Men are not disturbed by things, but by the view they take of things. – Epictetus
Since the terrorist attacks on the city of Mumbai tensions between India and Pakistan have once again reached the point where war is becoming a very real possibility. What makes the ongoing conflict in South Asia so worrying to the world at large is the possibility that these two countries will use their nuclear arsenals if pushed to an as of yet determined threshold. Currently, this is unlikely, but when the respective nuclear doctrine of both countries is considered it can appear that any provocation by India will result in Pakistan taking the conflict to the nuclear level. Nuclear doctrines are meant to outline when and how a nuclear power will use their ultimate weapon, but they can often seem ambiguous and leave much to be desired.
When discussing nuclear doctrine, phrases such as mutually assured destruction or flexible response come to mind, but one must remember these are merely titles and are not necessarily indicative of an entire doctrine. In fact, it is difficult for any doctrine to truly stand up against scrutiny because of its very nature. A major factor that further compounds analysis is that a nuclear doctrine has never been employed because a nuclear exchange has never taken place. With this in mind, how can one ever be sure of how a nation will react in the face of an impending nuclear war? The answer is that we simply do not know because doctrines are merely guidelines since neither the author nor the individual employing the doctrine know if it will hold up under the circumstances that their nation will face. This is the aforementioned ambiguity inherent in any nuclear doctrine.
Nuclear doctrines are written with the purpose of sowing confusion among a nations adversaries and promoting deterrence which is why they appear ambiguous and at times irrational. Nations are not likely to go to war with one another if victory, not to mention survival, does not appear possible thus creating the deterrent atmosphere that is sought by the possession of nuclear weapons. In essence what happens is not only a deterrent to war but also a constraint on how a nation will behave.
While the possession of nuclear weapons by both Pakistan and India has limited the type of conflict these nations engage in it does not eliminate conflict altogether. Since both nations held nuclear tests in May 1998, the conflict has become one of low intensity occasionally culminating in a terrorist attack that pushes India to the verge of taking military action against their western neighbor. Since 1998 New Delhi and Islamabad have come close to conventional conflict several times only to have the U.S. step in and play the role of peacemaker. The outcome of this mediation is always the same; India makes demands that they know Pakistan either will not or cannot carry out while Pakistan makes token gestures that only ensure the nations’ short-term survival. This is the status quo in South Asia and as history shows this type of unstable peace cannot last.
This paper will explore how the respective nuclear doctrines of India and Pakistan have on the one hand made a conventional war politically difficult while on the other has led to the rise of terrorist groups as the new arbiters of war and peace in the South Asian region.
India
Nuclear Doctrine
India detonated their first nuclear device in 1974, but did not enter into full scale production much later to continue research on the more powerful thermonuclear weapons (this became public in 1989). This move towards obtaining a nuclear arsenal was spurred on by the 1962 border war with China and the subsequent Chinese nuclear tests carried out in 1964. When tensions with Pakistan rose again in 1990, both countries were on the verge of ramping up research and beginning production only to have the crisis brought to an end by international intervention. Although this crisis was averted, it appears it was this event that prompted both India and Pakistan to continue their respective nuclear research with the goal of deterrence. In furtherance of this goal both nations conducted full scale nuclear tests in May 1998. It was after these tests that India produced an interim nuclear doctrine in 1999 and subsequently adopted the document with a few revisions in 2003. The doctrine was created with a focus on China and New Delhi’s main rival Pakistan.
While the Indian nuclear doctrine is several pages long it only contains a few salient features that bear mentioning. The first is the prohibition of a First Strike, second is the concept of massive retaliation, and the third is the choice not to distinguish between any weapons of mass destruction. The third feature simply means that India reserves the right to retaliate with nuclear weapons if they are struck with chemical or biological weapons. All these features work towards the same goal – deterrence.
Perhaps the most important factor in India’s nuclear doctrine is the prohibition of first use, or stated more plainly, India will not launch a first strike. In India’s doctrine the phrase used is actually, ‘retaliation only.’ Former Prime Minister Vajpayee’s statement made in the Indian Parliament that “India does not intend to use these weapons for aggression or for making threats against any country, these are weapons of self-defense, to ensure that India is not subjected to nuclear threats or coercion” may serve to clarify the relevance of a nuclear arsenal, but again reality trumps written doctrine. The reality is that India is under the coercion of non-state actors that were created and nurtured by Pakistan and has very little room to negate this criminal influence in international affairs because Pakistan is also a nuclear power. By stating that a nuclear arsenal is for ‘retaliation only’ without considering the unique dynamics of the south Asian conflict, India has in fact undermined the very reason they have stated for maintaining a nuclear arsenal.
