A Conspiracy of One

Authors note: The study of lone wolf terrorists is an area that receives little academic attention and yet has far reaching implications for the public. In this paper I use large terrorist movements, small groups, and spree killers as context in an attempt to highlight the differences between lone wolves and other terrorists. Additionally, this paper will discuss the prospects of lone wolves who are unaffiliated with one another and yet are bound through a common ideology to perpetrate self sustaining random violence – also known as low intensity conflict. This tactic is propagated in the Governance in the Wilderness by al-Qaeda’s chief theoretician, Sheik Abu-Bakar Naji.

First you feel nervous about riding the bus. Then you wonder about going to a mall. Then you think twice about sitting for long at your favorite café. Then nowhere seems safe. Terrorist groups have a strategy—to shrink to nothing the areas in which people move freely—and suicide bombers, inexpensive and reliably lethal, are their latest weapons. Israel has learned to recognize and disrupt the steps on the path to suicide attacks. We must learn too

--BRUCE HOFFMAN 2003

When it comes to terrorism – and any form of mass violence – the carnage of a successful attack can be contagious. What the author means by this is that other societal outsiders will try to replicate or expand upon a successful attack. A recent example is the Virginia Tech massacre that resulted in the deaths of 33 students and faculty. In the days and weeks that followed numerous threats were issued and several attempts were made to instigate violence at schools across the nation. Threats to attack public places occur on a daily basis, but in the wake of violence these threats or actual attempts at violence increase primarily because of media exposure. Societal outcasts, whether they are terrorists or disturbed individuals, seek to air their grievances in order to bring attention to their cause and today’s carnage oriented media is the perfect outlet. Unfortunately, as large terrorist groups fold under pressure from law enforcement and military the rise of lone wolves and small groups made up of like-minded individuals, thus diversifying the terrorist threat is inevitable.

The Strategy

The opening statement by Bruce Hoffman is a perfect example of how terrorists seize upon the successes of others to sow fear into the target population. The purpose of this is to force political change by using the population to lean on their government. In the example provided by Hoffman, Palestinian terrorist groups that operate independently can feed off a successful suicide bombing perpetrated by another group. First the attack may come from Hamas, followed by Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, and finally Islamic Jihad until the violence becomes self sustaining without any prior or continuing coordination among like-minded groups. Lone wolves and small violent movements all have the power to cause havoc in the same way and spread influence far beyond their inherently small numbers.

Take for instance the Anthrax letter attacks upon the U.S. from September to October 2001. A total of seven letters containing anthrax were mailed during this attack resulting in 22 people becoming infected and five eventually dying from the infection. These seven letters resulted in numerous building evacuations nationwide, a change in the routing of mail in four states, and hysteria by anyone receiving mail that looked as if it might have come into contact with a powdery substance. Granted, these attacks and the following reaction came on the heals of the 9/11, but we must also consider the reaction to the poisoned Tylenol bottles from the 1980’s. The deaths of seven people in the Chicago area led to a nationwide recall of 31 million bottles with a retail value of 100 million dollars. The attacks were simple and did not require extensive training, but the fallout from the attacks went well beyond the scope of the threat.

Size Does Matter

Bad pun, I know, but lone wolves and small groups do suffer from problems because of their size. While some lone wolves have been successful, one example is George Metesky, others have had limited success either because their grievances limit the target pool (these are known as single-issue terrorists), the target pool is so large that spotting trends is difficult, or because of a lack of training. In other instances the targets have taken measures to protect themselves or their property. In the case of Eric Robert Rudolph training wasn’t the issue but instead the precautions taken by his targets and the pressure applied by law enforcement. Unable to carry out any further attacks, Rudolph was forced to live in the North Carolina wilderness for five years before being apprehended. Rudolph did not have any formal training in the manufacture of explosives, but instead overcame this obstacle by stealing explosive material (as opposed to using improvised explosives with commercial chemicals) and using open source material to create an explosive device.

The Unabomber is another example of an individual terrorist having minimal impact. Theodore Kaczynski sent out 16 mail bombs and managed to kill three people, but his attacks did not produce any of the results he sought (Kaczynski was anti-technology) because his target pool was so large that patterns were difficult to distinguish. These patterns are used to find a common theme among targets in an attempt to learn the perpetrators motivation. What further hurt his cause, as if the bombs weren’t enough, was the lack of any publicized motivation. Kaczynski didn’t mail out his manifesto, Industrial Society and Its Future, until after his last bomb was mailed. Ironically, his publishing of the manifesto led to his capture. While lone wolves may not kill in great numbers they do manage to avoid apprehension because of their loner mentality.

