to large petroleum reserves and a steady stream of foreign investment. It is unlikely that any major changes will take place in any of these nations and should continue to be safe for business development and other investment.
Yemen
The country of Yemen is in trouble. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has made a return thanks to the release of members from Guantanamo. Because of the complexity of Yemen a full analysis will follow.
Friday, January 2, 2009
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam: A Primer
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or LTTE for short, is a separatist group based in Sri Lanka that has been fighting the majority Buddhist Sinhalese Government of the island nation since 1983. While the group was founded in 1976, it is the LTTE ambush of a military patrol that killed 13 in 1983 that is seen as the first battle of the civil war in Sri Lanka. In 2002, the LTTE and the government signed a cease-fire agreement that temporarily ended the violence only to see tensions erupt again in 2006 over the distribution of international aid that poured into the country after the 2004 tsunami. It is true that the LTTE have participated in peace talks; however their deliberate targeting of civilians and oppressive rule in the areas that group controls is what earns the Tigers the moniker of international terrorist organization. A 1999 estimate of deaths resulting from the fighting between the government and the LTTE came to about 60,000.
Leadership in the group is broken down into two tiers which include a military wing and a political wing that is subordinate. The leader and founder of the LTTE, Velupillai Prabhakaran, heads the central governing committee that oversees both wings. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, the central governing committee is also responsible for directing and controlling several specific subdivisions, including, an amphibious group (the Sea Tigers), an airborne group, (known as the Air Tigers), an elite fighting wing (known as the Charles Anthony Regiment), a suicide commando unit (the Black Tigers), a highly secretive intelligence group and a political office headed by Thamilselvam and Anton Balasingham, widely regarded to be the political advisor and ideologue of the LTTE. Additionally, the central governing committee has an international wing which runs the group’s global infrastructure. In all, the group is comprised of about 16,000 people according to the Sri Lankan government. Children soldiers are often forcibly recruited into the group to keep the number of members high.
The LTTE are unique among terrorist groups for several reasons among which are: The ability to govern provinces in the north and east of their home nation, the existence of an air force and navy (these elements are small but very effective), and the tactical capabilities to directly engage government troops. Perhaps the most startling revelation about the group is their invention of the suicide bomber vest and belt. In fact, while we often link suicide bombing to Palestinian terrorist groups it was the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) that dispatched several members to Sri Lanka in the 1980’s to learn this tactic for use against Israel. This tactic pioneered in the remote jungles of Sri Lanka has now become a nearly universally adopted weapon employed by terrorists around the world.
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam have also proven to be quite adept in the art of assassination. For instance, the LTTE assassinated Indian Premier Rajiv Gandhi when peace keepers from India arrived in Sri Lanka to offer counterinsurgency aid to the local military. The LTTE also managed to kill Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993. Others assassinated by the LTTE include:
In recent months the Sri Lankan government has managed to cause significant damage to the group via military and financial means. Since the beginning of the U.S. led War on Terror, terrorist groups that are designated as such by the U.S. State Department will be targeted financially through new legislation in countries allied with the U.S. and through the U.N. While these measures have hurt the group in countries where it used to operate freely, the LTTE has used illicit means, such as drug running, to augment their income. These measures have aided the Sri Lankan government greatly in their twenty plus war with the group. It should be noted however, that the LTTE has managed to survive international pressure and infighting throughout its 32 year history and will not go away quietly.
Today, government forces have managed to capture the de facto capital of the Tamal separatists in the northern part of the country. This is a significant blow to the terrorist organization, but a political solution is still needed to bring peace to a country that has been in a perpetual state of war for nearly forty years.
Leadership in the group is broken down into two tiers which include a military wing and a political wing that is subordinate. The leader and founder of the LTTE, Velupillai Prabhakaran, heads the central governing committee that oversees both wings. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, the central governing committee is also responsible for directing and controlling several specific subdivisions, including, an amphibious group (the Sea Tigers), an airborne group, (known as the Air Tigers), an elite fighting wing (known as the Charles Anthony Regiment), a suicide commando unit (the Black Tigers), a highly secretive intelligence group and a political office headed by Thamilselvam and Anton Balasingham, widely regarded to be the political advisor and ideologue of the LTTE. Additionally, the central governing committee has an international wing which runs the group’s global infrastructure. In all, the group is comprised of about 16,000 people according to the Sri Lankan government. Children soldiers are often forcibly recruited into the group to keep the number of members high.
The LTTE are unique among terrorist groups for several reasons among which are: The ability to govern provinces in the north and east of their home nation, the existence of an air force and navy (these elements are small but very effective), and the tactical capabilities to directly engage government troops. Perhaps the most startling revelation about the group is their invention of the suicide bomber vest and belt. In fact, while we often link suicide bombing to Palestinian terrorist groups it was the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) that dispatched several members to Sri Lanka in the 1980’s to learn this tactic for use against Israel. This tactic pioneered in the remote jungles of Sri Lanka has now become a nearly universally adopted weapon employed by terrorists around the world.
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam have also proven to be quite adept in the art of assassination. For instance, the LTTE assassinated Indian Premier Rajiv Gandhi when peace keepers from India arrived in Sri Lanka to offer counterinsurgency aid to the local military. The LTTE also managed to kill Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993. Others assassinated by the LTTE include:
Alfred Duraiyappah, mayor of Jaffna in the attack that brought them to prominence in 1975
Ranjan Wijeratne, Sri Lankan cabinet minister, former general, and the Minister of Defense
Lalith Athulathmudali, Sri Lankan cabinet minister
Gamini Dissanayake, Sri Lankan presidential candidate
Major Gen. Parami Kulatunga, third-highest ranking officer in the Sri Lankan Army
Lakshman Kadirgamar, Sri Lankan foreign minister, lawyer and international humanitarian
In recent months the Sri Lankan government has managed to cause significant damage to the group via military and financial means. Since the beginning of the U.S. led War on Terror, terrorist groups that are designated as such by the U.S. State Department will be targeted financially through new legislation in countries allied with the U.S. and through the U.N. While these measures have hurt the group in countries where it used to operate freely, the LTTE has used illicit means, such as drug running, to augment their income. These measures have aided the Sri Lankan government greatly in their twenty plus war with the group. It should be noted however, that the LTTE has managed to survive international pressure and infighting throughout its 32 year history and will not go away quietly.
Today, government forces have managed to capture the de facto capital of the Tamal separatists in the northern part of the country. This is a significant blow to the terrorist organization, but a political solution is still needed to bring peace to a country that has been in a perpetual state of war for nearly forty years.
