Georgia, Iraq and the Reemergence of the U.S. – Russian Divide

Over time the name or the economic system of a country may change, but the geopolitics of the nation remains pretty much the same. Such is the case of Russia and by extension Russian – US relations. The Cold War was fought mainly through proxies and relied heavily on nuclear deterrence. If ever a war broke out with the U.S. the Soviet doctrine was to deploy their tanks (and they used to have a lot of them) and occupy Europe. The theory was that with a large tank fleet invading Europe the U.S. would be forced to use a tactical nuclear strike to stop it thus plunging the world into a nuclear war. Since a nuclear war can ruin your whole day, both superpowers employed several measures to prevent that from happening. The Cuban missile crisis was all that was necessary for that to happen.

Back then Europe was considerably smaller (the Warsaw Pact powers made it that way) and Russia was significantly stronger than what it is today and that strategy may have worked.

Today the Russian doctrine is to control as much of the European economy as possible by controlling the oil and natural gas supply. If ever NATO appears to present too much of a threat the Russians can wage economic warfare by cutting off the oil and natural gas supply.

Enter Georgia

Georgia, a former Soviet state, has a strong western friendly government and wants NATO membership. Russia sees that as a threat and will do much to stop NATO membership for the former Warsaw Pact countries. Since Georgia is a small nation that resides outside of Europe proper it is a perfect target for the Russians to reassert themselves militarily. Adding to mix is a fuel pipeline that goes through Georgia to supply Eastern Europe, and Russia wants to control it. This strategy is two fold. One, it helps the Russians wage economic warfare against Europe, and two it brings the former Eastern Bloc back under Russian influence.

Russia saw the opportunity to pick a fight using South Ossetia. They granted Ossetians Russian citizenship in the early 1990’s and have been selling them weapons for years. Unbeknownst to most people the Russians have had their invasion forces on the border of South Ossetia, in addition to the peacekeeping forces already in the province, in preparation for an invasion for about 5 months. The Russians, either through the FSB or Special Operations troops, have been supporting Ossetian troops against the Georgian government hoping to make Georgia respond militarily.

Prior to the invasion the Ossetians and the Georgians were exchanging artillery fire for about three days before a small Ossetian offensive took place. The Georgians thought that this was a precursor to the coming Russian invasion and were forced to take the bait – just like Moscow wanted them too.

When Georgia went into Ossetia the Russians decided that this was the perfect time to go in under the guise of protecting Russian citizens. The underlying plan was to invade Georgia, discredit the pro-Western government, and set up a government that will be more favorable to Moscow without actually engaging in a long term occupation. Russia wanted to use a proxy government as opposed to bringing Georgia back within Russian borders so that the intervention would appear legitimate.

The Russian Invasion

Some observers have stated that the Russians successfully used a combined arms approach during the invasion. Through the lens of the reporters on the ground it looked that way, but under further scrutiny those claims don't add up. The Russians may have used several elements of their military but they didn't act in concert as you would expect in a true combined arms attack.

The mechanized infantry went in with a large number of troops and tanks that operated independently of other forces. The Russian navy struck Georgian ships in the Black Sea while the air force struck strategic targets – namely fixed military installations and political targets. A combined arms approach would have included the navy and air force striking tactical targets, in addition to striking strategic targets, to aid in the advance of ground forces. This approach did not take place.

What did happen was an approach that was similar to that of WWII complete with the inability to communicate between all forces. From a military perspective it appeared slightly embarrassing for the Russians since the Commander of the ground forces had to rely on war correspondents for the current positions of his troops in other parts of the country.

Many have stated that the U.S. didn't respond militarily because they simply couldn't. The U.S. currently has about one quarter of its army in Iraq and is also working in Afghanistan in a smaller capacity. That opens up the air force and the navy to respond. Since it appeared that the Russians did not have command and control of their invasion force the U.S. could have responded with air strikes against the Russians for at least a day before the Russian air force could respond.

Instead of responding militarily the U.S. played the waiting game because the Russian response to NATO or U.S. intervention is unknown. This strategy has allowed the Russian troops to do what they do best – pillage and burn. Because the Russian military does not have command and control over their troops looting by the Russian military is already taking place in front of the cameras of the international media.