Small terrorist movements also suffer from many of the same challenges that lone wolves do. A prime example is the Minnesota Patriots Council attempt to use ricin to poison a Deputy U.S. Marshall and a local Sheriff in retaliation for serving papers to a Council member. The Council had managed to produce .7 grams of ricin (enough to kill a least a hundred people), but failed to create a sufficient delivery system. The plot unraveled because of a marriage dispute that led to the arrest and conviction of four Council members under the 1989 Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act. The Council may have been successful in extracting the ricin, but because it chose a biological weapon it brought undue attention that may not have come if the group had relied on small arms for their assassination plot.

One small group that stands out is the Washington Beltway snipers. The two men that perpetrated the attacks simply used a Bushmaster version of an AR-15 and shot people at random for three weeks in October 2002. The attacks did not require much training beyond what John Allen Muhammad received in the military, but nonetheless left the Washington D.C. area in a state of fear. It is these types of attacks that prove to be the most successful for small groups and the fear that the attacks generate goes well beyond the scope of the threat. Small groups cannot be everywhere, but then again they don’t have to be; they just have to seem to be everywhere.

The ELF/ALF Model and the Modern Jihadist

The movement for freedom is rapidly approaching the point where for many people, the option of belonging to a group will be nonexistent. For others, group membership will be a viable option for only the immediate future. Eventually, and perhaps much sooner than most believe possible, the price paid for membership will exceed any perceived benefit. But for now, some of the groups that do exist often serve a useful purpose either for the newcomer who can be indoctrinated into the ideology of the struggle, or for generating positive propaganda to reach potential freedom fighters. It is sure that, for the most part, this struggle is rapidly becoming a matter of individual action, each of its participants making a private decision in the quietness of his heart to resist: to resist by any means necessary. It is hard to know what others will do, for no man truly knows another man's heart. It is enough to know what one himself will do. A great teacher once said "know thyself." Few men really do, but let each of us, promise ourselves, not to go quietly to the fate our would-be masters have planned.

--LOUIS BEAM

It is hard to improve upon the words of those people who wish to do others harms. In this case a white supremacist, Louis Beam, discusses in his work ‘Leaderless Resistance’ that the “struggle is rapidly becoming a matter of individual action.” What Beam means by this is that large movements attract attention while individual actors can hatch a plot in their head and execute it without fear of someone leaking the details to law enforcement. It is this idea that the modern ecoterrorist groups have used to their advantage. Movements such as ALF and ELF do not, and as far as I know have never, employed a hierarchal or pyramid structure. Instead, the movements depend on the internet to spread propaganda, indoctrinate, and instigate radicalism among the mainstream environmentalist movement – just as Louis Beam described for the white supremacist movement.

Many terrorist groups in the past have undergone transformations from hierarchal structures to cellular networks and finally to small movements or individual actors when pressured by individual governments. This process, which I call adaptive reconstruction, is born out of necessity not for the survival of the group, but more for the survival of the ideology. It is natural for people to congregate in groups for reasons of self preservation because a group, or tribes before the invention of the nation-state, can work together to better accomplish the needs of the individual. These needs – according to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs – include biological and physiological, safety, belongingness and love, esteem, and self-actualization. While it is possible for an individual to meet the biological and physiological needs; a group is better suited to meet the rest of the needs. The internet however, has shifted this paradigm.

The internet, and other means of modern communication, cannot fully replace the desire to form a physical group, but what it can do is provide information to people in search of belongingness to a movement. The modern jihadist has realized this. Not only have small groups tried to perpetrate attacks without the physical support of professional terrorists (theological and theoretical support not withstanding), but individuals as well have gravitated to the global jihad without any formal training. These individuals attended mainstream mosques and yet were radicalized by information provided on the internet. In this case the desire to belong to a group is somewhat fulfilled by being a member of a mainstream congregation, while simultaneously adding a divine purpose to their lives by joining other jihadists in cyberspace. While this phenomenon is occurring worldwide it has manifested in Great Britain substantially.

