Terrorism in a Nuclear South Asia

Gurkha, flying a swift and powerful vimana hurled a single projectile charged with all the power of the universe. An incandescent column of smoke and flame as bright as the thousand suns rose in all its splendor... a perpendicular explosion with its billowing smoke clouds......the cloud of smoke rising after its first explosion formed into expanding round circles like the opening of giant parasols... ...it was an unknown weapon, an iron thunderbolt, a gigantic messenger of death, which reduced to ashes the entire race of the Vrishnis and the Andhakas....The corpses were so burned as to be unrecognizable. The hair and nails fell out; pottery broke without apparent cause, and the birds turned white. After a few hours all foodstuffs were infected... ...to escape from this fire the soldiers threw themselves in streams to wash themselves and their equipment. – Mahabharata: (4th c. BC)

Men are not disturbed by things, but by the view they take of things. – Epictetus

Since the terrorist attacks on the city of Mumbai tensions between India and Pakistan have once again reached the point where war is becoming a very real possibility. What makes the ongoing conflict in South Asia so worrying to the world at large is the possibility that these two countries will use their nuclear arsenals if pushed to an as of yet determined threshold. Currently, this is unlikely, but when the respective nuclear doctrine of both countries is considered it can appear that any provocation by India will result in Pakistan taking the conflict to the nuclear level. Nuclear doctrines are meant to outline when and how a nuclear power will use their ultimate weapon, but they can often seem ambiguous and leave much to be desired.

When discussing nuclear doctrine, phrases such as mutually assured destruction or flexible response come to mind, but one must remember these are merely titles and are not necessarily indicative of an entire doctrine. In fact, it is difficult for any doctrine to truly stand up against scrutiny because of its very nature. A major factor that further compounds analysis is that a nuclear doctrine has never been employed because a nuclear exchange has never taken place. With this in mind, how can one ever be sure of how a nation will react in the face of an impending nuclear war? The answer is that we simply do not know because doctrines are merely guidelines since neither the author nor the individual employing the doctrine know if it will hold up under the circumstances that their nation will face. This is the aforementioned ambiguity inherent in any nuclear doctrine.

Nuclear doctrines are written with the purpose of sowing confusion among a nations adversaries and promoting deterrence which is why they appear ambiguous and at times irrational. Nations are not likely to go to war with one another if victory, not to mention survival, does not appear possible thus creating the deterrent atmosphere that is sought by the possession of nuclear weapons. In essence what happens is not only a deterrent to war but also a constraint on how a nation will behave.

While the possession of nuclear weapons by both Pakistan and India has limited the type of conflict these nations engage in it does not eliminate conflict altogether. Since both nations held nuclear tests in May 1998, the conflict has become one of low intensity occasionally culminating in a terrorist attack that pushes India to the verge of taking military action against their western neighbor. Since 1998 New Delhi and Islamabad have come close to conventional conflict several times only to have the U.S. step in and play the role of peacemaker. The outcome of this mediation is always the same; India makes demands that they know Pakistan either will not or cannot carry out while Pakistan makes token gestures that only ensure the nations’ short-term survival. This is the status quo in South Asia and as history shows this type of unstable peace cannot last.

This paper will explore how the respective nuclear doctrines of India and Pakistan have on the one hand made a conventional war politically difficult while on the other has led to the rise of terrorist groups as the new arbiters of war and peace in the South Asian region.

India

Nuclear Doctrine
India detonated their first nuclear device in 1974, but did not enter into full scale production much later to continue research on the more powerful thermonuclear weapons (this became public in 1989). This move towards obtaining a nuclear arsenal was spurred on by the 1962 border war with China and the subsequent Chinese nuclear tests carried out in 1964. When tensions with Pakistan rose again in 1990, both countries were on the verge of ramping up research and beginning production only to have the crisis brought to an end by international intervention. Although this crisis was averted, it appears it was this event that prompted both India and Pakistan to continue their respective nuclear research with the goal of deterrence. In furtherance of this goal both nations conducted full scale nuclear tests in May 1998. It was after these tests that India produced an interim nuclear doctrine in 1999 and subsequently adopted the document with a few revisions in 2003. The doctrine was created with a focus on China and New Delhi’s main rival Pakistan.

While the Indian nuclear doctrine is several pages long it only contains a few salient features that bear mentioning. The first is the prohibition of a First Strike, second is the concept of massive retaliation, and the third is the choice not to distinguish between any weapons of mass destruction. The third feature simply means that India reserves the right to retaliate with nuclear weapons if they are struck with chemical or biological weapons. All these features work towards the same goal – deterrence.