The U.S. response on August 13 proved interesting. Bush has order the Pentagon to put together a humanitarian effort to get medical supplies to the Georgian people. This strategy puts the Russians in a precarious situation. If any harm comes to U.S. troops on a humanitarian mission, especially in the face of Russian looting, Moscow will be hurt internationally – and very badly. What would happen is a classic case of operational blowback.

The U.S. Invasion of Iraq – Similarities and Differences

Many people internationally have expressed bewilderment at the U.S. reaction to the Russian invasion of Georgia when the U.S. invaded Iraq. To explain this we have to lay down a few rules about geopolitics:

• Wars are fought for primarily three reasons: geography, economics, and politics – usually in that order
• Politics includes matters of secular politics, religion, culture, and history
• All nations fight for their self interests – no exceptions
• All nations look to better their positions either regionally or internationally through diplomacy, the military, or economics

The Russian invasion of Georgia was primarily fought over geography. Georgia straddles the Caspian and the Black Seas which allow for transport of fuel without crossing Russian borders. The more energy lines that Moscow controls the better their strategy will work against Europe if it is ever needed.

The U.S. invasion of Iraq was also fought over geography. Prior to the 9/11 attacks the region of southwest Asia that stretched from Afghanistan to Syria is something I like to call rogue regime row. Since the U.S. had a presence in Afghanistan with a reluctant ally to the south, the Americans still faced a strategic problem in the form of the Jihadist war. Iran, the most active state sponsor of terror, is a large country that is not conducive to an invasion. An invasion of Iran would have left Iraq and Syria – both Baathist regimes – able to cooperate should the need ever arise. Both nations supported terror, even if it wasn’t al-Qaeda, and could pose a long term problem. Invading Syria would have left Iraq and Iran as a continual threat to the Middle East since both nations have a habit of warring and supporting terror. Iraq was the best solution in a field of bad choices.

The Emerging Results of the U.S. Invasion

Invading Iraq has fundamentally changed the Middle East by isolating Syria to the west and isolating Iran to the east. Syria got the better end of the deal and is trying to make the most of it with France and Turkey helping to foster dialog with Israel. Israel, Jordan, and Egypt have benefited from their respective peace deals and it now appears that Syria wants a try and benefit from the arrangement as well. Syria has long played the role of rogue nation, but with an economy that is going, and has gone, nowhere little incentive is left for Syria to align itself with Iran. Iran has played patron to Syria in a number of areas, but Syrian President Bashir Assad may be feeling the pressure from such an alliance. With a stabilizing Iraq, the Syrian – Iranian alliance may become a thing of the past.

Syria – It may sound strange that a stable Iraq would hinder the Syrian – Iranian alliance, but once again geography plays an important role. Through 2006 it appeared that Iraq was doomed to fall under the influence of Iran and thus allow the Ayatollahs free reign over much of the ME. Syria may have been hedging its bets in forming the alliance although the two nations had little in common politically or economically. In fact the relationship may be defined by the common interest in funding and arming Hezbollah and keeping their common enemy, Israel, off balance. Now that Iraq is stabilizing Iran doesn’t have an avenue to become a regional power, thus negating the underlying reason for the Syrian – Iranian alliance.

Syria was dealt a blow when the international community demanded that all Syrian troops be removed from Lebanon. Lebanon was economically and militarily important for the Syrians thus making the withdrawal all the more difficult. From an economic perspective Syria was able to use Lebanon as a means of gaining greater access to Mediterranean trade, while also allowing Syria to use Lebanon as a battleground should war with Israel erupt. The military strategy was a terrible one, but it was the only option available since Israel controlled a valuable piece of real estate known as the Golan Heights. The Golan Heights give Israel direct access to Damascus which is a mere thirty miles from the Syrian – Israeli border. Recently Lebanon and Syria have formally agreed to establish full diplomatic ties. This removes the stigma that the Syrians view Lebanon as nothing more than a Syrian province. Since this agreement is still new the long term relationship is still cloudy.

