Tuesday, September 9, 2008

Counterintelligence Operations and the Recent Airstrikes in Pakistan

In late July of this year, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen traveled to Pakistan on an unannounced trip, where he presented Pakistani military officials with evidence of the Inter-Services Intelligence’s (ISI) involvement in attacks in Afghanistan. The most recent large scale attack that the ISI may have been involved in took place on July 7, and was against the Indian embassy in Kabul resulting in the deaths of at least 58 people and injured more than 140. Two high ranking diplomats, Indian Defense Attache Brig. Gen. Ravi Dutt Mehta and the embassy’s Political and Information Counselor Vadapalli Venkateswara Rao, were among those killed in the attack. This attack in particular has all the hallmarks of an assassination.

A U.S. military strike in Pakistan on September 8 resulted in the deaths of multiple civilians all from the same extended family. While the loss of civilian lives in combat is regrettable this airstrike was not an accident. The target of the attack was the home of a Taliban leader that was most likely responsible for the attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul with the assistance of the ISI. Unfortunately the target of the strike was not home at the time and may have actually been in Afghanistan participating in the insurgency, but that is not the focus of this article.

So what do these two events, along with the dramatic increase of U.S. airstrikes in Pakistan, have in common? In a word – counterintelligence or CI. Before we discuss the link between these two events we must first understand the many purposes of CI. If intelligence is gathering information then it would make sense that counterintelligence is the method that prevents adversaries from learning what you know, but not all CI operations are the same. For instance, the FBI is charged with CI operations in the U.S. and strives to prevent, and if necessary identify, foreign espionage and subversion. Ultimately the FBI’s goal is to disrupt the flow of information to American adversaries and prosecute those individual’s involved. The CIA on the other hand often takes a different approach depending on the circumstances.

The CIA, a foreign intelligence service of the U.S., also works to identify individuals involved in collecting sensitive information, but disruption is not always the goal. Once a subversive element is discovered, whether it is an individual or a group, the CIA strives to learn the entire communication chain the subversive element uses. This allows the Agency to plant disinformation that can be used in a future operation, or in the case of the War on Terrorism, locate an individual.

Using the ISI

Pakistan’s traditional adversary has been India and the War on Terrorism has not changed that. In much the same fashion as how Russian and the U.S. fought during the Cold War, Pakistan has been using militant Islamists to stir up trouble in India in an attempt to prevent the struggle between the two from becoming a larger conventional conflict or worse – a nuclear standoff. The ISI has been the front agency for cultivating these proxy fighters, but in the last few years the ISI’s creation has turned against its master. In fact, the Institute for Conflict Management notes that suicide bombings in Pakistan rose from seven in 2006 to 56 in 2007. Further compounding the problem is the high number of Islamist sympathizers within the Pakistani intelligence agency that have been working against both the U.S. and their own government.

On many fronts the ISI, or elements within the agency, has been compromising intelligence activities by warning the militant factions of military movements or pending intelligence operations. This, of course, has hampered the ability of the U.S., NATO, and the Afghan military to deal with the raging insurgency. However, oftentimes problems can become opportunities when handled correctly.

The use of Counterintelligence Operations

Information can flow both ways. If the ISI is funneling information to the Taliban then from a CI perspective the communications network can be uncovered and exploited. In regards to this most recent airstrike it appears that the U.S. managed to locate the home of Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani, a top Taliban leader with close ties to al-Qaeda, by using those elements of the ISI that are in contact with him. This seems likely for several reasons with the foremost reason being the Haqqani has been on the U.S. hit list for some time and the strike on his compound only coming recently means that its location was just discovered. Unfortunately for the U.S., it missed its target and ended up killing several civilians along with a few militants. This can happen if the intelligence only offers a small window of opportunity for a military strike to take place and the operation is rushed. This may not be what happened, but it is the theory that makes the most sense.

In the waning months of the Bush administration it is highly likely that constant airstrikes in Pakistan will continue. It is also likely that more counterintelligence operations will take place since as-Shahab, the propaganda wing of al-Qaeda, has promised to deliver addresses from al-Qaeda leadership on the anniversary of the 9/11 attack. CI operations are not constrained to the agencies of foreign governments, but the media outlets that happen to just “find” an al-Qaeda audio or video tape for publication are likely to be a prime target. All non-state actors need to communicate with the outside world and this is more often than not the weak link in their security. It is the vulnerability of communications networks that brought an end to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq; and Pablo Escobar, the notorious leader of the Medellin Cartel. So it begs the question, could bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, or Mullah Omar be next?

*The descriptions of intelligence and CI operations described above are an oversimplified account for the purpose of brevity.

Thursday, September 4, 2008

Al-Assad Speaks – Nothing Changes

Please read my September 3 post, Syria's Last Strategic Option, and this post will make more sense.

Syrian President Bashir al-Assad presented to Turkey 6 points that detail his position of departure in the negotiations during a press conference today. But what has captured the headlines in the Israeli press is al-Assad’s declaration that he will not break off ties to Hezbollah and Palestinian militants. This would seem to contradict my earlier statements regarding Syria no longer wanting to be a rogue regime. On the contrary this statement by al-Assad only reinforces my analysis and represents Syria playing the only card it has in this deal with Tel Aviv – reining in militant factions that present a security threat to Israel.

Here’s how I got there. Syria has only one thing to offer Israel – dismantling Hezbollah and curtailing the activities of militant Palestinians. That being said it makes sense that al-Assad would trumpet this because it would play well in the Israeli press. Additionally, the other major players in this deal – France, Turkey, Egypt, and Qatar – would not want a peace deal that allowed a repeat of the Israeli-Hezbollah war of 2006. Such an allowance would make any peace deal ridiculous.