Perhaps the most important factor in India’s nuclear doctrine is the prohibition of first use, or stated more plainly, India will not launch a first strike. In India’s doctrine the phrase used is actually, ‘retaliation only.’ Former Prime Minister Vajpayee’s statement made in the Indian Parliament that “India does not intend to use these weapons for aggression or for making threats against any country, these are weapons of self-defense, to ensure that India is not subjected to nuclear threats or coercion” may serve to clarify the relevance of a nuclear arsenal, but again reality trumps written doctrine. The reality is that India is under the coercion of non-state actors that were created and nurtured by Pakistan and has very little room to negate this criminal influence in international affairs because Pakistan is also a nuclear power. By stating that a nuclear arsenal is for ‘retaliation only’ without considering the unique dynamics of the south Asian conflict, India has in fact undermined the very reason they have stated for maintaining a nuclear arsenal.

The decision against using a first strike is only a single part of the nuclear doctrine. India states the overall goal of their nuclear arsenal is to provide ‘credible minimal deterrence.’ In the context of nuclear states, the word credible is applied to nations that have openly declared their possession of nuclear weapons and verifiably tested at least one such device, while minimal simply means that a nation will not produce more weapons than are deemed necessary. Once again we are struck with the ambiguity of nuclear terminology. In the current context the international community is expected to believe that the mere possession of nuclear weapons and not the will to use such weapons is what is deemed credible. This is not to mean that a nation must immediately use a nuclear weapon or device against an adversary to establish credibility, but instead shows just how generalized these words are.

Outside of the rhetoric one would expect to find in a nuclear doctrine is an interesting entry in paragraph 2.4 of the Objectives section:

2.4. The fundamental purpose of Indian nuclear weapons is to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by any state or entity against India and its forces. India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.

This section is interesting because it allows for the possibility that a non-state actor could acquire a nuclear weapon or device. This entry is aimed directly at Pakistan. If the Pakistani state fails India wants to be sure that they have recourse in the event that their adversary’s arsenal falls into the wrong hands. After all, nuclear weapons in the hands of a non-state entity do not have to be used to be effective.

India has chosen to add a concept known as massive retaliation to their doctrine. This means that India may not be the first to use a nuclear weapon, but will retaliate to inflict unacceptable damage upon the aggressor. Paragraph 2.3 of the Objectives section states:

2.3. India shall pursue a doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence. In this policy of “retaliation only,” the survivability of our arsenal is critical. This is a dynamic concept related to the strategic environment, technological imperatives and the needs of national security. The actual size, components, deployment and employment of nuclear forces will be decided in the light of these factors. India’s peacetime posture aims at convincing any potential aggressor that:

a. any threat of use of nuclear weapons against India shall involve measures to counter the threat; and

b. any nuclear attack on India and its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor.
India knows that it must have the ability to respond to threats against its sovereignty with conventional forces. When India decides to employ their conventional military it may not always be on Indian soil; therefore it becomes imperative that India extend their doctrine of massive retaliation to nuclear attacks against the Indian military.

To be fair to it should be stated that India is the only nuclear power to articulate a nuclear doctrine and release it in full to the public thus opening up the document to criticism. While it is true that nuclear powers have stated their views and strategy in the past, they have never released an actual doctrine explaining the role of nuclear weapons in their overall strategy.

Pakistan

Nuclear Doctrine
Pakistan has never officially articulated a nuclear doctrine nor have they come close to enunciating a statement as to how and when nuclear weapons will be used. A statement by Dr. Shireen Mazari, Director General at the Strategic Studies Institute – Islamabad, is telling:

“Pakistan has chosen not to publicly enunciate a comprehensive nuclear doctrine partly because it does not see a political/status utility for the nuclear capability – rather, it envisages the nuclear capability as having a purely defensive, security-related purpose. Pakistan’s threat perceptions are seen as stemming primarily from India both at the level of all-out conventional war, limited war and low intensity conflict (LIC). Within the nuclear framework, Pakistan seeks to establish deterrence against all-out conventional war.”

Further compounding this veil of secrecy is the unwillingness of the Pakistani Army to follow or let alone read a doctrine if it were published because it would be perceived to be too political. Fortunately, the Pakistani military establishment has published several papers by former military and academic leaders describing what a Pakistani nuclear doctrine might look like. The journal publications that have been selected for review in this paper are very similar in their assessments of a nuclear doctrine leading one to believe that a doctrine does indeed exist, but it is kept from public view to increase the pressure on India to refrain from using conventional forces against Pakistan. As previously stated this is normal in nuclear postures; however Pakistan takes it to a new level.

The papers chosen for review were selected by the proximity each author has to the Pakistani military, and by extension, to the nuclear program. To begin with, Pakistan has stated that they will not launch a first strike with their strategic nuclear weapons. In a newspaper interview former Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf stated:

"This is not Warsaw Pact versus NATO situation where warheads and missiles were ready for fire with a button in a hand. There is no button in our case… Missiles and warheads are not permitted together. They are separated. There is geographical separation between them. One has to go up to escalation ladder. Then comes this stage."