Wednesday, December 24, 2008
Terrorism in a Nuclear South Asia
Gurkha, flying a swift and powerful vimana hurled a single projectile charged with all the power of the universe. An incandescent column of smoke and flame as bright as the thousand suns rose in all its splendor... a perpendicular explosion with its billowing smoke clouds......the cloud of smoke rising after its first explosion formed into expanding round circles like the opening of giant parasols... ...it was an unknown weapon, an iron thunderbolt, a gigantic messenger of death, which reduced to ashes the entire race of the Vrishnis and the Andhakas....The corpses were so burned as to be unrecognizable. The hair and nails fell out; pottery broke without apparent cause, and the birds turned white. After a few hours all foodstuffs were infected... ...to escape from this fire the soldiers threw themselves in streams to wash themselves and their equipment. – Mahabharata: (4th c. BC)
Men are not disturbed by things, but by the view they take of things. – Epictetus
Since the terrorist attacks on the city of Mumbai tensions between India and Pakistan have once again reached the point where war is becoming a very real possibility. What makes the ongoing conflict in South Asia so worrying to the world at large is the possibility that these two countries will use their nuclear arsenals if pushed to an as of yet determined threshold. Currently, this is unlikely, but when the respective nuclear doctrine of both countries is considered it can appear that any provocation by India will result in Pakistan taking the conflict to the nuclear level. Nuclear doctrines are meant to outline when and how a nuclear power will use their ultimate weapon, but they can often seem ambiguous and leave much to be desired.
When discussing nuclear doctrine, phrases such as mutually assured destruction or flexible response come to mind, but one must remember these are merely titles and are not necessarily indicative of an entire doctrine. In fact, it is difficult for any doctrine to truly stand up against scrutiny because of its very nature. A major factor that further compounds analysis is that a nuclear doctrine has never been employed because a nuclear exchange has never taken place. With this in mind, how can one ever be sure of how a nation will react in the face of an impending nuclear war? The answer is that we simply do not know because doctrines are merely guidelines since neither the author nor the individual employing the doctrine know if it will hold up under the circumstances that their nation will face. This is the aforementioned ambiguity inherent in any nuclear doctrine.
Nuclear doctrines are written with the purpose of sowing confusion among a nations adversaries and promoting deterrence which is why they appear ambiguous and at times irrational. Nations are not likely to go to war with one another if victory, not to mention survival, does not appear possible thus creating the deterrent atmosphere that is sought by the possession of nuclear weapons. In essence what happens is not only a deterrent to war but also a constraint on how a nation will behave.
While the possession of nuclear weapons by both Pakistan and India has limited the type of conflict these nations engage in it does not eliminate conflict altogether. Since both nations held nuclear tests in May 1998, the conflict has become one of low intensity occasionally culminating in a terrorist attack that pushes India to the verge of taking military action against their western neighbor. Since 1998 New Delhi and Islamabad have come close to conventional conflict several times only to have the U.S. step in and play the role of peacemaker. The outcome of this mediation is always the same; India makes demands that they know Pakistan either will not or cannot carry out while Pakistan makes token gestures that only ensure the nations’ short-term survival. This is the status quo in South Asia and as history shows this type of unstable peace cannot last.
This paper will explore how the respective nuclear doctrines of India and Pakistan have on the one hand made a conventional war politically difficult while on the other has led to the rise of terrorist groups as the new arbiters of war and peace in the South Asian region.
India
Nuclear Doctrine
India detonated their first nuclear device in 1974, but did not enter into full scale production much later to continue research on the more powerful thermonuclear weapons (this became public in 1989). This move towards obtaining a nuclear arsenal was spurred on by the 1962 border war with China and the subsequent Chinese nuclear tests carried out in 1964. When tensions with Pakistan rose again in 1990, both countries were on the verge of ramping up research and beginning production only to have the crisis brought to an end by international intervention. Although this crisis was averted, it appears it was this event that prompted both India and Pakistan to continue their respective nuclear research with the goal of deterrence. In furtherance of this goal both nations conducted full scale nuclear tests in May 1998. It was after these tests that India produced an interim nuclear doctrine in 1999 and subsequently adopted the document with a few revisions in 2003. The doctrine was created with a focus on China and New Delhi’s main rival Pakistan.
While the Indian nuclear doctrine is several pages long it only contains a few salient features that bear mentioning. The first is the prohibition of a First Strike, second is the concept of massive retaliation, and the third is the choice not to distinguish between any weapons of mass destruction. The third feature simply means that India reserves the right to retaliate with nuclear weapons if they are struck with chemical or biological weapons. All these features work towards the same goal – deterrence.
Perhaps the most important factor in India’s nuclear doctrine is the prohibition of first use, or stated more plainly, India will not launch a first strike. In India’s doctrine the phrase used is actually, ‘retaliation only.’ Former Prime Minister Vajpayee’s statement made in the Indian Parliament that “India does not intend to use these weapons for aggression or for making threats against any country, these are weapons of self-defense, to ensure that India is not subjected to nuclear threats or coercion” may serve to clarify the relevance of a nuclear arsenal, but again reality trumps written doctrine. The reality is that India is under the coercion of non-state actors that were created and nurtured by Pakistan and has very little room to negate this criminal influence in international affairs because Pakistan is also a nuclear power. By stating that a nuclear arsenal is for ‘retaliation only’ without considering the unique dynamics of the south Asian conflict, India has in fact undermined the very reason they have stated for maintaining a nuclear arsenal.
The decision against using a first strike is only a single part of the nuclear doctrine. India states the overall goal of their nuclear arsenal is to provide ‘credible minimal deterrence.’ In the context of nuclear states, the word credible is applied to nations that have openly declared their possession of nuclear weapons and verifiably tested at least one such device, while minimal simply means that a nation will not produce more weapons than are deemed necessary. Once again we are struck with the ambiguity of nuclear terminology. In the current context the international community is expected to believe that the mere possession of nuclear weapons and not the will to use such weapons is what is deemed credible. This is not to mean that a nation must immediately use a nuclear weapon or device against an adversary to establish credibility, but instead shows just how generalized these words are.
Outside of the rhetoric one would expect to find in a nuclear doctrine is an interesting entry in paragraph 2.4 of the Objectives section:
2.4. The fundamental purpose of Indian nuclear weapons is to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by any state or entity against India and its forces. India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.
This section is interesting because it allows for the possibility that a non-state actor could acquire a nuclear weapon or device. This entry is aimed directly at Pakistan. If the Pakistani state fails India wants to be sure that they have recourse in the event that their adversary’s arsenal falls into the wrong hands. After all, nuclear weapons in the hands of a non-state entity do not have to be used to be effective.