The most recent attempt was carried out by a mentally ill convert to Islam. The man, Nicky Reilly, carried three bombs into the bathroom of a family restaurant but failed to cause any damage other than to himself. The plot failed only because one of the devices detonated prematurely. Police suspect that Reilly was chosen because of his mental illness – a tactic that has garnered quite a bit press in the Iraq theatre. But Reilly is not alone in the lone wolf game. In April of this year, British police arrested a 19 year old student thanks to a tip from his Imam (the suspect had numerous burns on his hands) that led police to confiscate three improvised explosive devices from his apartment. Just a few months prior another arrest was made, this time the suspect was found to be stockpiling chemicals and other bomb making materials. It is believed that this man, Hassan Tabbakh, was in fact, Britain’s first jihadist lone wolf bomber (though he had yet to carry out an attack).

Are Suicide Tactics Next?

In the age of on demand information, escalation of tactics and weapons can occur without regard to success or failure of past attacks. Suicide tactics are inexpensive to carry out – usually around 150 dollars at the Home Depot – and work to influence public movements. The suicide bomber also adds to the psychological element of the attack because the idea of someone killing themselves to harm you is quite discomforting. But the question remains; would a small group or lone wolf carry out such an attack? Both are unlikely scenarios, but the Nicky Reilly case may prove to be the future. As stated previously, the use of the mentally ill as a tactic is something that has been occurring over the last few years. Unfortunately children and the elderly have also been used to carry out suicide attacks – sometimes without their knowledge. This approach allows the orchestrator of the attack to try again with another patsy or simply claim ignorance.

Suicide tactics also include lone gunman who wish to be killed by security forces while killing as many bystanders with as possible. This has worked well in the western world and the defense against such an attack is difficult. In the past few years the U.S. has witnessed such attacks in schools and malls – all soft targets – and it is unlikely to end. Spree shooters, regardless of motivation, often act alone, but that does not mean they will not inspire others. Following the Virginia Tech massacre, police stopped several individuals from carrying out similar attacks. These were not just threats, but plans that had gone operational only to be reported by concerned family members and friends.

Conclusion

Violence begets violence and often motivation can be inconsequential in lone wolf attacks. But in the case of terrorist groups that adaptively deconstruct into smaller movements, motivation may prove to be the factor that ensures indiscriminate violence can be sustained. After all it is motivation that separates terrorists from spree killers or other practitioners of mass violence by definition. The desire of terrorist movements is to influence government decisions through public opinion and the use of sustained random violence can accomplish this; at least temporarily. History shows us that all terrorist movements eventually fail because the violence employed alienates the population – a population that terrorists rely on to accomplish their goals. Of course simply resting on historical occurrences is hardly a viable counter-violence strategy, but the lesson we should take away is that they fail because of the intolerance for indiscriminate violence by the population.

Psychiatrist Jerrold Post postulated that individuals become terrorists in order to join terrorist groups and commit acts of terrorism. While the good doctor admits that this is an extreme position (Post studies terrorism with the theory that political violence is driven by psychological forces) he makes an important point. Terrorists engage in terrorism as a means to give purpose to their life (Maslow’s self-actualization), but the forces that work against them is death, apprehension, internal infighting, or success. Death, apprehension, or infighting is the most likely outcome, but success is an interesting proposition. As previous stated terrorists always fail not only because of outside pressure, but success – the accomplishment of the terrorists stated goals – negates the purpose of the group. What this means is that the outcast that had his individual needs met will once again be an outcast and forced to find another accepting group. This is utterly impossible from many terrorists. Once again we can turn to history to find examples of terrorist groups continuing violent acts after their demands have been met. The IRA, ETA, and PFLP all continued to engage in terrorism after each political success.

Most instances of terrorism and mass violence can be prevented. This cannot be overstated. Lone wolves and small groups survive as long as they do because family and friends have a hard time believing what is apparent – we know an individual that is disturbed and needs help. Earlier I mentioned that the Unabomber was only caught after he published his manifesto. It was his brother that recognized the phrases and prose when the document was published and yet he still struggled with the realization that his brother was a terrorist and must be turned in. In the event that an act of terrorism occurs it is important to watch for other individuals to capitalize on the media frenzy. They may use a variety of tactics to ensure that the attack works, but the signs they show before an attack will give them away.

When you report something that appears out of the ordinary you cannot be wrong. As Gavin de Becker stated, “You can only be wrong if you place your personal pride above your personal safety.” Simply speaking up can stop an attack regardless of size or complexity.

Until next time stay safe.

The Beginning of the End?

In the last few months the following has occurred in the Iraq theatre:

• Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has recently admitted that attacks have fallen 94%.
  
• Recent Iraqi Army operations have detained over 800 suspected combatants.
  
• Foreign Fighters that traveled to Iraq are beginning to return home.
  