While Pakistan may refrain from using their strategic weapons first they do not have any reservations about using tactical nuclear weapons to stop an invading army. This is because the Indian military outnumbers the Pakistani military substantially and Pakistan cannot conceive any method other than the use of a nuclear weapon to halt the invasion. Lt Gen (Ret) Sardar FS Lodi states in his paper Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine:

“In a deteriorating military situation when an Indian conventional attack is likely to break through our defenses or has already breached the main defense line causing a major set-back to the defenses, which cannot be restored by conventional means at our disposal, the government would be left with no other option except to use Nuclear Weapons to stabilize the situation. India's superiority in conventional arms and manpower would have to be offset by nuclear weapons. The political will to use nuclear weapons is essential to prevent a conventional armed conflict, which would later on escalate into a nuclear war.”

Brig Gen (Ret) Saeed Ismat articulates a deteriorating situation more clearly. Ismat states that the Rajistan Desert, more commonly known as the Thar Desert, is the most likely avenue of invasion by conventional Indian forces. By taking this strategic area India could, in a matter of days, cut Pakistan in two, thus severing communications and dividing the remnants of the Pakistan’s military. It is in this case that Ismat states the Pakistani leadership would be left with no other option than to use a nuclear weapon to prevent the state from fracturing. While Ismat declares that the use of nuclear weapon would prevent Indian forces from severing Pakistan, he does not say how deep the invading army would have to penetrate before this would happen. The General also fails to say who should have authority to launch the weapon should the invading army advance too rapidly and communications with the civilian leadership are cutoff. The need for the delegation of authority in times of crisis will be discussed later, but General Ismat’s statements show that while a strategic objective can be defined generally the threshold for employing a nuclear weapon must be defined specifically.

After reviewing material relevant to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal a rudimentary doctrine can be compiled. This is not meant to be representative of Pakistani policy, but rather a compilation of interests and capabilities demonstrated by Pakistan’s military and political establishment. The elements of nuclear employment may be as follows:

1. Pakistan will not use strategic nuclear weapons in a First Strike.
2. If nuclear deterrent fails and the aggressor seizes the initiative to launch the First Strike, Pakistan shall hit back with its Second Strike ability.
3. If deterrent fails to prevent a convention invasion, Pakistan will first rely on conventional means to defend the nation.
4. If the invading military appears to be overrunning Pakistan’s military a public warning may be issued followed by a test detonation if time permits.
5. If the invading military does not halt the invasion, Pakistan will employ tactical nuclear weapons against the invading force on Pakistani soil.
6. Should the previous steps fail, Pakistan will launch strategic nuclear weapons against critical but purely military targets in India across the border from Pakistan in thinly populated areas in the desert or semi-desert, causing the least collateral damage.
7. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine with be defensive in nature with controlled escalation to allow for a political process to take place.
8. Pakistan’s response with be directly proportionate to the actions of enemy provocation and threat posed to Pakistan’s security.

India’s doctrine describes not only how and when a nuclear weapon will be employed, but also who has control over the employment decision. This is not the case with Pakistan. Former Pakistani Army Chief Pervez Musharraf said the central command system to use nuclear and missile technology would be ready within one month after the nuclear tests of 1998. This didn’t happen, however because the civilian leadership did not want to integrate the military leadership into the command and control of the nuclear arsenal. This may have been one of the factors that led Musharraf to seize power and usher in an era of military dictatorship. Under Musharraf the National Command Authority was finally created in February 2000 and the authority to employ nuclear weapons was given to the Head of State.

Given the poor state of communications within Pakistan the Head of State may not have the ability to give the command to launch or stand down to elements in the field armed with a tactical nuclear weapon. It is in the scenario that General Lodi suggests that:

“Although the decision to employ the nuclear option is that of the government. Yet it must be decided before hand as to when and to whom would the authority to use nuclear weapons be delegated in a crisis situation. India our potential enemy has numerical superiority in conventional forces and would have the advantage of initiative as an aggressor, time would therefore be of essence to the defender with numerical inferiority. Delegation of authority to use the nuclear option would therefore be essential. It may eventually be given to the commander of forces in the field under specified circumstances depending on the course and direction in which the battle unfolds to our eventual disadvantage.”

Although Lodi goes on to state that the government must decide before hand when and at what stage of a military conflict it would be forced to employ the nuclear option, this is hardly sufficient for a field commander who may feel compelled to use a nuclear weapon before a predefined threshold was crossed. A commander on a battlefield will have a very different view of a battle than a politician in Islamabad creating a situation that cannot be reconciled by any doctrine. While this approach would also have a deterrent value by sowing doubt in a potential adversary, in reality it cannot be employed reliably.