India has chosen to add a concept known as massive retaliation to their doctrine. This means that India may not be the first to use a nuclear weapon, but will retaliate to inflict unacceptable damage upon the aggressor. Paragraph 2.3 of the Objectives section states:
2.3. India shall pursue a doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence. In this policy of “retaliation only,” the survivability of our arsenal is critical. This is a dynamic concept related to the strategic environment, technological imperatives and the needs of national security. The actual size, components, deployment and employment of nuclear forces will be decided in the light of these factors. India’s peacetime posture aims at convincing any potential aggressor that:
a. any threat of use of nuclear weapons against India shall involve measures to counter the threat; and
b. any nuclear attack on India and its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor.
India knows that it must have the ability to respond to threats against its sovereignty with conventional forces. When India decides to employ their conventional military it may not always be on Indian soil; therefore it becomes imperative that India extend their doctrine of massive retaliation to nuclear attacks against the Indian military.
To be fair to it should be stated that India is the only nuclear power to articulate a nuclear doctrine and release it in full to the public thus opening up the document to criticism. While it is true that nuclear powers have stated their views and strategy in the past, they have never released an actual doctrine explaining the role of nuclear weapons in their overall strategy.
Pakistan
Nuclear Doctrine
Pakistan has never officially articulated a nuclear doctrine nor have they come close to enunciating a statement as to how and when nuclear weapons will be used. A statement by Dr. Shireen Mazari, Director General at the Strategic Studies Institute – Islamabad, is telling:
The papers chosen for review were selected by the proximity each author has to the Pakistani military, and by extension, to the nuclear program. To begin with, Pakistan has stated that they will not launch a first strike with their strategic nuclear weapons. In a newspaper interview former Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf stated:
After reviewing material relevant to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal a rudimentary doctrine can be compiled. This is not meant to be representative of Pakistani policy, but rather a compilation of interests and capabilities demonstrated by Pakistan’s military and political establishment. The elements of nuclear employment may be as follows:
Given the poor state of communications within Pakistan the Head of State may not have the ability to give the command to launch or stand down to elements in the field armed with a tactical nuclear weapon. It is in the scenario that General Lodi suggests that:
As previously mentioned Pakistan has not published an official nuclear doctrine because Islamabad feels it adds to their deterrent capabilities. After careful research into the Pakistani nuclear program it appears that the choice not to publish a doctrine is less about deterrence and more about nonchalance. The statement by a British official that the Pakistani’s, ‘think a nuclear weapon is just a bigger artillery piece’ is rather revealing in this case and does little to instill confidence in Islamabad’s control over its nuclear program.
India’s Limited Warfare Approach
In the face of a fracturing Pakistan, India may no longer be left with any other option than to respond to rogue elements of the Pakistani intelligence service supporting terrorist groups. If India fails to respond effectively to the Mumbai attacks the government may find itself in peril; after all governments have failed over lesser matters. Since India’s counterterrorism efforts have yet to mature, a conventional response becomes the most likely avenue of ensuring security. If India responds via conventional military means it has a number of options at its disposal – at least on paper. Since the behavior of adversarial nations changes with the inclusion of nuclear weapons, it becomes prudent to list the conventional options in a non-nuclear context. This means only conventional options will be chosen based upon their ability to prevent escalation.
India has conventional military assets in the form of land, air, and sea power, but the use of these assets must be limited to prevent escalation. In fact, India will most likely use land and air assets to attack targets across the Kashmir Line of Control thus preventing Pakistan from responding too harshly. If India were to go after symbols of the Pakistani state such as military or intelligence headquarters, Pakistan may have to respond with a conventional strike of their own for domestic political reasons. That being said it is likely that India will engage terrorist enclaves in Pakistan using precision strikes from the air with special operations forces targeting from the ground. Any large troop movements across the Line of Control would simply be too provocative.
Another option would be the targeting of the Pakistani economy which is in a perpetually fragile state. This option is difficult since the Pakistani response is unknown. Pakistan has a population over 168 million people in an area the size of New England and any economic blockade could lead to Islamabad taking extreme measures to prevent social unrest. Considering Islamabad’s current economic woes, any military action taken to blockade Pakistan could result in rapid escalation with disastrous consequences – something that India would be looking to avoid. Both India and Pakistan lack modern early warning system, but it really doesn’t matter since a launch of a strategic nuclear weapon would only take four to eight minutes to reach its target. India would be best advised to prevent to use of strategic missiles with convention warheads as Pakistan could be forced to launch their strategic nuclear weapons based on a misperception.
Terrorism in a Nuclear Context
India has suffered significant loss at the hands of Pakistani trained terrorists from the attack on the Indian Parliament to the more recent attacks in Mumbai. Pakistan’s statement that it will not use their nuclear arsenal as a political tool rings hollow in the face of these continued attacks because India knows that if New Delhi carries out a conventional retaliatory strike against Pakistani targets the conflict could go to the nuclear level rather quickly. India knows full well that Pakistan intends to use a nuclear weapon to halt an Indian attack forcing New Delhi to often just absorb the attack and move on.
India also knows Pakistan is falling apart. Islamabad’s continued support of Islamism that helped appease tribal entities for so many years has caused to opposite to occur in the last decade. India understands that Pakistan has limited control over the terrorist groups that the ISI created, but New Delhi also knows it cannot continue to absorb these attacks. This situation has placed India in a strange predicament – India cannot allow their foe Pakistan to fall apart because the situation would worsen, but India would like to see Pakistan pushed to the point where terrorist support becomes a strategic liability.
The various non-state factions operating in Pakistan may use several different names, but they are bound by geography, ethnicity, and ideology. Currently, the focus of the Indo-Pakistani conflict is focused on the respective nation-states, but the Islamists have the upper hand and are dictating events. If India decides to strike targets in Pakistan it will be because a former tool of Islamabad has gone off the reservation and is operating independently of their former masters. This reality is not lost on the Islamists. The Islamists know that if they can force India to attack Pakistan they will then stand a better chance of gaining further autonomy and influence in the state. Unfortunately this situation is lost in the bigger conflict between the two nuclear powers. Currently there are rumblings of Indian troop build ups in Kashmir in the northern area of the Thar Desert. On the Pakistani side, Islamabad has replaced border patrol troops with regular army units. These types of troop movements are often a sign of war preparation.
The Indian deadline for Pakistan to hand over individuals suspected of involvement in the Mumbai attacks is set to expire on December 26. What happens after that date is anybody’s guess. What is known is that two nuclear powers are on the brink of war over a terrorist attack that Islamabad probably did not order and India cannot ignore. Clearly, the Islamists have the upper hand.
Men are not disturbed by things, but by the view they take of things. – Epictetus
Since the terrorist attacks on the city of Mumbai tensions between India and Pakistan have once again reached the point where war is becoming a very real possibility. What makes the ongoing conflict in South Asia so worrying to the world at large is the possibility that these two countries will use their nuclear arsenals if pushed to an as of yet determined threshold. Currently, this is unlikely, but when the respective nuclear doctrine of both countries is considered it can appear that any provocation by India will result in Pakistan taking the conflict to the nuclear level. Nuclear doctrines are meant to outline when and how a nuclear power will use their ultimate weapon, but they can often seem ambiguous and leave much to be desired.