• U.S. military surge units have been withdrawn – Gen. Petraeus will recommend further cuts in September.
  
• Moqtada Al-Sadr (a.k.a. “Mookie”) has been maligned by Iran and much of the Shiite community.

All this information sounds good but, we should all refrain from pulling out the party hats and bubbly for time being. Iraq is on course to become a viable nation if, and only if, these trends continue. The counterinsurgency operations run by the U.S. and Iraqi militaries can only continue to be successful if the Iraqi political establishment does not become dominated by one ethnic or religious faction and if economic stability manifests and proves conducive to foreign investment. But we’re getting ahead of ourselves here, let begin with the above headlines one by one.

Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has recently admitted that attacks have fallen 94%.

This information didn’t come out via an al-Qaeda press conference, but instead was revealed through captured documents in recent raids conducted by the Iraqi military. What this means is, one counterinsurgency methods are working, and two many foreign fighters have chosen to return home because its no longer worth fighting if local support for the mujahedeen has dried up. Terrorist groups fall flat on their face without local support regardless of amounts of money and weapons. It appears that al-Qaeda has learned this the hard way.

While these successes can be sustained they will not ultimately remove al-Qaeda from Iraq. On the contrary AQI will instead try to use Iraq as a transient training ground and also as a route to move money and weapons for attacks elsewhere in the world against western interests. Unfortunately we haven’t heard the last of this group. I fully suspect that AQI will become the future of the jihadist movement only they will be a flatter organization with more global capabilities.

Recent Iraqi Army operations have detained over 800 suspected combatants.

While the number of individuals detained may look impressive it is of limited importance. The real story lies in the capability of the Iraqi military to carry out this operation with limited U.S. support and the desire of the Iraqi government to exercise power through force and political maneuver. Both of these very important elements of the new Iraq have been maligned by the western press and have been given very little chance for success; especially following the Basra debacle. But the battle of Basra was not a failure for the al-Maliki government and certainly was not a success for the Shiite rebels, but instead has proven to a be incident that has allowed the political powers to negotiate with nationalistic Shiites that want to be included in the democratic government and has isolated the more radical Shiite militias. The Iraqi army is slowly proving itself to be a viable entity in the new Iraq and should continue to be sustained by western training and funding.

Foreign Fighters that traveled to Iraq are beginning to return home.

The exodus of foreign fighters out of Iraq is not a phenomenon without precedence. The last time such a movement of well trained terrorists took place was after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in which the world witnessed the birth of al-Qaeda and other associated terror groups. The contemporary exodus is very similar to the one of the 1980’s in that most foreign fighters are returning to their home countries of Libya and Saudi Arabia, the same two nations that produced most of the former Arab-Afghans. Further compounding the problem is the return of fighters to another country that has played an unwilling host to an al-Qaeda movement – Algeria.

The problems associated with returning jihadists are already playing out in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Algeria. As with the 1980’s exodus, these terrorists are still filled with the spirit of jihad and are looking to take on the government regimes of their home nations and looking to replace them with more fundamentalist governments. What does appear to be slightly different this time is the immediate willingness to cooperate with other groups in a more regional manner, as opposed to solely national cooperation, and the desire to target western interests abroad. The Algerian al-Qaeda (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb [AQIM]) component has managed to pull off more spectacular attacks, but this will only lead to harsh counterinsurgency methods employed by the Algerian government to curb the violence. Like al-Qaeda prime (bin Laden’s al-Qaeda apparatus) AQIM seems overly fixated on large spectacular events that provide short term success at the expense of long term strategy that is necessary for guerilla groups to gain ground. This short sighted approach will force the group to constantly relocate to Mali and other havens in Northern Africa.

The recent violence in Yemen on the other hand is low intensity basic guerilla combat employed to exploit divisions in the government and along sectarian lines. Recently Kataib Jund al-Yaman, a subgroup of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) that operates in both Yemen and Saudi Arabia, threatened to target all visitors that enter the region. While these threats are far from new, the return of foreign fighters to Saudi Arabia that have trained in Iraq is enough to take this threat a little more seriously. It is this violence in Yemen that is likely to become the norm for the new generation of jihadists.

U.S. military surge units have been withdrawn – Gen. Petraeus will recommend further cuts in September.

