The War over Fourth Generation Warfare

Outside of the Pentagon and military analyst circles, the theory of fourth generation warfare (4GW) is rarely heard of let alone discussed. Unfortunately the 4GW theory is not debated as often as it should be, and when it is discussed the debate only focuses on the theories proponents and those who completely deny the viability of the theory. I fall some where in the middle as I believe that the foundations of the 4GW theory are flawed, but the proponents have brought the possibilities of a protracted asymmetric war into sharp perspective. This is an important discussion with regards to the current war on terror and the billions being spent by the Pentagon to transform the military to confront the possibility of asymmetric wars of attrition.

Fourth Generation Warfare: A Primer

For the sake of brevity I will quote directly from the article that started it all.

“While military development is generally a continuous evolutionary process, the modern era has witnessed three watersheds in which change has been dialectically qualitative. Consequently, modern military development comprises three distinct generations.”

“First generation warfare reflects tactics of the era of the smoothbore musket, the tactics of line and column. These tactics were developed partially in response to technological factors — the line maximized firepower, rigid drill was necessary to generate a high rate of fire, etc.— and partially in response to social conditions and ideas, e.g., the columns of the French revolutionary armies reflected both the élan of the revolution and the low training levels of conscripted troops. Although rendered obsolete with the replacement of the smoothbore by the rifled musket, vestiges of first generation tactics survive today, especially in a frequently encountered desire for linearity on the battlefield. Operational art in the first generation did not exist as a concept although it was practiced by individual commanders, most prominently Napoleon.”

“Second generation warfare was a response to the rifled musket, breechloaders, barbed wire, the machinegun, and indirect fire. Tactics were based on fire and movement, and they remained essentially linear. The defense still attempted to prevent all penetrations, and in the attack a laterally dispersed line advanced by rushes in small groups. Perhaps the principal change from first generation tactics was heavy reliance on indirect fire; second generation tactics were summed up in the French maxim, "the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies." Massed firepower replaced massed manpower. Second generation tactics remained the basis of U.S. doctrine until the 1980s, and they are still practiced by most American units in the field.”

“While ideas played a role in the development of second generation tactics (particularly the idea of lateral dispersion), technology was the principal driver of change. Technology manifested itself both qualitatively, in such things as heavier artillery and bombing aircraft, and quantitatively, in the ability of an industrialized economy to fight a battle of materiel (Materialschlacht).”

“The second generation saw the formal recognition and adoption of the operational art, initially by the Prussian army. Again, both ideas and technology drove the change. The ideas sprang largely from Prussian studies of Napoleon's campaigns. Technological factors included von Moltke's realization that modern tactical firepower mandated battles of encirclement and the desire to exploit the capabilities of the railway and the telegraph.”

“Third generation warfare was also a response to the increase in battlefield firepower. However, the driving force was primarily ideas. Aware they could not prevail in a contest of materiel because of their weaker industrial base in World War I, the Germans developed radically new tactics. Based on maneuver rather than attrition, third generation tactics were the first truly nonlinear tactics. The attack relied on infiltration to bypass and collapse the enemy's combat forces rather than seeking to close with and destroy them. The defense was in depth and often invited penetration, which set the enemy up for a counterattack.”

“While the basic concepts of third generation tactics were in place by the end of 1918, the addition of a new technological element-tanks-brought about a major shift at the operational level in World War II. That shift was blitzkrieg. In the blitzkrieg, the basis of the operational art shifted from place (as in Liddell-Hart's indirect approach) to time.”

“In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between "civilian" and "military" may disappear. Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants' depth, including their society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity. Major military facilities, such as airfields, fixed communications sites, and large headquarters will become rarities because of their vulnerability; the same may be true of civilian equivalents, such as seats of government, power plants, and industrial sites (including knowledge as well as manufacturing industries). Success will depend heavily on effectiveness in joint operations as lines between responsibility and mission become very blurred. Again, all these elements are present in third generation warfare; fourth generation will merely accentuate them.”

Additionally, 4GW was broken down by some of the proponents into the following three points:

1. The loss of the nation-states monopoly on war.

2. A return to a world of cultures and states in conflict.

3. Internal segmentation/division along ethnic, religious, and special interest lines within our own society.

Rebuttal:

First off, any examination of warfare cannot ignore the exploits of great military leaders such as Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Joshua the Israelite, Sun Tzu, or even George Washington. The impact these men had on warfare is still relevant to this day, regardless of the advent of new technologies.

Secondly, the nation-state has never held a monopoly on warfare. If they did, civil wars and political coups would be a thing of the past. Also, the influence of terrorism and revolutionary groups would have minimal impact or be completely nonexistent and they are obviously not.

Thirdly, the world cannot return to a state of conflict because it has never left. In the last twenty years alone conflict has been a way of life in Africa, while many Asian and South American nations have been ravaged by wars of attrition between nation-states and non-state actors. In Europe the conflict in the former Yugoslavia has forced many Western nations to patrol their own backyard.

Finally, the U.S. has always been divided along racial and religious lines. In fact, many sociologists have stated for years now that the U.S. is more of a mixing bowl as opposed to a melting pot. Religion has always been a fiercely debated topic in the U.S. as evidenced by Mitt Romney’s run for the Presidency and previously with JFK.

Tomorrow I will comment on where I agree with the proponents of 4GW as well as a counter definition that better defines the current state of warfare.