When discussing nuclear doctrine, phrases such as mutually assured destruction or flexible response come to mind, but one must remember these are merely titles and are not necessarily indicative of an entire doctrine. In fact, it is difficult for any doctrine to truly stand up against scrutiny because of its very nature. A major factor that further compounds analysis is that a nuclear doctrine has never been employed because a nuclear exchange has never taken place. With this in mind, how can one ever be sure of how a nation will react in the face of an impending nuclear war? The answer is that we simply do not know because doctrines are merely guidelines since neither the author nor the individual employing the doctrine know if it will hold up under the circumstances that their nation will face. This is the aforementioned ambiguity inherent in any nuclear doctrine.
Nuclear doctrines are written with the purpose of sowing confusion among a nations adversaries and promoting deterrence which is why they appear ambiguous and at times irrational. Nations are not likely to go to war with one another if victory, not to mention survival, does not appear possible thus creating the deterrent atmosphere that is sought by the possession of nuclear weapons. In essence what happens is not only a deterrent to war but also a constraint on how a nation will behave.
While the possession of nuclear weapons by both Pakistan and India has limited the type of conflict these nations engage in it does not eliminate conflict altogether. Since both nations held nuclear tests in May 1998, the conflict has become one of low intensity occasionally culminating in a terrorist attack that pushes India to the verge of taking military action against their western neighbor. Since 1998 New Delhi and Islamabad have come close to conventional conflict several times only to have the U.S. step in and play the role of peacemaker. The outcome of this mediation is always the same; India makes demands that they know Pakistan either will not or cannot carry out while Pakistan makes token gestures that only ensure the nations’ short-term survival. This is the status quo in South Asia and as history shows this type of unstable peace cannot last.
This paper will explore how the respective nuclear doctrines of India and Pakistan have on the one hand made a conventional war politically difficult while on the other has led to the rise of terrorist groups as the new arbiters of war and peace in the South Asian region.
India
Nuclear Doctrine
India detonated their first nuclear device in 1974, but did not enter into full scale production much later to continue research on the more powerful thermonuclear weapons (this became public in 1989). This move towards obtaining a nuclear arsenal was spurred on by the 1962 border war with China and the subsequent Chinese nuclear tests carried out in 1964. When tensions with Pakistan rose again in 1990, both countries were on the verge of ramping up research and beginning production only to have the crisis brought to an end by international intervention. Although this crisis was averted, it appears it was this event that prompted both India and Pakistan to continue their respective nuclear research with the goal of deterrence. In furtherance of this goal both nations conducted full scale nuclear tests in May 1998. It was after these tests that India produced an interim nuclear doctrine in 1999 and subsequently adopted the document with a few revisions in 2003. The doctrine was created with a focus on China and New Delhi’s main rival Pakistan.
While the Indian nuclear doctrine is several pages long it only contains a few salient features that bear mentioning. The first is the prohibition of a First Strike, second is the concept of massive retaliation, and the third is the choice not to distinguish between any weapons of mass destruction. The third feature simply means that India reserves the right to retaliate with nuclear weapons if they are struck with chemical or biological weapons. All these features work towards the same goal – deterrence.
Perhaps the most important factor in India’s nuclear doctrine is the prohibition of first use, or stated more plainly, India will not launch a first strike. In India’s doctrine the phrase used is actually, ‘retaliation only.’ Former Prime Minister Vajpayee’s statement made in the Indian Parliament that “India does not intend to use these weapons for aggression or for making threats against any country, these are weapons of self-defense, to ensure that India is not subjected to nuclear threats or coercion” may serve to clarify the relevance of a nuclear arsenal, but again reality trumps written doctrine. The reality is that India is under the coercion of non-state actors that were created and nurtured by Pakistan and has very little room to negate this criminal influence in international affairs because Pakistan is also a nuclear power. By stating that a nuclear arsenal is for ‘retaliation only’ without considering the unique dynamics of the south Asian conflict, India has in fact undermined the very reason they have stated for maintaining a nuclear arsenal.
The decision against using a first strike is only a single part of the nuclear doctrine. India states the overall goal of their nuclear arsenal is to provide ‘credible minimal deterrence.’ In the context of nuclear states, the word credible is applied to nations that have openly declared their possession of nuclear weapons and verifiably tested at least one such device, while minimal simply means that a nation will not produce more weapons than are deemed necessary. Once again we are struck with the ambiguity of nuclear terminology. In the current context the international community is expected to believe that the mere possession of nuclear weapons and not the will to use such weapons is what is deemed credible. This is not to mean that a nation must immediately use a nuclear weapon or device against an adversary to establish credibility, but instead shows just how generalized these words are.
Outside of the rhetoric one would expect to find in a nuclear doctrine is an interesting entry in paragraph 2.4 of the Objectives section:
2.4. The fundamental purpose of Indian nuclear weapons is to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by any state or entity against India and its forces. India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.
This section is interesting because it allows for the possibility that a non-state actor could acquire a nuclear weapon or device. This entry is aimed directly at Pakistan. If the Pakistani state fails India wants to be sure that they have recourse in the event that their adversary’s arsenal falls into the wrong hands. After all, nuclear weapons in the hands of a non-state entity do not have to be used to be effective.
India has chosen to add a concept known as massive retaliation to their doctrine. This means that India may not be the first to use a nuclear weapon, but will retaliate to inflict unacceptable damage upon the aggressor. Paragraph 2.3 of the Objectives section states:
2.3. India shall pursue a doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence. In this policy of “retaliation only,” the survivability of our arsenal is critical. This is a dynamic concept related to the strategic environment, technological imperatives and the needs of national security. The actual size, components, deployment and employment of nuclear forces will be decided in the light of these factors. India’s peacetime posture aims at convincing any potential aggressor that:
a. any threat of use of nuclear weapons against India shall involve measures to counter the threat; and
b. any nuclear attack on India and its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor.
India knows that it must have the ability to respond to threats against its sovereignty with conventional forces. When India decides to employ their conventional military it may not always be on Indian soil; therefore it becomes imperative that India extend their doctrine of massive retaliation to nuclear attacks against the Indian military.
To be fair to it should be stated that India is the only nuclear power to articulate a nuclear doctrine and release it in full to the public thus opening up the document to criticism. While it is true that nuclear powers have stated their views and strategy in the past, they have never released an actual doctrine explaining the role of nuclear weapons in their overall strategy.