The purpose of the surge was to improve security in Iraq. As you can probably tell by the al-Qaeda admission that their operations have decrease significantly the surge has worked well, but these gains can be undone over night. General Petraeus obviously knows this and is waiting out to summer before he recommends troop reductions. It is doubtful that he will simply state that troops will be substantially withdrawn come September, but I suspect that he will instead order a realignment of forces and a change in mission. What this means in laymen’s terms is that the Iraqi government and military must continue to step forward and take charge of their country. As I stated previously this is already happening in many parts of the country and looks to be viable and sustainable.

The future of the U.S. mission in Iraq will begin to change in the near term. The training and supplying of arms will of course continue, but the patrolling and support by the U.S. military must begin to diminish. In areas such as close air support the U.S. obviously cannot step away quite yet, but then again air power is much less visible than a soldier or Marine patrolling the streets of Baghdad. If the current trend holds this could significantly diminish in the next twelve months as capable Iraqi forces take over control. All told I expect the U.S. military direct operational involvement to be cut back drastically over the next 12 to 18 months. By this time the U.S. will have reassessed its long term mission in Iraq.

Moqtada al-Sadr (a.k.a. “Mookie”) has been maligned by Iran and much of the Shiite community.

I seriously doubt al-Sadr’s buddies refer to him as Mookie, but that won’t stop me from doing so. My personal assessment of Mookie is that he is not as important as the western media makes him out to be, in fact western media is almost single handedly responsible for many of the myths that have been continuously propagated about the chubby cleric. Here are a few of the myths:

• Al-Sadr controls the whims of the majority of Iraqi Shiites.
• Iran has complete control over al-Sadr and plays puppet master when it serves Tehran’s interest.
• Shiites often follow al-Sadr’s fatwas.
• Mookie has agreed to work with the Jenny Craig program to become more photogenic.

Alright, I made the last one up. First let’s clear up some of these myths before we discuss Mookie’s future. Al-Sadr’s following is relatively small when compared to other Shiite movements. What makes Mookie appear important is his militia known as the Mahdi army, a military movement that Mookie had no business forming since he doesn’t have the religious authority to do so.

Iran and Mookie do not get along at all and more than likely will not in the future either. Iran gambled that they could use Mookie and his militia as a means of extending influence in Iraq, but failed to consider that the Sadr family hatred of Tehran could not be overcome. Mookie’s father, Mohammed al-Sadr, worked against Iranian hegemony in the Shiite world – a position that was taken up by Mookie upon his father’s death.

The final myth that we have to contend with concerns Mookie’s fatwa’s. The problem with this myth is that al-Sadr does not have the religious authority that comes with education to issue any religious edicts. Mookie is currently a student at a Shiite hawza in Qom at the invite of Iran. Again, this does not mean that Mookie is working with the Iranians; on the contrary it means that al-Sadr understands that education in the Shiite system is the only way to gain the authority he desires in Iraq.

The current problem in Iraq, with regards to Mookie, is that the U.S. wants to see him brought into the mainstream political system while the Iraqi government wants to pull his turban all the way down to his ankles. In essence most Iraqi’s are sick of Mookie as the recent assassination of al-Sadr’s closest aide shows. Mookie is not the last, or even the most pressing problem in Iraq, but he is a problem that must be dealt with by the Iraqi’s.

Conclusion – The Final Phase in Iraq

Iraq has the potential to become a viable nation and an economic and political leader in the Middle East, but potential does not always turn into reality. As I stated previously, the counterinsurgency operations run by the U.S. and Iraqi militaries can only continue to be successful if the Iraqi political establishment does not become dominated by one ethnic or religious faction and if economic stability manifests and proves conducive to foreign investment. Parliamentary elections have been postponed one month and will take place in November. These elections should be a good indicator of the political environment in Iraq since many of the Sunni’s that boycotted previous elections are expected to participate this time.

Another wild card many are expecting to see complicate the Iraq rebuilding process is the U.S. presidential election. Barring any strange political twists it appears that the Republican nominee will be John McCain and the Democratic nominee will be Barack Obama. As best as I can tell, McCain’s approach is inline with President Bush’s current strategy – wait until the general’s report back. Obama on the other hand favors an immediate withdrawal of all U.S. forces. What may sound strange is that both strategies could result in the same outcome because of the current situation on the ground and other strategic challenges to the U.S. global hegemony that are occurring because of the massive amount of military involvement in Iraq. In the end McCain will not wait too long and Obama couldn’t move too fast. An immediate withdrawal of troops is not possible, military movements across continents take time – sometimes over a year – which would fit my assessment of when the U.S. military will want to move on anyway. Waiting to long for Iraqi developments is not an option either. In response to the U.S. recognition of Kosovo independence Russia has made aggressive moves in Georgia – a U.S. ally. Russia is taking the opportunity presented by U.S. involvement in Iraq as a means to further influence former Soviet bloc countries – a problem since the U.S. invested 50 years in the form of a cold war to free these nations.