The decision against using a first strike is only a single part of the nuclear doctrine. India states the overall goal of their nuclear arsenal is to provide ‘credible minimal deterrence.’ In the context of nuclear states, the word credible is applied to nations that have openly declared their possession of nuclear weapons and verifiably tested at least one such device, while minimal simply means that a nation will not produce more weapons than are deemed necessary. Once again we are struck with the ambiguity of nuclear terminology. In the current context the international community is expected to believe that the mere possession of nuclear weapons and not the will to use such weapons is what is deemed credible. This is not to mean that a nation must immediately use a nuclear weapon or device against an adversary to establish credibility, but instead shows just how generalized these words are.
Outside of the rhetoric one would expect to find in a nuclear doctrine is an interesting entry in paragraph 2.4 of the Objectives section:
2.4. The fundamental purpose of Indian nuclear weapons is to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by any state or entity against India and its forces. India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.
This section is interesting because it allows for the possibility that a non-state actor could acquire a nuclear weapon or device. This entry is aimed directly at Pakistan. If the Pakistani state fails India wants to be sure that they have recourse in the event that their adversary’s arsenal falls into the wrong hands. After all, nuclear weapons in the hands of a non-state entity do not have to be used to be effective.
India has chosen to add a concept known as massive retaliation to their doctrine. This means that India may not be the first to use a nuclear weapon, but will retaliate to inflict unacceptable damage upon the aggressor. Paragraph 2.3 of the Objectives section states:
2.3. India shall pursue a doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence. In this policy of “retaliation only,” the survivability of our arsenal is critical. This is a dynamic concept related to the strategic environment, technological imperatives and the needs of national security. The actual size, components, deployment and employment of nuclear forces will be decided in the light of these factors. India’s peacetime posture aims at convincing any potential aggressor that:
a. any threat of use of nuclear weapons against India shall involve measures to counter the threat; and
b. any nuclear attack on India and its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor.
India knows that it must have the ability to respond to threats against its sovereignty with conventional forces. When India decides to employ their conventional military it may not always be on Indian soil; therefore it becomes imperative that India extend their doctrine of massive retaliation to nuclear attacks against the Indian military.
To be fair to it should be stated that India is the only nuclear power to articulate a nuclear doctrine and release it in full to the public thus opening up the document to criticism. While it is true that nuclear powers have stated their views and strategy in the past, they have never released an actual doctrine explaining the role of nuclear weapons in their overall strategy.
Pakistan
Nuclear Doctrine
Pakistan has never officially articulated a nuclear doctrine nor have they come close to enunciating a statement as to how and when nuclear weapons will be used. A statement by Dr. Shireen Mazari, Director General at the Strategic Studies Institute – Islamabad, is telling:
“Pakistan has chosen not to publicly enunciate a comprehensive nuclear doctrine partly because it does not see a political/status utility for the nuclear capability – rather, it envisages the nuclear capability as having a purely defensive, security-related purpose. Pakistan’s threat perceptions are seen as stemming primarily from India both at the level of all-out conventional war, limited war and low intensity conflict (LIC). Within the nuclear framework, Pakistan seeks to establish deterrence against all-out conventional war.”Further compounding this veil of secrecy is the unwillingness of the Pakistani Army to follow or let alone read a doctrine if it were published because it would be perceived to be too political. Fortunately, the Pakistani military establishment has published several papers by former military and academic leaders describing what a Pakistani nuclear doctrine might look like. The journal publications that have been selected for review in this paper are very similar in their assessments of a nuclear doctrine leading one to believe that a doctrine does indeed exist, but it is kept from public view to increase the pressure on India to refrain from using conventional forces against Pakistan. As previously stated this is normal in nuclear postures; however Pakistan takes it to a new level.
