Over the last few years the U.S. has been moving naval strike groups in and out of the Persian Gulf in support of ongoing operations in Iraq and also to send a message to Iran. For the most part only one aircraft carrier strike group is present in the Gulf at any given time. When two carriers are put in place it allows for 24 hour operations so there is no gap in airstrikes should they take place. The additional presence of guided missile cruisers allows for the launching of cruise missiles for strikes against hardened targets. Since three carriers will ultimately be in place it would appear the strikes against Iran are immanent, but that may not be the case.
It is normal for the U.S. to move military muscle around to give the impression that an attack is immanent only to pull back and do it again several months later. This tends to wear down an adversaries response time as the movements are viewed as routine. When the U.S. finally does attack the enemy response is significantly degraded and the attack has a greater chance of success. It is possible that’s all that is happening here. Iran recently missed a deadline for indicating it was seriously ready to discuss ending its pursuit of nuclear weapons. While Iran has missed every deadline in the past the further Tehran gets in advancing its nuclear program the more pressure the U.S. and Europe are likely to apply.
Currently a military strike against Iran is unlikely, at least in the short term. President Bush is engaged in a farewell tour in Asia and attending the opening of the Olympic Games. It is unlikely that the U.S. would strike Iran while the President is out of the country. The U.S. has also discussed opening an interests-section office in the capital of Iran that will allow for direct talks between the two nations. This is just below full diplomatic relations. Tehran has been receptive to the idea, but nothing concrete has taken place. Most recently the U.S. sent the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs to the negotiating table in Geneva, another factor that looks as if the diplomatic process will continue – at least for a little while longer.
Iran’s Domestic Problems
Iran is in bad shape economically. Inflation is around 20 percent, unemployment is in the double digits, and 18 percent of the population lives in extreme poverty. The Iranian nuclear program has increased these problems by bringing international sanctions against Iranian banks and its wealthiest citizens. Additional problems include government sponsored gas subsidies in the face of high oil prices. Iran may be a top exporter of petroleum, but is also a major importer of refined products such as gasoline. Because of these problems Iran is increasingly vulnerable to international pressure and possibly revolution.
When discussing Iran it is often prudent to discuss the nature of its military. The primary mission of the Iranian military is to maintain order within the country and repel invaders should it become necessary. Although Iran does not have the capability to project a conventional military force it engages in the exportation of the Islamic revolution through the use of its al-Quds Force (Jerusalem Force) – a branch of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Iran is an ethnically diverse nation that often times faces domestic problems typically revolving around treatment of ethnic and religious minorities. It is these problems that consume most of the Iranian military effort.
The Iranians did try to use unconventional forces in Iraq in an attempt to force the U.S. to leave so that Tehran could spread its influence in Baghdad. What happened to the Iranians is known as operational blowback. Iran never had a good hold over the Shiite Muslims in Iraq and was known to provide weapons, money, and training to both Sunni and Shiite militants. This persisted until the U.S. surge proved too much for the Iranians to oppose. The employing of the Sunni Awakening councils and the political leverage used by al-Maliki over the Shiites also did much to force Iranian influence out of Iraq. While Iran wanted to use the support of the various factions fighting the new Iraqi government to spread influence it instead has suffered the opposite. Many Iraqis are distrustful of Tehran and have instead shown an increased loyalty to Baghdad.
The U.S. felt as if it had to negotiate with Iran over the future of Iraq and engaged in several rounds of talks in Baghdad. But with the success of the surge and the consolidation of power in the Iraqi government the Iranians were on the outs. The U.S. also received more than it bargained for. The Iraqi government and military have become strong enough that they want to know how and when the U.S. will withdraw its military force. Currently the U.S. is looking at withdrawing 3 of the 15 brigade combat teams this September with further cuts to be announced in January. This move by the Iraqis is a good sign that the government in now confident enough to stand on its own and the continued presence of foreign troops is becoming a political liability. It is this strength in Baghdad and the new Iraqi army at 137,000 strong that has created a situation the Iranians have long feared.
What a Strike Might Look Like
With Iran as isolated as it is and with international sanctions steadily increasing over the nuclear program one would think that military action is inevitable when in fact the opposite is true. Israel has made statements that it will not allow Iran to construct a nuclear weapon and will use force to stop it. For any strike against the nuclear facilities it would require air and naval attacks on 2 of the 11 hardened sites protected by advanced Russian air defenses.* Currently Israel does not possess any long range heavy bombers for an air attack and would have to rely on fighter/attack aircraft with a refueling stop in Turkey. Another aspect to the attack would require naval support most likely in the form of cruise missiles. Israel has three dolphin class submarines capable of firing Popeye turbo cruise missiles at a range of just over 900 miles. Cruise missiles are meant to be a weapon used for high value targets that need to be hit with surgical precision, but with only two of the three submarines launching missiles (only two are known to operate in the Persian Gulf) the attack may only cause limited damage.