Pakistan
Nuclear Doctrine
Pakistan has never officially articulated a nuclear doctrine nor have they come close to enunciating a statement as to how and when nuclear weapons will be used. A statement by Dr. Shireen Mazari, Director General at the Strategic Studies Institute – Islamabad, is telling:
“Pakistan has chosen not to publicly enunciate a comprehensive nuclear doctrine partly because it does not see a political/status utility for the nuclear capability – rather, it envisages the nuclear capability as having a purely defensive, security-related purpose. Pakistan’s threat perceptions are seen as stemming primarily from India both at the level of all-out conventional war, limited war and low intensity conflict (LIC). Within the nuclear framework, Pakistan seeks to establish deterrence against all-out conventional war.”Further compounding this veil of secrecy is the unwillingness of the Pakistani Army to follow or let alone read a doctrine if it were published because it would be perceived to be too political. Fortunately, the Pakistani military establishment has published several papers by former military and academic leaders describing what a Pakistani nuclear doctrine might look like. The journal publications that have been selected for review in this paper are very similar in their assessments of a nuclear doctrine leading one to believe that a doctrine does indeed exist, but it is kept from public view to increase the pressure on India to refrain from using conventional forces against Pakistan. As previously stated this is normal in nuclear postures; however Pakistan takes it to a new level.
The papers chosen for review were selected by the proximity each author has to the Pakistani military, and by extension, to the nuclear program. To begin with, Pakistan has stated that they will not launch a first strike with their strategic nuclear weapons. In a newspaper interview former Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf stated:
"This is not Warsaw Pact versus NATO situation where warheads and missiles were ready for fire with a button in a hand. There is no button in our case… Missiles and warheads are not permitted together. They are separated. There is geographical separation between them. One has to go up to escalation ladder. Then comes this stage."While Pakistan may refrain from using their strategic weapons first they do not have any reservations about using tactical nuclear weapons to stop an invading army. This is because the Indian military outnumbers the Pakistani military substantially and Pakistan cannot conceive any method other than the use of a nuclear weapon to halt the invasion. Lt Gen (Ret) Sardar FS Lodi states in his paper Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine:
“In a deteriorating military situation when an Indian conventional attack is likely to break through our defenses or has already breached the main defense line causing a major set-back to the defenses, which cannot be restored by conventional means at our disposal, the government would be left with no other option except to use Nuclear Weapons to stabilize the situation. India's superiority in conventional arms and manpower would have to be offset by nuclear weapons. The political will to use nuclear weapons is essential to prevent a conventional armed conflict, which would later on escalate into a nuclear war.”Brig Gen (Ret) Saeed Ismat articulates a deteriorating situation more clearly. Ismat states that the Rajistan Desert, more commonly known as the Thar Desert, is the most likely avenue of invasion by conventional Indian forces. By taking this strategic area India could, in a matter of days, cut Pakistan in two, thus severing communications and dividing the remnants of the Pakistan’s military. It is in this case that Ismat states the Pakistani leadership would be left with no other option than to use a nuclear weapon to prevent the state from fracturing. While Ismat declares that the use of nuclear weapon would prevent Indian forces from severing Pakistan, he does not say how deep the invading army would have to penetrate before this would happen. The General also fails to say who should have authority to launch the weapon should the invading army advance too rapidly and communications with the civilian leadership are cutoff. The need for the delegation of authority in times of crisis will be discussed later, but General Ismat’s statements show that while a strategic objective can be defined generally the threshold for employing a nuclear weapon must be defined specifically.
After reviewing material relevant to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal a rudimentary doctrine can be compiled. This is not meant to be representative of Pakistani policy, but rather a compilation of interests and capabilities demonstrated by Pakistan’s military and political establishment. The elements of nuclear employment may be as follows:
1. Pakistan will not use strategic nuclear weapons in a First Strike.India’s doctrine describes not only how and when a nuclear weapon will be employed, but also who has control over the employment decision. This is not the case with Pakistan. Former Pakistani Army Chief Pervez Musharraf said the central command system to use nuclear and missile technology would be ready within one month after the nuclear tests of 1998. This didn’t happen, however because the civilian leadership did not want to integrate the military leadership into the command and control of the nuclear arsenal. This may have been one of the factors that led Musharraf to seize power and usher in an era of military dictatorship. Under Musharraf the National Command Authority was finally created in February 2000 and the authority to employ nuclear weapons was given to the Head of State.
2. If nuclear deterrent fails and the aggressor seizes the initiative to launch the First Strike, Pakistan shall hit back with its Second Strike ability.
3. If deterrent fails to prevent a convention invasion, Pakistan will first rely on conventional means to defend the nation.
4. If the invading military appears to be overrunning Pakistan’s military a public warning may be issued followed by a test detonation if time permits.
5. If the invading military does not halt the invasion, Pakistan will employ tactical nuclear weapons against the invading force on Pakistani soil.
6. Should the previous steps fail, Pakistan will launch strategic nuclear weapons against critical but purely military targets in India across the border from Pakistan in thinly populated areas in the desert or semi-desert, causing the least collateral damage.
7. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine with be defensive in nature with controlled escalation to allow for a political process to take place.
8. Pakistan’s response with be directly proportionate to the actions of enemy provocation and threat posed to Pakistan’s security.
Given the poor state of communications within Pakistan the Head of State may not have the ability to give the command to launch or stand down to elements in the field armed with a tactical nuclear weapon. It is in the scenario that General Lodi suggests that:
“Although the decision to employ the nuclear option is that of the government. Yet it must be decided before hand as to when and to whom would the authority to use nuclear weapons be delegated in a crisis situation. India our potential enemy has numerical superiority in conventional forces and would have the advantage of initiative as an aggressor, time would therefore be of essence to the defender with numerical inferiority. Delegation of authority to use the nuclear option would therefore be essential. It may eventually be given to the commander of forces in the field under specified circumstances depending on the course and direction in which the battle unfolds to our eventual disadvantage.”Although Lodi goes on to state that the government must decide before hand when and at what stage of a military conflict it would be forced to employ the nuclear option, this is hardly sufficient for a field commander who may feel compelled to use a nuclear weapon before a predefined threshold was crossed. A commander on a battlefield will have a very different view of a battle than a politician in Islamabad creating a situation that cannot be reconciled by any doctrine. While this approach would also have a deterrent value by sowing doubt in a potential adversary, in reality it cannot be employed reliably.
As previously mentioned Pakistan has not published an official nuclear doctrine because Islamabad feels it adds to their deterrent capabilities. After careful research into the Pakistani nuclear program it appears that the choice not to publish a doctrine is less about deterrence and more about nonchalance. The statement by a British official that the Pakistani’s, ‘think a nuclear weapon is just a bigger artillery piece’ is rather revealing in this case and does little to instill confidence in Islamabad’s control over its nuclear program.