The bottom line is we are witnessing the beginning of the end of U.S. military operations in Iraq not only because the situation on the ground has improved, but also because we cannot continue operations there for much longer.

Operation Goldenrod and the USS Cole

On October 12 of this year will mark eight years since the bombing of the USS Cole and full justice has yet to come. Several of the perpetrators have been killed or incarcerated and yet the ‘mastermind’ of the attack has not served his prison sentence imposed by the Yemeni government. After reading the excellent post by Douglas Farah in response to a Washington Post article I was reminded about a little known rendition operation run by the FBI in the late 1980’s – Operation Goldenrod. Rendition operations are controversial and are rarely carried out without the host countries consent; however, as Goldenrod demonstrates, other methods are available to the military and law enforcement that have been upheld by the Supreme Court.

USS Cole bombing: the aftermath

The FBI and NCIS agents involved in the investigation were constantly frustrated by the Yemeni government. Both agencies frequently reported the suspects being moved or hidden prior to scheduled questioning – questioning that had been scheduled by the Yemeni government for the benefit of U.S. law enforcement. Yemen also declined to extradite the suspects to the U.S. for trial because it violated their constitution. While this explanation is satisfactory the Yemeni government, who practically begged the U.S. Navy to use Aden as a refueling stop to help bolster the local economy, did little to accommodate U.S. requests for interrogation or to monitor the perpetrators in prison. The Yemeni government does deserve some credit however for allowing the CIA to use an unmanned Predator to strike a vehicle carrying some of the Cole bombing suspects (and other al-Qaeda operatives) with a hellfire missile. Unfortunately not all suspects have been arrested or executed such as two that went to Iraq to carry out suicide attacks against the U.S.

Jamel Ahmed Mohammed Ali Al-Badawi

On May 15th, 2003 the U.S. indicted al-Badawi for the attack on the Cole and was later captured by the Yemeni government on September 29, 2004. Yemen would find al-Badawi guilty and sentence him to death, but his sentence would never be carried out – because he would escape from prison twice. After Al-Badawi managed to escape from prison the second time he was subsequently granted a pardon for the Cole conviction after turning himself in to authorities. According to Farah’s article, al-Badawi is now aiding the Yemeni government in exposing other al-Qaeda operations – which is obviously not going according to plan as witnessed by the recent spike in violence against foreigners in Yemen by an al-Qaeda affiliate. While the lead FBI agent on the case states that he is ‘back to square one’ he should not abandon hope as his predecessors have faced similar situations.

Fawaz Younis and Operation Goldenrod

At the Beirut Airport on June 11, 1985, five terrorists charged up the stairs of Royal Jordanian Airlines Flight 402 as it was boarding passengers and promptly took control of the aircraft. The Jordanian sky marshals providing security were tortured until they revealed the hiding places for their weapons. As was customary of hijackings at the time, the plane was flown to several locations where the terrorists would stop for fuel and hold press conferences detailing their demands (in this case it was for the expulsion of all Palestinians out of Lebanon). After the aircraft returned to Beirut for the final time all passengers were released shortly before the plane was blown up. A man who only identified himself as Nazeeh held a final press conference were the terrorists demands were reiterated. Nazeeh, as it would turn out, was in fact a man named Fawaz Younis, a member of the Lebanese Amal.

In the time following the hijacking Younis had been looking for a means to make money. U.S. intelligence operatives, who had made contact with Younis posing as drug runners, made him an offer and gave him a meeting place – in international waters off the coast of Cyprus. The FBI rented a yacht for the meeting to add legitimacy to the drug dealer façade. Once Younis set foot on the yacht he was promptly arrested and moved to the USS Butte, next the USS Saratoga, and finally flown back to the U.S. where he was charged under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. This act gave the FBI jurisdiction over terrorist acts in which Americans were taken hostage – no matter where the acts occurred. That authority was expanded in 1986 with the passage of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act. Younis was eventually convicted, despite several setbacks and appeals, of conspiracy, aircraft piracy, and hostage-taking. He would get thirty years.

Operation Goldenrod should be studied by all FBI agents investigating terrorist acts upon Americans. The operation was successful in capturing a wanted terrorist and several federal courts upheld the method by which the operation was run. If the FBI wants to apprehend al-Badawi, Operation Goldenrod provides and excellent example of how it could be done.

