Analysis of Iran NIE

On December 3, the National Intelligence Council released a new National Intelligence Estimate regarding the nuclear intentions and capabilities of Iran. I have waited until now to comment on this estimate to better gauge the response by politicians, media, and other sources. Although I set my expectations low for an intelligent response to the new estimate I was still disappointed. The two most popular interpretations of the estimate include ‘Bush lied’ and ‘intelligence community undercuts Bush.’ While these responses were not surprising in the least; what I found truly confounding was the lack of an attempt to consult those familiar with intelligence to better explain the findings.

In sharp contrast to media reporting some folks who are familiar with NIE’s, and intelligence in general, attempted to make sense out of the recent finding. Although I disagree with some of their respective commentary it is nice to know that the capability for rational thought still exists. For the most part, the commentators that I respect asked questions surrounding the value of the new intelligence as well as the timing and the source. What I found to be lacking in the questions raised were questions about the motive of the White House to agree to declassify this NIE. More on this in a moment.

Here are some quick facts about the NIE:

The title of this NIE is Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities.

The document is over 150 pages, although only two and a half were declassified.

The NIE states that Iran suspended their nuclear weapon program in 2003.

The NIE states that the suspension was in response to international pressure.

The NIE believes that the Iranians abandoned the program because the costs outweighed the benefits.

Stephen Hadley, the National Security advisor to President Bush, and John Michael McConnell, the Director of National Intelligence, have made statements in the recent past stating that future NIE’s would not be declassified.

Here are some questions that I have about the NIE:

What international pressure was applied to Iran in 2003 that forced them to abandon their weapons program?

Why did the U.S. rely on recent intelligence that has been reportedly rejected by some of our European and Middle East allies?

If the Iranians abandoned their weapons program in 2003 why did the 2005 NIE report that the program was ongoing?

Why was this NIE declassified after Hadley and McConnell stated that future NIE’s would remain classified?

Why did the Iranians pursue a nuclear weapons program in the first place?

The NIE raises many other questions, but these are some of the most pressing questions that need to be addressed. Let’s explore these questions starting in reverse order.

Why did the Iranians pursue a nuclear weapons program in the first place?

Disregarding the insane ravings by Iranian President Ahmadinejad, it would seem that the possession of nuclear weapons would serve as a deterrent to outside invasion. I discount Ahmadinejad because the country of Iran is primarily run by the Supreme Leader and the Shura council who handle foreign affairs with the position of President handling many domestic affairs such as the economy. The Supreme Leader has the final say in most matters and serves as the Commander in Chief of the armed forces. That being said it is doubtful that the Iranians had planned to use these nuclear weapons for any forward deployment. If the Iranians did manage to develop a nuke it would be a crude weapon and could not be fixed to any missile in their arsenal. If we were to assume that the regime did manage to acquire a nuclear weapon with outside support the use of the weapon in conjunction with a missile to target Israel or the Europeans, it would put the revolutionary regime in the cross hairs of the U.S. and Israel. This is not the goal of Iran.

Why was this NIE declassified after Hadley and McConnell stated that future NIE’s would remain classified?

I believe that the NIE was declassified to send a message to the Iranians. First of all, if the Iranians were still pursuing a nuclear weapons program it would be years before they got close to producing a weapon and even longer before they could produce any meaningful arsenal. Secondly, if the Iranians have indeed suspended their program it would take even longer for weapons production. From the perspective of the United States, an Iranian nuclear weapons program serves as more of a long term national security challenge that can be dealt with at a later date, while finding a solution to the current situation in Iraq is a more pressing issue. By declassifying this document, the U.S. is telling Iran we do not have any desire to attack you militarily in the near future.

If the Iranians abandoned their weapons program in 2003 why did the 2005 NIE report that the program was ongoing?

Gathering intelligence inside Iran is a notoriously difficult challenge. Iran is a country that is primarily focused on internal security and the preservation of the revolution. As such, foreigners are difficult to get in country and getting the right individual that would understand what they are looking at is even harder. That being said, it is possible that the 2005 NIE was based on old intelligence or intelligence so ambiguous as to prevent the intelligence community from making a more accurate assessment.

Why did the U.S. rely on recent intelligence that has been reportedly rejected by some of our European and Middle East allies?

Once again it appears that the NIE was not only an intelligence estimate but a message to Iran that military action would not be taken in the near future. Irregardless of the current state of the Iranian nuclear weapons program, it would be some time before the country could produce anything meaningful. Additionally, the U.S. may want to talk with the Iranians about a solution for Iraq. It is in the interest of both nations that the Iraqi nation stabilizes in the near future. By the U.S. stating that it does not believe that Iran is working on a nuclear weapon; it takes away a possible bargaining chip that could be used by Iran in possible negotiations. It is worth restating that Iran was funding the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan along with the U.S. right through 9/11. The Iranians also cooperated with the Afghan invasion by sharing intelligence with the U.S. On the Iraqi front, Saddam Hussein was a significant national security challenge for the Iranians. Iran was devastated by the Iran-Iraq war and could only benefit by the U.S. invasion. By recognizing common interests, the U.S. and the Iranians could come to an accord, albeit quietly, over the situation in Iraq.

What international pressure was applied to Iran in 2003 that forced them to abandon their weapons program?

From 2002-2003, the U.S. was more involved with Afghanistan and preparing for the invasion of Iraq to put any meaningful pressure on the Iranians to end their nuclear ambitions. The Iranians may have been persuaded to end any WMD programs after the run up to the Iraqi invasion just as Muammar al-Gaddafi in Libya did. This is a real possibility given the cost-benefit statement in the NIE. Additionally, the leaders of Iran and North Korea went into hiding for several weeks during the initial invasion of Iraq because they feared the U.S. would move into their nations next.

Conclusion:

I believe that regardless of the current state of the Iranian nuclear weapons program it is irrelevant because of the time it would take for them to produce a weapon. I also believe that the latest NIE is more a message to Iran than an intelligence estimate that requires immediate attention. Given the behavior of the Iranian President it is understandable how an Iranian nuclear weapon could be perceived as an immediate danger, but the reality is very different. The Iranian regime may make overly eschatological statements, and their support for terrorism certainly doesn’t help, but it is a rational actor when it comes to the preservation of the revolutionary government. From this perspective it becomes clear why the White House would release this intelligence estimate in the face of its previous statements about Iran. I have little doubt that the U.S. is looking for regional actors to aid in the political stability of Iraq. The U.S. military has performed exceptionally well and has managed to keep the violence in Iraq relatively low, but this cannot last indefinitely without a political solution. Iran on the other hand desires a stable Iraq but cannot control the various Shi’ite factions in Iraq and it certainly cannot accept a predominately Sunni government. The cooperation between the U.S. and Iran may be the key.