In the face of political problems in Israel it is still apparent that Tel Aviv holds the trump card – the Golan Heights. Israel would never agree to give up Golan without security assurances on its northern border. From Syria’s perspective the return of Golan is necessary for security since Damascus is a mere 30 miles from the current border with Israel.

I have stated before that one should never confuse rhetoric for policy. In this case al-Assad’s statement that he will continue to support Hezbollah and the militant Palestinian factions is an untenable position and he knows it. Damascus desperately needs this peace deal so it can tap into the global economy. Al-Assad needs to grow Syria’s economy so he can stay in power and clinging to the old habits of supporting terrorism would run counter to that goal. Al-Assad’s may be a young leader, but he is not stupid.

Wednesday, September 3, 2008

Syria’s Last Strategic Option

The last couple of years have been tough on the al-Assad regime in Syria. But before we can discuss the current realities faced by Damascus we first must understand the geography that influences the Middle East and the unstable politics that make the conflicts in the region what they are today. Syria has long been on the end of something I call rogue regime row which stretched from Afghanistan in the east across Iran and Iraq and finally ending with Syria bordering the Mediterranean in the west. Each of these nations contained dynamics that were opposed to their neighbors and thus created an environment that was made up of minor actors that could only antagonize each other through proxies without one ever coming out on top. This is one of the main reasons that the Middle East is a prime berthing ground for terrorism. The 9/11 attacks upset this strange balance.

With the ensuing occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq by the United States, Damascus was forced to find a large power to ensure their survival. The first option was Iran, but in the face of a stabilizing Iraq this arrangement became impossible. Further adding to the problems of the alliance was disagreements over Hezbollah and the large ideological divide between the two nations didn’t help either. Without a strong backer Syria became isolated.

Prior to the Iranian-Syrian alliance becoming strained was the boneheaded move by Damascus to assassinate former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. This move caused the major Western powers to respond by demanding a full withdrawal of all Syrian troops from Lebanon. Syria attempted to resist, but with the odds were greatly stacked against them. In the end Damascus was forced to move out and in the process lose their most promising economic interests. The weak alliance with Iran and the Hariri assassination brought international scrutiny in the face of declining oil revenues and surging economic problems. Syria is without the ability to remain a rogue regime and must join the international community if the Assad regime is to survive; it is Syria’s last remaining option.

Turkey and the Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks

Turkey has been playing the role of matchmaker in the preliminary talks between Syria and Israel for several reasons. Perhaps the most pressing is setting up a stable south when the U.S. completely pulls out of Iraq. Other than dealing with the militant Kurdish forces of Northern Iraq, Turkey also wants to create a stable region on the coast of the Mediterranean. Crafting a peace deal between Tel Aviv and Damascus would go a long way to accomplishing this. Turkey is also working out an energy deal with Syria that would help both countries economically and provide energy to Europe that would bypass a resurgent Russia. This is something the Europeans are desperate for and both Syria and Turkey are in prime position to offer this alternative.

The Israeli-Syrian talks have continued in fits and starts in the face of many challenges. Both nations have much to gain from a peace deal in the form of security for Israel and continuance of the Assad regime in Syria. As is usually the case with diplomatic talks the nations involved will work against and with each other behind the scenes to push negotiations in their favor. This is most likely what resulted in the Mugniyeh assassination. Needless to say Hezbollah was not pleased with the Syrian move and are worried that an Israeli-Syrian deal would mean the loss of Syria as a patron and the money and arms that go with it.

The moves that Syria had to undertake as a condition of talks with Israel did not bode well for the regime. Other than Hezbollah, Syria has also played host to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad and removing these elements is not something that is easily done. After the Mugniyeh assassination, the head of Syrian Intelligence and al-Assad’s brother-in-law, Asef Shawkat, was place under house arrest. It is believed that he was planning a coup and sought the help of the CIA after a meeting in Turkey. The CIA turned him down.

Al-Assad’s Attempt to Curry Russian Favor

Assad saw an opportunity in the Russian invasion of Georgia to curry favor with Moscow in an attempt to bolster its standing in the talks with Israel. Syria had offered to house Russian missiles to counter the missiles the U.S. was planning on placing in Poland and also a naval station in the Mediterranean. The Russian President, Dmitri Medvedev, turned him down on all counts most likely because the Israelis got there first. It appears that the Russian decision hinged on a deal with Israel that prevented the Israelis from selling weapons to Georgia as long as Russia did not sell weapons to Syria.

The Last Option

Syria has one move left – a peace deal with Israel. Since Russia isn’t interested and Iran is too far away to project any military power in defense of Damascus Syria is forced to play nice. However, not all is lost and the recent developments with Lebanon certainly help. Syria needs Lebanon far more that the other way around which is why the two nations have finally agreed to establish full diplomatic recognition. Damascus has long viewed Lebanon as a Syrian province so this move is significant.This gives the Syrians the ability to tap back into Lebanon economically while offering Beirut the ability to hurt Hezbollah. This is something that Israel wants and Lebanon could use. Hezbollah has brought nothing but misery to Lebanon and the Israeli-Syrian deal will hurt the terror organization significantly – not to mention Hamas and PIJ. Al-Assad seems to recognize the need to drop the rogue act and join in the international economy. Without significant foreign investment the Syrian economy will continue on its downward dive and the al-Assad regime days will be numbered.