India’s Limited Warfare Approach
In the face of a fracturing Pakistan, India may no longer be left with any other option than to respond to rogue elements of the Pakistani intelligence service supporting terrorist groups. If India fails to respond effectively to the Mumbai attacks the government may find itself in peril; after all governments have failed over lesser matters. Since India’s counterterrorism efforts have yet to mature, a conventional response becomes the most likely avenue of ensuring security. If India responds via conventional military means it has a number of options at its disposal – at least on paper. Since the behavior of adversarial nations changes with the inclusion of nuclear weapons, it becomes prudent to list the conventional options in a non-nuclear context. This means only conventional options will be chosen based upon their ability to prevent escalation.
India has conventional military assets in the form of land, air, and sea power, but the use of these assets must be limited to prevent escalation. In fact, India will most likely use land and air assets to attack targets across the Kashmir Line of Control thus preventing Pakistan from responding too harshly. If India were to go after symbols of the Pakistani state such as military or intelligence headquarters, Pakistan may have to respond with a conventional strike of their own for domestic political reasons. That being said it is likely that India will engage terrorist enclaves in Pakistan using precision strikes from the air with special operations forces targeting from the ground. Any large troop movements across the Line of Control would simply be too provocative.
Another option would be the targeting of the Pakistani economy which is in a perpetually fragile state. This option is difficult since the Pakistani response is unknown. Pakistan has a population over 168 million people in an area the size of New England and any economic blockade could lead to Islamabad taking extreme measures to prevent social unrest. Considering Islamabad’s current economic woes, any military action taken to blockade Pakistan could result in rapid escalation with disastrous consequences – something that India would be looking to avoid. Both India and Pakistan lack modern early warning system, but it really doesn’t matter since a launch of a strategic nuclear weapon would only take four to eight minutes to reach its target. India would be best advised to prevent to use of strategic missiles with convention warheads as Pakistan could be forced to launch their strategic nuclear weapons based on a misperception.
Terrorism in a Nuclear Context
India has suffered significant loss at the hands of Pakistani trained terrorists from the attack on the Indian Parliament to the more recent attacks in Mumbai. Pakistan’s statement that it will not use their nuclear arsenal as a political tool rings hollow in the face of these continued attacks because India knows that if New Delhi carries out a conventional retaliatory strike against Pakistani targets the conflict could go to the nuclear level rather quickly. India knows full well that Pakistan intends to use a nuclear weapon to halt an Indian attack forcing New Delhi to often just absorb the attack and move on.
India also knows Pakistan is falling apart. Islamabad’s continued support of Islamism that helped appease tribal entities for so many years has caused to opposite to occur in the last decade. India understands that Pakistan has limited control over the terrorist groups that the ISI created, but New Delhi also knows it cannot continue to absorb these attacks. This situation has placed India in a strange predicament – India cannot allow their foe Pakistan to fall apart because the situation would worsen, but India would like to see Pakistan pushed to the point where terrorist support becomes a strategic liability.
The various non-state factions operating in Pakistan may use several different names, but they are bound by geography, ethnicity, and ideology. Currently, the focus of the Indo-Pakistani conflict is focused on the respective nation-states, but the Islamists have the upper hand and are dictating events. If India decides to strike targets in Pakistan it will be because a former tool of Islamabad has gone off the reservation and is operating independently of their former masters. This reality is not lost on the Islamists. The Islamists know that if they can force India to attack Pakistan they will then stand a better chance of gaining further autonomy and influence in the state. Unfortunately this situation is lost in the bigger conflict between the two nuclear powers. Currently there are rumblings of Indian troop build ups in Kashmir in the northern area of the Thar Desert. On the Pakistani side, Islamabad has replaced border patrol troops with regular army units. These types of troop movements are often a sign of war preparation.
The Indian deadline for Pakistan to hand over individuals suspected of involvement in the Mumbai attacks is set to expire on December 26. What happens after that date is anybody’s guess. What is known is that two nuclear powers are on the brink of war over a terrorist attack that Islamabad probably did not order and India cannot ignore. Clearly, the Islamists have the upper hand.
Monday, December 1, 2008
The Mumbai Incident
I have been away the last few weeks because my father passed away. I have been working on another article that discusses the impact of oil prices on counterterrorism efforts and should have that up shortly.
Much has been written in the last few days with regards to the recent terrorist attack in Mumbai, so I will keep my comments brief. In my previous article I noted that the Pakistani government is weak and this attack will only add to the pressure they are facing, which in fact may have been part of the motivation to begin with. I will discuss that tactics of the operation later but first I would like to focus on the impending response by the Indian government.
India
India is one of the countries most brutalized by terrorism. In fact, according to an article in the Middle East Times, India has suffered well over 4,000 casualties from terrorism since 2004. Unfortunately that figure is about right. India is in the middle of a political campaign and the controlling party has been accused of being weak on terror, and as such faces a very real possibility of losing the upcoming elections, so a response is imminent.
Pakistan
With the government as weak as it is a coup is a very real possibility. The civilian government is out of money, has very little control over the country, and no control over the military. Speaking of a coup this early in the game is often times laughable, but with the dynamics that are in play Pakistan will inevitably get the shaft. Should India make any conventional incursions into Pakistan proper the military will be forced to respond and I doubt the civilian government can exercise any control over the decision making. If India faces little resistance the only way to stop an invasion would be the threat of using a nuclear weapon – Pakistan has nothing else.
Mumbai – A tactical perspective
The attacks that began Wednesday were carried out professionally, in a coordinated manner, and perhaps most stunningly, only required ten people. The Indian police have put the body count at almost 200 with hundreds more injured. The real story here is the target, however. Mumbai is a tourist destination and a large financial hub. By targeting Mumbai’s five-star hotels the attackers were sure to kill Westerners and hurt the city – and to a larger extent the country – financially.
The attackers only used small arms and explosives, a combination that works well when properly employed. This is the type of attack that keeps me up at night. For instance, think of an attack like this at an American mall or at Wal-Mart during black Friday. There is little that the targeted population can do to protect themselves and there is little the police or security forces can do to prevent it. If you can imagine a large crowd, probably numbering in the hundreds, gathering in the early morning waiting for the store to open when suddenly a suicide bomber detonates his vest – things get ugly really quick. So too did the attacks that struck Mumbai – only this attack is leading to a standoff between two nuclear powers.
Much has been written in the last few days with regards to the recent terrorist attack in Mumbai, so I will keep my comments brief. In my previous article I noted that the Pakistani government is weak and this attack will only add to the pressure they are facing, which in fact may have been part of the motivation to begin with. I will discuss that tactics of the operation later but first I would like to focus on the impending response by the Indian government.
