On December 30, 2009, a CIA informant claiming to have urgent information on al Qaeda’s second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was brought to an ISAF Forward Operating Base to meet with several CIA officers. Since the informant was known an Afghan security officer drove the individual to the base and failed to conduct a search for weapons or explosives. This oversight led to the deaths of eight people and wounded several others.
The bomber was Dr. Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi, a jihadist that was captured by the Jordanians, went through a rehabilitation process in Jordan, and was ultimately used by U.S. and Jordanian intelligence as an asset to infiltrate al-Qaeda in Pakistan. As is typical with these types of operations an asset turning into a double agent is a risk that runs high. It appears that al-Balawi did provide important information that led to the successful execution of several drone strikes in the Pakistani Tribal region before turning his allegiance to the Pakistani Taliban.
The Haqqani Network
At this point it appears that the attack was orchestrated by the Haqqani network. The Haqqani network is run by Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Siraj Haqqani who have close ties to al-Qaeda and the Taliban movement. The following information on Jalaluddin Haqqani is from recently declassified diplomatic cables:
7. In a January 6 conversation with poloff, redacted a Taliban supporter redacted said he knows Haqqani and agrees that he is an effective military strategist. He argued that Haqqani "should be seen in his proper context and he has clear links with Islamic extremists." Warming to this theme redacted asserted that Haqqani had developed a close relationship with various radical Arab groups during the jihad. These relationships, redacted asserted, have continued and, in exchange for 'weapons and money, Haqqani is "offering shelter for various Arabs in areas of Paktia province." Brushing aside poloff's request for further information on this subject, redacted stated that he did not have the details, but that Haqqani's role with the “Arabs” is “well-known.” (Note: reporting in other channels indicate that Haqqani maintains these links.)
8. Turning to the issue of Haqqani's relationship with the Taliban, redacted concurred with Wahab's assessment that Haqqani probably did not have significant influence with the Taliban on political or social issues. "although he is a mullah," he related, "Haqqani is not considered to be a Taliban and he has little credibility with them on issues outside of the military realm." he observed that Haqqani's ties to Islamic extremists are also opposed by a number of Taliban officials, including "acting foreign minister" Ghaus. (Note: in a meeting with DCM: in early December, mullah Ghaus, when asked about Haqqani’s relationship with the Taliban, was dismissive and intimated that Haqqani was not important in the Taliban leadership hierarchy.) Nonetheless, redacted advised, “Haqqani could prove to have a negative influence on the Taliban by making them more prone to accept the advice of Islamic radicals.”
The aforementioned information came from an informant prior to 9/11. Since the Taliban were removed from power Haqqani has become a prized commander not only from his experience, but also because of his ties to multiple militant Islamic groups. In the last couple of years Siraj, Jalaluddin’s son, has taken on more responsibility in the group and is poised to inherit his father’s network. It certainly appears as if the Haqqani’s are preparing for an American exit from Afghanistan and will use their new found power to buy influence in whatever replaces the current Afghan government. The successful assassination of seven CIA officers will go a long way in accomplishing their goals, that is if they escape CIA retaliation.
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