The papers chosen for review were selected by the proximity each author has to the Pakistani military, and by extension, to the nuclear program. To begin with, Pakistan has stated that they will not launch a first strike with their strategic nuclear weapons. In a newspaper interview former Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf stated:
"This is not Warsaw Pact versus NATO situation where warheads and missiles were ready for fire with a button in a hand. There is no button in our case… Missiles and warheads are not permitted together. They are separated. There is geographical separation between them. One has to go up to escalation ladder. Then comes this stage."While Pakistan may refrain from using their strategic weapons first they do not have any reservations about using tactical nuclear weapons to stop an invading army. This is because the Indian military outnumbers the Pakistani military substantially and Pakistan cannot conceive any method other than the use of a nuclear weapon to halt the invasion. Lt Gen (Ret) Sardar FS Lodi states in his paper Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine:
“In a deteriorating military situation when an Indian conventional attack is likely to break through our defenses or has already breached the main defense line causing a major set-back to the defenses, which cannot be restored by conventional means at our disposal, the government would be left with no other option except to use Nuclear Weapons to stabilize the situation. India's superiority in conventional arms and manpower would have to be offset by nuclear weapons. The political will to use nuclear weapons is essential to prevent a conventional armed conflict, which would later on escalate into a nuclear war.”Brig Gen (Ret) Saeed Ismat articulates a deteriorating situation more clearly. Ismat states that the Rajistan Desert, more commonly known as the Thar Desert, is the most likely avenue of invasion by conventional Indian forces. By taking this strategic area India could, in a matter of days, cut Pakistan in two, thus severing communications and dividing the remnants of the Pakistan’s military. It is in this case that Ismat states the Pakistani leadership would be left with no other option than to use a nuclear weapon to prevent the state from fracturing. While Ismat declares that the use of nuclear weapon would prevent Indian forces from severing Pakistan, he does not say how deep the invading army would have to penetrate before this would happen. The General also fails to say who should have authority to launch the weapon should the invading army advance too rapidly and communications with the civilian leadership are cutoff. The need for the delegation of authority in times of crisis will be discussed later, but General Ismat’s statements show that while a strategic objective can be defined generally the threshold for employing a nuclear weapon must be defined specifically.
After reviewing material relevant to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal a rudimentary doctrine can be compiled. This is not meant to be representative of Pakistani policy, but rather a compilation of interests and capabilities demonstrated by Pakistan’s military and political establishment. The elements of nuclear employment may be as follows:
1. Pakistan will not use strategic nuclear weapons in a First Strike.India’s doctrine describes not only how and when a nuclear weapon will be employed, but also who has control over the employment decision. This is not the case with Pakistan. Former Pakistani Army Chief Pervez Musharraf said the central command system to use nuclear and missile technology would be ready within one month after the nuclear tests of 1998. This didn’t happen, however because the civilian leadership did not want to integrate the military leadership into the command and control of the nuclear arsenal. This may have been one of the factors that led Musharraf to seize power and usher in an era of military dictatorship. Under Musharraf the National Command Authority was finally created in February 2000 and the authority to employ nuclear weapons was given to the Head of State.
2. If nuclear deterrent fails and the aggressor seizes the initiative to launch the First Strike, Pakistan shall hit back with its Second Strike ability.
3. If deterrent fails to prevent a convention invasion, Pakistan will first rely on conventional means to defend the nation.
4. If the invading military appears to be overrunning Pakistan’s military a public warning may be issued followed by a test detonation if time permits.
5. If the invading military does not halt the invasion, Pakistan will employ tactical nuclear weapons against the invading force on Pakistani soil.
6. Should the previous steps fail, Pakistan will launch strategic nuclear weapons against critical but purely military targets in India across the border from Pakistan in thinly populated areas in the desert or semi-desert, causing the least collateral damage.
7. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine with be defensive in nature with controlled escalation to allow for a political process to take place.
8. Pakistan’s response with be directly proportionate to the actions of enemy provocation and threat posed to Pakistan’s security.
Given the poor state of communications within Pakistan the Head of State may not have the ability to give the command to launch or stand down to elements in the field armed with a tactical nuclear weapon. It is in the scenario that General Lodi suggests that:
“Although the decision to employ the nuclear option is that of the government. Yet it must be decided before hand as to when and to whom would the authority to use nuclear weapons be delegated in a crisis situation. India our potential enemy has numerical superiority in conventional forces and would have the advantage of initiative as an aggressor, time would therefore be of essence to the defender with numerical inferiority. Delegation of authority to use the nuclear option would therefore be essential. It may eventually be given to the commander of forces in the field under specified circumstances depending on the course and direction in which the battle unfolds to our eventual disadvantage.”Although Lodi goes on to state that the government must decide before hand when and at what stage of a military conflict it would be forced to employ the nuclear option, this is hardly sufficient for a field commander who may feel compelled to use a nuclear weapon before a predefined threshold was crossed. A commander on a battlefield will have a very different view of a battle than a politician in Islamabad creating a situation that cannot be reconciled by any doctrine. While this approach would also have a deterrent value by sowing doubt in a potential adversary, in reality it cannot be employed reliably.