India
India is one of the countries most brutalized by terrorism. In fact, according to an article in the Middle East Times, India has suffered well over 4,000 casualties from terrorism since 2004. Unfortunately that figure is about right. India is in the middle of a political campaign and the controlling party has been accused of being weak on terror, and as such faces a very real possibility of losing the upcoming elections, so a response is imminent.
Pakistan
With the government as weak as it is a coup is a very real possibility. The civilian government is out of money, has very little control over the country, and no control over the military. Speaking of a coup this early in the game is often times laughable, but with the dynamics that are in play Pakistan will inevitably get the shaft. Should India make any conventional incursions into Pakistan proper the military will be forced to respond and I doubt the civilian government can exercise any control over the decision making. If India faces little resistance the only way to stop an invasion would be the threat of using a nuclear weapon – Pakistan has nothing else.
Mumbai – A tactical perspective
The attacks that began Wednesday were carried out professionally, in a coordinated manner, and perhaps most stunningly, only required ten people. The Indian police have put the body count at almost 200 with hundreds more injured. The real story here is the target, however. Mumbai is a tourist destination and a large financial hub. By targeting Mumbai’s five-star hotels the attackers were sure to kill Westerners and hurt the city – and to a larger extent the country – financially.
The attackers only used small arms and explosives, a combination that works well when properly employed. This is the type of attack that keeps me up at night. For instance, think of an attack like this at an American mall or at Wal-Mart during black Friday. There is little that the targeted population can do to protect themselves and there is little the police or security forces can do to prevent it. If you can imagine a large crowd, probably numbering in the hundreds, gathering in the early morning waiting for the store to open when suddenly a suicide bomber detonates his vest – things get ugly really quick. So too did the attacks that struck Mumbai – only this attack is leading to a standoff between two nuclear powers.
Thursday, October 16, 2008
Feeling the Squeeze
Since the ‘surge’ in Iraq has produced an improved security situation media reports have once again focused on the war in Afghanistan. These reports have painted the Afghan theater as a lost cause that cannot be won or even brought to a palatable conclusion. The media tends to take a one dimensional approach to news coverage and often overlooks the numerous dynamics that are in play. This doesn’t mean that the situation in Afghanistan is rosy however, but before an assessment can be made the situation must be dissected.
Afghanistan, Pakistan, the U.S., and the Taliban are suffering from a prolonged war that has gone on for seven years now. While at the onset of the war on terror 80 percent of al-Qaeda prime was destroyed the core leadership has managed to elude capture and the people in the regions that they are taking refuge are paying the price. Regardless of this success here is the current situation:
In the process of the war Afghanistan has gained a new government, but it is weak and unable to build a consensus among the numerous warlords that call the country home.
The U.S. is looking to draw down troops in Iraq and move several brigade combat teams to the Afghan theater, but troop strength alone will not be enough and the military command knows it.
Pakistan has lost significant influence in Afghanistan, is facing an insurgency at home, and India – their primary adversary – has moved troops and advanced aircraft into Kashmir. India has also invested significantly in Afghanistan thus expanding their influence on two of Pakistan’s borders. Additionally, China has moved troops into the Xinjiang province – which borders Pakistan – to crack down on the Muslim Uyghurs which Islamabad has supported in the past. Though Pakistan and China are occasional allies, China is not happy with the Washington – Islamabad alliance. All told Pakistan is not in good shape.
The Taliban have been getting hammered by the U.S. for seven years, but have managed to survive and occasionally regroup. The Taliban, it should be noted, are not a single homogenous group, but rather several Pashtun tribes that have embraced the Deobandi form of Islam that is the foundation of the Taliban ideology. In essence it would take the defeat or destruction of an entire ethnic group to claim victory over the Taliban. Simply put, that will not happen.
Each player in the Afghan theater is feeling the squeeze and something has to give – soon.
Taliban looking for peace?
Several news reports have claimed that a delegation of Afghan government officials and Afghan Taliban representatives met in Saudi Arabia to discuss the prospect of peace at the behest of Saudi King Abdullah. This comes on the heels of the Afghan president Karzai and some high ranking NATO officers calling for peace negotiations with the Taliban. In spite of the reports both the Afghan government and the Afghan Taliban have claimed that a meeting did occur, but there was no discussion of peace or national reconciliation. That being said I doubt that they met to discuss the weather.
Afghanistan needs forge a path towards national reconciliation and that includes that Taliban. Those that are loyal to the Taliban know that they cannot defeat the foreign forces in Afghanistan and waiting for the foreigners to leave while their people suffer from war is not an option either. The only available option is for the government and the Afghan Taliban to come to an accord whether it is politically palatable for the foreign forces or not.
It is interesting to note that the representatives of the Taliban that attended the meeting in Saudi Arabia are either no longer affiliated with the group or have been cast aside. This does not matter however, because the Afghan government and the Taliban have a problem that needs to be solved and a meeting with the most powerful nation in Sunni Islam is a good place to start. The Afghan government has been reaching out to the Saudi’s for some time now and will probably view the meeting as a short term victory – even if they do it silently.
Understandably the U.S. is not happy with the prospect of watching the Afghan government negotiate a peace deal with the faction the Karzai government replaced. While it may not be the best solution from Washington’s standpoint, it is a solution that may become more acceptable should the Taliban decide to split with al-Qaeda. The U.S. could extract itself from the Afghan theater if the top tear of al-Qaeda was killed or captured, but this will only happen when the local population turns against the foreigners.
Pakistan: The perils of a weak government
In my previous article I discussed the increase of U.S. raids into Pakistani territory. While the CIA and Special Forces have been doing this for years, it is only recently that conventional military forces have made incursions into the Tribal Areas of Pakistan. After seven years of the War on Terror, why is this only occurring now? A number of reasons immediately come to mind, such as the war in Iraq, the coming end to the Bush administration, poor intelligence, and perhaps the most overlooked reason – Pakistani politics.
Pakistan has survived so long as the Army survived. Prior to the ouster of President Musharraf, the Army and the government were one in the same and the country was ruled by a single homogonous entity. This is no longer the case. The change came when Western powers pressed Musharraf to give up his direct military role and hold open elections. Musharraf would eventually acquiesce thus pushing the country into chaos. The newly elected Parliament moved quickly to pressure Musharraf into resigning by threatening him with impeachment. This move did not fracture the government per se, but it did fracture the control of the country and has led to competing directives between the Army and the civilian government.
A prime example of this was the decision to bring the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) under the control civilian control by placing the organization under the Interior Ministry. Two days later the government was forced to recant this declaration claiming that the Army was not given a say in the matter, but the implication was clear – the Army wasn’t going to listen and the government couldn’t do anything about it. It now appears that the Army will make a move to put the government under military influence and not the other way around. It is a similar situation that led to Musharraf seizing control of the government in the first place.