The Golan Heights may be the key to a peace agreement between Syria and Israel, but it is not the only factor that will dictate success. With a stable and possible power rising to its east, Syria would effectively be cut of from Iran and forced to make nice with all its neighbors. This may be the motivation behind creating a peace deal with Israel. The French who have historic ties to Syria have made several offers to help Syria return to the international community the most visible being the Mediterranean Union. The Mediterranean Union is more of a platform for the nations of Northern Africa, Southern Europe, and part of the ME to work towards peace rather than any cooperation that could actually achieve these goals. For the Union to achieve any results economic incentives must be presented. This is crucial for Syria.

Another important factor that must be taken into account for an Israeli – Syrian peace to succeed is the halting of Syrian support for terrorism. For Syria this is an easy move; for the Israelis this is an absolute necessary for security. Without Iran acting as a patron to Syria the support for terror can end and the Israelis can force Syria to deal with Hezbollah. Hezbollah is the only serious threat to Israel from the north, but the terror organization relies heavily on Iranian and Syrian weapons imports and to a greater extent the 500 million dollars a year in Iranian financial assistance.

The current negotiations between Israel and Syria are being handled by Turkey and have produces some tenuous results in the form of several assassinations. The first assassination was carried out by Syria and removed Hezbollah commander Imad Mugniyeh from the terrorist party. This may have been done for two reasons. The first was that Mugniyeh had plenty of Israeli blood on his hands and the second reason is he may have been behind the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. More recently Brig. Gen. Mohammad Suleiman, the man responsible for facilitating Syrian support for Hezbollah, was shot to death on a beach resort near the Syrian port city of Tartous. It appears that Suleiman was also responsible for the Syrian nuclear reactor that was destroyed by the Israeli air force in September 2007. Both of these assassinations may be an attempt by President Assad to clean house.

But the main sticking point of the Golan Heights remains. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has made statements alluding to the possibility of ceding Golan, but since he has announced his resignation amid charges of corruption the peace process is on hold for now. Two of the candidates vying for his position have stated they will still work for a peace deal with Syria. The third major candidate, Benjamin Netanyahu, has stated that he would not give up the Golan for peace. The Golan Heights are of strategic value to whoever holds the territory and Netanyahu may fear a Syrian military occupation of the Golan plateau that overlooks several Israeli villages. What is clear is that Israel will not cede Golan without a guarantee of demilitarization of the area. This leaves Syria in a difficult position – unable to survive economically without foreign support and unable to maintain the status quo without Iranian assistance. We are at the point where something has to give, soon.

Iran – Iran is now vulnerable to international sanctions over its nuclear program. With a strong Iraq, Iran can now be put under a naval blockade. For the rest on Iran see my previous article.

The reasoning behind the U.S. invasion has become irrelevant not because it isn’t important, but because the deed has been done. The U.S. needed to find the best way to hamper the Jihadist war by changing the dynamics of the Middle East and Iraq has proven to be the best answer. While some violence continues in Iraq it is hardly enough to threaten the Iraqi government. In essence the Iraq war as we have known it over the past few years is over. The U.S. will withdraw three of the 15 combat brigades in September and will probably withdraw another two in January or February. The current agreement between the U.S. and the Iraqi government calls for the withdrawal of all combat troops in three years – a more than reasonable goal.

The Continuance of the U.S. – Russian Divide

The Jihadist movement no longer poses a strategic threat to the U.S., but their ability to kill people remains. The situation in Afghanistan has proven to be a problem for the U.S. but that doesn’t mean it can’t be handled. The improving situation in Iraq and a manageable situation in Afghanistan couldn’t have come at a better time for the Americans.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union the U.S. has worked hard and spent a great deal of money to bring Russia into the international community as a democratic partner. Unfortunately it couldn’t last forever. The U.S. and Russia will always be adversaries because of geography – a problem that can’t be reconciled. The U.S. will always be bound to Europe politically and economically and the Russians will always pose a threat to Europe because the Russian – European border does not lend itself to Russia’s security. In essence what is old is new again and it will be just as ugly as the last time.