Sidebar: The presence of two U.S. citizens aboard Royal Jordanian Airlines Flight 402 brought the investigation under the jurisdiction of the FBI. Those two citizens were Thomas Landry Slade, the vice president of the American University in Beirut, and William, his 16-year-old son. Both Americans were released with the other hostages in Beirut only to be hijacked again the next day attempting to fly back to the U.S.

Al-Qaeda's Future Operations in Saudi Arabia and Yemen

Recent violence in Yemen is the result of a decade’s long struggle between various factions that range from religious motivation to purely political struggles. It is this type of environment that al-Qaeda (and terrorists in general) likes to exploit to make reaching their goals much easier. The violence in Yemen between pro-government groups, anti-government groups, and the Shiite Muslim sect have made terrorist operations far simpler because of the preoccupation of the government to curb domestic political violence. The attack on the homes of U.S. oil experts is an attempt by the Yemeni al-Qaeda affiliate* to reestablish itself following counterinsurgent operations (as limited as they were) by the government. This violence could spill over into Saudi Arabia and possibly be a glimpse of al-Qaeda operations post-Iraq.

Saudi Arabia and Yemen have long been at odds over their common border. The first such contemporary instance took place back in the 1930’s and flared up once again following the unification of North Yemen and South Yemen in 1990. Originally the dispute was over the actual location of the border, which was settled with the 2000 Jeddah Treaty, while today tensions are primarily over the movement of Jihadists into Saudi Arabia. In an attempt to alleviate the problem, Saudi Arabia began work on a border fence that drew loud protests from the Yemeni government and several tribes that straddle the border. Saudi Arabia relented and suspended construction following mediation by Egypt and agreed to patrol the border jointly with the Yemeni military. This agreement has not solved the problem of cross border attacks against the Saudi government or foreigners in the country. It is highly likely that the al-Qaeda affiliate in Yemen will work with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to target Westerners and the Saudi government. Furthermore, recent protests in Yemen are likely to be infiltrated by al-Qaeda in an attempt to perpetuate violence and cause chaos.

The situation in Iraq also has an impact in Saudi Arabia. Most of the foreign fighters that fought under the al-Qaeda banner came from Saudi Arabia. This places the Saudis in a precarious situation, one that is not all that foreign to them. The Saudis and the Libyans in particular faced a crisis after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, which was what to do with the Jihadists returning home. Many of these fighters sought to overthrow their current regimes and replace them with more fundamentalist governments. The attempts to overthrow these governments failed and forced the Jihadists to remote parts of their home countries or seek to refuge in a foreign land. When the current generation of Jihadists return home they may not seek to target their government right away, but instead attempt to remove Western influence from their countries and attack Shiite minorities. Unfortunately this does not bode well in a Middle East that is witnessing an Iran that is becoming increasingly influential.

The Shiite minorities in Saudi Arabia primarily live in the oil rich regions in the east. This also happens to be the home to many Western oil companies as well as foreign military bases. The Sunni fighters are not alone in their militancy, however. The Saudi Hizballah has proven to be a force in Saudi Arabia and is very good at carrying out terrorist attacks. It was the Saudi Hizballah that attacked the Khobar Towers killing 19 U.S. servicemen. Currently the Saudi Hizballah does not seek to engage in violence for two reasons. The first is the current cooperation with the Saudi government (which is primarily for show so that the Saudi Hizballah can reconstitute). The second is Saudi Hizballah is taking a ‘wait and see’ approach to the situation in Iraq. If any violence between the Sunnis and the Shiites were to take place in Saudi Arabia, most of the fighting would be in the eastern provinces while terrorist attacks could occur nationwide. What is clear is that the al-Qaeda in Iraq will be forced out of the country with in the next 12 to 18 months as they have lost all local support and are completely dependant upon Iran for weapons and money. Those Jihadists returning home could complicate the delicate dance between the Sunni House of Saud and the Komeninist Shiites and shove the Middle East into tit for tat terror attacks among the two countries.

*The recent communiqués come from a group calling itself the Soldiers Brigade of Yemen. Other groups that have been identified as being apart of al-Qaeda proper in the Arabian Peninsula include the Islamic Army of Aden (IAA) and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Terrorist groups like to use several names to confuse intelligence and complicate counterinsurgency operations.