The newly formed democratic government is already in trouble and near bankruptcy. Several countries and institutions have offered aid, but if it doesn’t come soon the government may face social unrest after only a few months in office. Perhaps the most difficult challenge that Pakistan faces is the Taliban insurgency. The Taliban is flush with cash from the poppy crop and has asserted itself more recently in areas of the country that have been traditionally more stable. With India spreading money and influence in Afghanistan and the U.S. engaging in missile strikes inside the FATA on a daily basis, Pakistan could be thrust further into turmoil.
What happens next?
Right now the next move will be made by the U.S., but probably not until the election is over. The U.S. military is planning on a winter offensive to take on Taliban and al-Qaeda that remain in the country during the winter months. Afghanistan is a mountainous country which makes combat during winter months very difficult for poorly equipped light infantry elements such as Taliban and AQ fighters. The U.S. is betting on this and going for the jugular so to speak. During the winter months all logistical support is scaled back because the mountains become impassable from the heavy snow fall. If the U.S. is successful in taking on those elements that do not winter in Pakistan the dynamic of the theater could change. The success of this offensive will not end the war, but it could bring the conclusion closer.
Afghanistan, Pakistan, the U.S., and the Taliban are suffering from a prolonged war that has gone on for seven years now. While at the onset of the war on terror 80 percent of al-Qaeda prime was destroyed the core leadership has managed to elude capture and the people in the regions that they are taking refuge are paying the price. Regardless of this success here is the current situation:
In the process of the war Afghanistan has gained a new government, but it is weak and unable to build a consensus among the numerous warlords that call the country home.
The U.S. is looking to draw down troops in Iraq and move several brigade combat teams to the Afghan theater, but troop strength alone will not be enough and the military command knows it.
Pakistan has lost significant influence in Afghanistan, is facing an insurgency at home, and India – their primary adversary – has moved troops and advanced aircraft into Kashmir. India has also invested significantly in Afghanistan thus expanding their influence on two of Pakistan’s borders. Additionally, China has moved troops into the Xinjiang province – which borders Pakistan – to crack down on the Muslim Uyghurs which Islamabad has supported in the past. Though Pakistan and China are occasional allies, China is not happy with the Washington – Islamabad alliance. All told Pakistan is not in good shape.
The Taliban have been getting hammered by the U.S. for seven years, but have managed to survive and occasionally regroup. The Taliban, it should be noted, are not a single homogenous group, but rather several Pashtun tribes that have embraced the Deobandi form of Islam that is the foundation of the Taliban ideology. In essence it would take the defeat or destruction of an entire ethnic group to claim victory over the Taliban. Simply put, that will not happen.
Each player in the Afghan theater is feeling the squeeze and something has to give – soon.
Taliban looking for peace?
Several news reports have claimed that a delegation of Afghan government officials and Afghan Taliban representatives met in Saudi Arabia to discuss the prospect of peace at the behest of Saudi King Abdullah. This comes on the heels of the Afghan president Karzai and some high ranking NATO officers calling for peace negotiations with the Taliban. In spite of the reports both the Afghan government and the Afghan Taliban have claimed that a meeting did occur, but there was no discussion of peace or national reconciliation. That being said I doubt that they met to discuss the weather.
Afghanistan needs forge a path towards national reconciliation and that includes that Taliban. Those that are loyal to the Taliban know that they cannot defeat the foreign forces in Afghanistan and waiting for the foreigners to leave while their people suffer from war is not an option either. The only available option is for the government and the Afghan Taliban to come to an accord whether it is politically palatable for the foreign forces or not.
It is interesting to note that the representatives of the Taliban that attended the meeting in Saudi Arabia are either no longer affiliated with the group or have been cast aside. This does not matter however, because the Afghan government and the Taliban have a problem that needs to be solved and a meeting with the most powerful nation in Sunni Islam is a good place to start. The Afghan government has been reaching out to the Saudi’s for some time now and will probably view the meeting as a short term victory – even if they do it silently.
Understandably the U.S. is not happy with the prospect of watching the Afghan government negotiate a peace deal with the faction the Karzai government replaced. While it may not be the best solution from Washington’s standpoint, it is a solution that may become more acceptable should the Taliban decide to split with al-Qaeda. The U.S. could extract itself from the Afghan theater if the top tear of al-Qaeda was killed or captured, but this will only happen when the local population turns against the foreigners.
Pakistan: The perils of a weak government
In my previous article I discussed the increase of U.S. raids into Pakistani territory. While the CIA and Special Forces have been doing this for years, it is only recently that conventional military forces have made incursions into the Tribal Areas of Pakistan. After seven years of the War on Terror, why is this only occurring now? A number of reasons immediately come to mind, such as the war in Iraq, the coming end to the Bush administration, poor intelligence, and perhaps the most overlooked reason – Pakistani politics.
Pakistan has survived so long as the Army survived. Prior to the ouster of President Musharraf, the Army and the government were one in the same and the country was ruled by a single homogonous entity. This is no longer the case. The change came when Western powers pressed Musharraf to give up his direct military role and hold open elections. Musharraf would eventually acquiesce thus pushing the country into chaos. The newly elected Parliament moved quickly to pressure Musharraf into resigning by threatening him with impeachment. This move did not fracture the government per se, but it did fracture the control of the country and has led to competing directives between the Army and the civilian government.
A prime example of this was the decision to bring the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) under the control civilian control by placing the organization under the Interior Ministry. Two days later the government was forced to recant this declaration claiming that the Army was not given a say in the matter, but the implication was clear – the Army wasn’t going to listen and the government couldn’t do anything about it. It now appears that the Army will make a move to put the government under military influence and not the other way around. It is a similar situation that led to Musharraf seizing control of the government in the first place.
The newly formed democratic government is already in trouble and near bankruptcy. Several countries and institutions have offered aid, but if it doesn’t come soon the government may face social unrest after only a few months in office. Perhaps the most difficult challenge that Pakistan faces is the Taliban insurgency. The Taliban is flush with cash from the poppy crop and has asserted itself more recently in areas of the country that have been traditionally more stable. With India spreading money and influence in Afghanistan and the U.S. engaging in missile strikes inside the FATA on a daily basis, Pakistan could be thrust further into turmoil.
What happens next?
Right now the next move will be made by the U.S., but probably not until the election is over. The U.S. military is planning on a winter offensive to take on Taliban and al-Qaeda that remain in the country during the winter months. Afghanistan is a mountainous country which makes combat during winter months very difficult for poorly equipped light infantry elements such as Taliban and AQ fighters. The U.S. is betting on this and going for the jugular so to speak. During the winter months all logistical support is scaled back because the mountains become impassable from the heavy snow fall. If the U.S. is successful in taking on those elements that do not winter in Pakistan the dynamic of the theater could change. The success of this offensive will not end the war, but it could bring the conclusion closer.
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