Counterintelligence Operations and the Recent Airstrikes in Pakistan

In late July of this year, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen traveled to Pakistan on an unannounced trip, where he presented Pakistani military officials with evidence of the Inter-Services Intelligence’s (ISI) involvement in attacks in Afghanistan. The most recent large scale attack that the ISI may have been involved in took place on July 7, and was against the Indian embassy in Kabul resulting in the deaths of at least 58 people and injured more than 140. Two high ranking diplomats, Indian Defense Attache Brig. Gen. Ravi Dutt Mehta and the embassy’s Political and Information Counselor Vadapalli Venkateswara Rao, were among those killed in the attack. This attack in particular has all the hallmarks of an assassination.

A U.S. military strike in Pakistan on September 8 resulted in the deaths of multiple civilians all from the same extended family. While the loss of civilian lives in combat is regrettable this airstrike was not an accident. The target of the attack was the home of a Taliban leader that was most likely responsible for the attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul with the assistance of the ISI. Unfortunately the target of the strike was not home at the time and may have actually been in Afghanistan participating in the insurgency, but that is not the focus of this article.

So what do these two events, along with the dramatic increase of U.S. airstrikes in Pakistan, have in common? In a word – counterintelligence or CI. Before we discuss the link between these two events we must first understand the many purposes of CI. If intelligence is gathering information then it would make sense that counterintelligence is the method that prevents adversaries from learning what you know, but not all CI operations are the same. For instance, the FBI is charged with CI operations in the U.S. and strives to prevent, and if necessary identify, foreign espionage and subversion. Ultimately the FBI’s goal is to disrupt the flow of information to American adversaries and prosecute those individual’s involved. The CIA on the other hand often takes a different approach depending on the circumstances.

The CIA, a foreign intelligence service of the U.S., also works to identify individuals involved in collecting sensitive information, but disruption is not always the goal. Once a subversive element is discovered, whether it is an individual or a group, the CIA strives to learn the entire communication chain the subversive element uses. This allows the Agency to plant disinformation that can be used in a future operation, or in the case of the War on Terrorism, locate an individual.

Using the ISI

Pakistan’s traditional adversary has been India and the War on Terrorism has not changed that. In much the same fashion as how Russian and the U.S. fought during the Cold War, Pakistan has been using militant Islamists to stir up trouble in India in an attempt to prevent the struggle between the two from becoming a larger conventional conflict or worse – a nuclear standoff. The ISI has been the front agency for cultivating these proxy fighters, but in the last few years the ISI’s creation has turned against its master. In fact, the Institute for Conflict Management notes that suicide bombings in Pakistan rose from seven in 2006 to 56 in 2007. Further compounding the problem is the high number of Islamist sympathizers within the Pakistani intelligence agency that have been working against both the U.S. and their own government.

On many fronts the ISI, or elements within the agency, has been compromising intelligence activities by warning the militant factions of military movements or pending intelligence operations. This, of course, has hampered the ability of the U.S., NATO, and the Afghan military to deal with the raging insurgency. However, oftentimes problems can become opportunities when handled correctly.

The use of Counterintelligence Operations

Information can flow both ways. If the ISI is funneling information to the Taliban then from a CI perspective the communications network can be uncovered and exploited. In regards to this most recent airstrike it appears that the U.S. managed to locate the home of Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani, a top Taliban leader with close ties to al-Qaeda, by using those elements of the ISI that are in contact with him. This seems likely for several reasons with the foremost reason being the Haqqani has been on the U.S. hit list for some time and the strike on his compound only coming recently means that its location was just discovered. Unfortunately for the U.S., it missed its target and ended up killing several civilians along with a few militants. This can happen if the intelligence only offers a small window of opportunity for a military strike to take place and the operation is rushed. This may not be what happened, but it is the theory that makes the most sense.

In the waning months of the Bush administration it is highly likely that constant airstrikes in Pakistan will continue. It is also likely that more counterintelligence operations will take place since as-Shahab, the propaganda wing of al-Qaeda, has promised to deliver addresses from al-Qaeda leadership on the anniversary of the 9/11 attack. CI operations are not constrained to the agencies of foreign governments, but the media outlets that happen to just “find” an al-Qaeda audio or video tape for publication are likely to be a prime target. All non-state actors need to communicate with the outside world and this is more often than not the weak link in their security. It is the vulnerability of communications networks that brought an end to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq; and Pablo Escobar, the notorious leader of the Medellin Cartel. So it begs the question, could bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, or Mullah Omar be next?

*The descriptions of intelligence and CI operations described above are an oversimplified account for the purpose of brevity.