Here We Go Again

An article on the Jerusalem Post website states:

An upcoming joint US-Israel report on the September 6 IAF strike on a Syrian facility will claim that former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein transferred weapons of mass destruction to the country, Channel 2 stated Monday.

Furthermore, according to a report leaked to the TV channel, Syria has arrested 10 intelligence officials following the assassination of Hizbullah terror chief Imad Mughniyeh.

This report was requested by congress. Congress would not sign off on the intelligence budget without a report on the target of the September 6 raid. What will garner most of the attention however, is the statement that Saddam moved part of his chem/bio weapons arsenal to Syria. This is really no surprise and its nice that the intelligence community can finally put this information in the public domain. As far as I know information regarding what happened to the remnants of his stockpile are still classified although some information has made it into the media.

For those that don't remember, on September 6, 2007, Israeli fighters struck what appears to be a nuclear reactor in Syria. Israeli intelligence hacked the Syrian air defense network which allowed their fighters to penetrate undetected and strike the alleged reactor which was strikingly familiar to the one in North Korea. I mentioned in an earlier post that North Korean and Iranian military officials were working together to place a chemical warhead on a Syrian missile which prematurely detonated killing several people. This cooperation is not new.

As far as the Mughniyeh assassination goes the arrest of 10 intelligence officials in Syria makes sense. Here is what I know thus far:
1. The order for the assassination most likely came from Assad's brother-in-law who runs much of the intelligence apparatus - apparently bad blood existed between him and Mughniyeh.
2. The actual operation was probably carried out with the help of Israeli Mossad, although the level of cooperation from Israel and the level of complicity from Syria is still unknown.
3. Mughniyeh was tied to the Hariri assassination - Syria may have been trying to distance itself from the international inquiry which is likely to find Syria responsible for the assassination with Mughniyeh's minion(s) as the operator(s).
4. This purge may be the last effort to remove all individuals involved with Mughniyeh and the Hariri assassination.

Syria will still have to deal with the finding of the international investigation, but will have little recourse since it has either disappeared or killed all involved. Either way Syria will continue to 'influence' Lebanese politics.

The WMD's are another issue that could cause problems for Assad. Syria has long been suspected of having a large chem/bio weapons program without the aid of Assad's fellow baathist, Saddam Hussein. Perhaps this 'revelation' will force the international community to apply pressure to the Assad regime to open up Syria's weapons programs. So, here we go again, but maybe this time it will be a little more interesting.

Fitna the Movie Hits the Net

Netherlands PM Geert Wilders new movie "Fitna" has been posted on the live leak website. It is a movie that runs for fifteen minutes and shows various passages out of the Koran urging Muslims to commit acts of violence against non-believers. After watching the movie I found very little original material, in fact many of the clips can be found at memri.org or in the 2005 movie "Obsession." That being said I don't believe the purpose of the movie was to be a primer on the political philosophy of Islamism or the threat that ideology presents to all nations of the earth. What the movie does appear to be is volley directed at those who do not believe in Mr. Wilders version of the threat. I fully suspect the motivation behind this film is to provoke a violent reaction from Muslims worldwide similar to the riots that followed the Danish cartoon controversy and the false Newsweek article about U.S interrogators flushing the Koran. The only thing I find useful in this film is the inclusion of newspaper headlines that describe the problems the Netherlands and the rest of Europe are facing.

For those people that are interested in more academic material I recommend the following:

Sheikh Abdel‐Fatah Al‐Khalidi Revitalizes Sayid Qutb
The Ikhwan in North America: A Short History
“The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States: A Brief History”

I also recommend the blog run by Douglas Farah. He has done some of the best work I've seen on the Muslim Brotherhood and the influence it has on modern jihadist groups.

If anyone has specific questions just leave a comment and I will give you what information I have as well as some additional sources. I will also be updating my links list to include other sources that are relevant to the study of terrorism, cults, and other non-state actors.

Update: Mughniyah assassination

In my earlier statement I said that Mughniyah was the only occupant of the targeted vehicle. It now turns out that a deputy to Hezbollah General Secretary Hassan Nasrallah, Haj Hussein Khalil was also killed in the attack. While this assassination dealt a blow to Hezbollah's militia apparatus Hezbollah will retaliate as they always do. With the death of Khalil it becomes more apparent that this assassination was carried out by Israel (multiple sources now confirm this). Had the U.S. decided to carry out the attack it may have been postponed until Mughniyah was alone. By killing both men of high status within Hezbollah, the Israelis will see a retaliatory attack very shortly.