As previously mentioned Pakistan has not published an official nuclear doctrine because Islamabad feels it adds to their deterrent capabilities. After careful research into the Pakistani nuclear program it appears that the choice not to publish a doctrine is less about deterrence and more about nonchalance. The statement by a British official that the Pakistani’s, ‘think a nuclear weapon is just a bigger artillery piece’ is rather revealing in this case and does little to instill confidence in Islamabad’s control over its nuclear program.
India’s Limited Warfare Approach
In the face of a fracturing Pakistan, India may no longer be left with any other option than to respond to rogue elements of the Pakistani intelligence service supporting terrorist groups. If India fails to respond effectively to the Mumbai attacks the government may find itself in peril; after all governments have failed over lesser matters. Since India’s counterterrorism efforts have yet to mature, a conventional response becomes the most likely avenue of ensuring security. If India responds via conventional military means it has a number of options at its disposal – at least on paper. Since the behavior of adversarial nations changes with the inclusion of nuclear weapons, it becomes prudent to list the conventional options in a non-nuclear context. This means only conventional options will be chosen based upon their ability to prevent escalation.
India has conventional military assets in the form of land, air, and sea power, but the use of these assets must be limited to prevent escalation. In fact, India will most likely use land and air assets to attack targets across the Kashmir Line of Control thus preventing Pakistan from responding too harshly. If India were to go after symbols of the Pakistani state such as military or intelligence headquarters, Pakistan may have to respond with a conventional strike of their own for domestic political reasons. That being said it is likely that India will engage terrorist enclaves in Pakistan using precision strikes from the air with special operations forces targeting from the ground. Any large troop movements across the Line of Control would simply be too provocative.
Another option would be the targeting of the Pakistani economy which is in a perpetually fragile state. This option is difficult since the Pakistani response is unknown. Pakistan has a population over 168 million people in an area the size of New England and any economic blockade could lead to Islamabad taking extreme measures to prevent social unrest. Considering Islamabad’s current economic woes, any military action taken to blockade Pakistan could result in rapid escalation with disastrous consequences – something that India would be looking to avoid. Both India and Pakistan lack modern early warning system, but it really doesn’t matter since a launch of a strategic nuclear weapon would only take four to eight minutes to reach its target. India would be best advised to prevent to use of strategic missiles with convention warheads as Pakistan could be forced to launch their strategic nuclear weapons based on a misperception.
Terrorism in a Nuclear Context
India has suffered significant loss at the hands of Pakistani trained terrorists from the attack on the Indian Parliament to the more recent attacks in Mumbai. Pakistan’s statement that it will not use their nuclear arsenal as a political tool rings hollow in the face of these continued attacks because India knows that if New Delhi carries out a conventional retaliatory strike against Pakistani targets the conflict could go to the nuclear level rather quickly. India knows full well that Pakistan intends to use a nuclear weapon to halt an Indian attack forcing New Delhi to often just absorb the attack and move on.
India also knows Pakistan is falling apart. Islamabad’s continued support of Islamism that helped appease tribal entities for so many years has caused to opposite to occur in the last decade. India understands that Pakistan has limited control over the terrorist groups that the ISI created, but New Delhi also knows it cannot continue to absorb these attacks. This situation has placed India in a strange predicament – India cannot allow their foe Pakistan to fall apart because the situation would worsen, but India would like to see Pakistan pushed to the point where terrorist support becomes a strategic liability.
The various non-state factions operating in Pakistan may use several different names, but they are bound by geography, ethnicity, and ideology. Currently, the focus of the Indo-Pakistani conflict is focused on the respective nation-states, but the Islamists have the upper hand and are dictating events. If India decides to strike targets in Pakistan it will be because a former tool of Islamabad has gone off the reservation and is operating independently of their former masters. This reality is not lost on the Islamists. The Islamists know that if they can force India to attack Pakistan they will then stand a better chance of gaining further autonomy and influence in the state. Unfortunately this situation is lost in the bigger conflict between the two nuclear powers. Currently there are rumblings of Indian troop build ups in Kashmir in the northern area of the Thar Desert. On the Pakistani side, Islamabad has replaced border patrol troops with regular army units. These types of troop movements are often a sign of war preparation.
The Indian deadline for Pakistan to hand over individuals suspected of involvement in the Mumbai attacks is set to expire on December 26. What happens after that date is anybody’s guess. What is known is that two nuclear powers are on the brink of war over a terrorist attack that Islamabad probably did not order and India cannot ignore. Clearly, the Islamists have the upper hand.