A U.S. led operation is really the only possibility should a military confrontation with Iran take place. The Pentagon has stated that it could destroy the Iranian military in three days. To accomplish this, the U.S. can move two aircraft carriers to the Persian Gulf that allow for 24 hour operations supported by bomber and naval fire. It is conceivable that the U.S. could carry out this operation, but that would mean sacrificing the progress made in the talks with Iran over the future of Iraq. It’s doubtful that the Iranians could respond by supporting another insurgency in Iraq, but it could do enough to cause problems. Currently Iraq is not supporting any action against Iran and has told the U.S. it will not allow any cross border attacks. It is unclear whether any Iranian retaliation in Iraq would draw Baghdad into a larger conflict, but it would be best if Iraqi involvement in an action against Iran not take place. Iran and Iraq have a long history of animosity and any Iraqi action could lead to a groundswell of Iranian nationalism.
Another possibility for an Iranian response would be through Hezbollah. Iran funds Hezbollah at about 500 million a year plus supplements in the event of a war with Israel. In the event of a military attack, Iran would want to get its moneys worth. Hezbollah is the most adept and capable terrorist organization in the world and could launch attacks against U.S. interests globally. Any action taken against the Iranian nuclear program must consider this possibility and employ methods to counter the Hezbollah threat.
The Iranians have also threatened to close the Hormuz straits in the event of a military attack. While this makes for good fodder for the media because of the 16-17 million barrels of oil – about 40% of daily global oil consumption – that travel through the strait each day the possibility of Iran doing this effectively is remote. The last time the Iranians and the U.S. had a military engagement in the Persian Gulf was in 1988 and things work out so well for the Iranian navy. The operation was known as Preying Mantis and resulted in a large portion of the Iranian navy being destroyed in a single day by U.S. naval ships. Iran may try to use mines in the strait, but with U.S. and other naval war vessels in the area the attempt would be a token gesture at best.
Is Another Iranian Revolution Possible?
Currently Iran has more problems than answers. These political problems, both internal and external, are being handled by the officer corps of the IRGC. This has taken place by replacing 9 of the 21 cabinet members with IRGC officers and allowing these men to crush dissent. The Iranian people have not taken this change lightly and the proper application of support by the U.S. or other western nations may bring clerical rule to an end.
In fact this support is already taking place. Congress has already approved 400 million dollars to this very enterprise and it appears as if American military and intelligence personnel are working in Iran. The purpose of this funding is to foment domestic unrest and undermine the Iranian nuclear program. Operations such as this are fraught with risk and blowback is a very real possibility. With the increase of the military in domestic politics the theocratic regime could be replaced with a military dictatorship. This outcome is not in the interest of the Iranian people the U.S. or any other nation in the ME.
Many powerful people have called for reform in Tehran not the least of whom is Hossein Khomeini, the grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini has asked for President Bush to come and occupy Iran like the U.S. did in Iraq. He has also stated that ‘freedom must come to Iran in any possible way, whether through internal or external developments.’ These words are not to be taken lightly and represent the feelings of a great many Iranians. Regardless of local support, the change in political and economic systems of any nation is a difficult enterprise – even in the most pro-American country in the ME.
The Wildcards – New Intelligence and Developments
Of course without access to classified estimates and the possibility that new developments in the Iranian nuclear program can take place a military strike could happen. At this point it is unclear what the tipping point would be. Iran has already enriched about half of the uranium needed for a nuclear weapon, but of course a nuclear weapon isn’t worth much if it is too big for any of the Iranian delivery systems. The best it could be used for is as a disincentive to invade with a ground force. In any case it is unlikely that the U.S. would use much of a ground force in the event of an attack on Iran. In all actuality the attack would probably resemble the airstrikes that took place at the beginnings of the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns with the use of Special Forces to make contacts and create alliances with the local population to bring down the government.
In the end a U.S. strike would have to topple the government or at least dispatch the Iranian scientists involved in the nuclear program. The survival of the regime would allow for the rebuilding of the nuclear facilities and only serve to delay the nuclear program. If the scientists were removed or the regime collapsed the nuclear issue would cease. In the past few years both American and Iranian leaders have used strong rhetoric over the nuclear issue, but rhetoric should never be confused with policy. And while it appears as if a military strike is about to take place other developments lean toward continued diplomacy. What will happen in the next few months and with the new President however, remain to be seen.
*Iran’s uranium enrichment is taking place at the Natanz facility, while the suspected weapons program is taking place at the Esfahan [Isfahan] Nuclear Technology Center.
The following maps show the location and purpose of Iran’s declared facilities
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