As previously mentioned Pakistan has not published an official nuclear doctrine because Islamabad feels it adds to their deterrent capabilities. After careful research into the Pakistani nuclear program it appears that the choice not to publish a doctrine is less about deterrence and more about nonchalance. The statement by a British official that the Pakistani’s, ‘think a nuclear weapon is just a bigger artillery piece’ is rather revealing in this case and does little to instill confidence in Islamabad’s control over its nuclear program.

India’s Limited Warfare Approach

In the face of a fracturing Pakistan, India may no longer be left with any other option than to respond to rogue elements of the Pakistani intelligence service supporting terrorist groups. If India fails to respond effectively to the Mumbai attacks the government may find itself in peril; after all governments have failed over lesser matters. Since India’s counterterrorism efforts have yet to mature, a conventional response becomes the most likely avenue of ensuring security. If India responds via conventional military means it has a number of options at its disposal – at least on paper. Since the behavior of adversarial nations changes with the inclusion of nuclear weapons, it becomes prudent to list the conventional options in a non-nuclear context. This means only conventional options will be chosen based upon their ability to prevent escalation.

India has conventional military assets in the form of land, air, and sea power, but the use of these assets must be limited to prevent escalation. In fact, India will most likely use land and air assets to attack targets across the Kashmir Line of Control thus preventing Pakistan from responding too harshly. If India were to go after symbols of the Pakistani state such as military or intelligence headquarters, Pakistan may have to respond with a conventional strike of their own for domestic political reasons. That being said it is likely that India will engage terrorist enclaves in Pakistan using precision strikes from the air with special operations forces targeting from the ground. Any large troop movements across the Line of Control would simply be too provocative.

Another option would be the targeting of the Pakistani economy which is in a perpetually fragile state. This option is difficult since the Pakistani response is unknown. Pakistan has a population over 168 million people in an area the size of New England and any economic blockade could lead to Islamabad taking extreme measures to prevent social unrest. Considering Islamabad’s current economic woes, any military action taken to blockade Pakistan could result in rapid escalation with disastrous consequences – something that India would be looking to avoid. Both India and Pakistan lack modern early warning system, but it really doesn’t matter since a launch of a strategic nuclear weapon would only take four to eight minutes to reach its target. India would be best advised to prevent to use of strategic missiles with convention warheads as Pakistan could be forced to launch their strategic nuclear weapons based on a misperception.

Terrorism in a Nuclear Context

India has suffered significant loss at the hands of Pakistani trained terrorists from the attack on the Indian Parliament to the more recent attacks in Mumbai. Pakistan’s statement that it will not use their nuclear arsenal as a political tool rings hollow in the face of these continued attacks because India knows that if New Delhi carries out a conventional retaliatory strike against Pakistani targets the conflict could go to the nuclear level rather quickly. India knows full well that Pakistan intends to use a nuclear weapon to halt an Indian attack forcing New Delhi to often just absorb the attack and move on.

India also knows Pakistan is falling apart. Islamabad’s continued support of Islamism that helped appease tribal entities for so many years has caused to opposite to occur in the last decade. India understands that Pakistan has limited control over the terrorist groups that the ISI created, but New Delhi also knows it cannot continue to absorb these attacks. This situation has placed India in a strange predicament – India cannot allow their foe Pakistan to fall apart because the situation would worsen, but India would like to see Pakistan pushed to the point where terrorist support becomes a strategic liability.

The various non-state factions operating in Pakistan may use several different names, but they are bound by geography, ethnicity, and ideology. Currently, the focus of the Indo-Pakistani conflict is focused on the respective nation-states, but the Islamists have the upper hand and are dictating events. If India decides to strike targets in Pakistan it will be because a former tool of Islamabad has gone off the reservation and is operating independently of their former masters. This reality is not lost on the Islamists. The Islamists know that if they can force India to attack Pakistan they will then stand a better chance of gaining further autonomy and influence in the state. Unfortunately this situation is lost in the bigger conflict between the two nuclear powers. Currently there are rumblings of Indian troop build ups in Kashmir in the northern area of the Thar Desert. On the Pakistani side, Islamabad has replaced border patrol troops with regular army units. These types of troop movements are often a sign of war preparation.

The Indian deadline for Pakistan to hand over individuals suspected of involvement in the Mumbai attacks is set to expire on December 26. What happens after that date is anybody’s guess. What is known is that two nuclear powers are on the brink of war over a terrorist attack that Islamabad probably did not order and India cannot ignore. Clearly, the Islamists have the upper hand.

The Mumbai Incident

I have been away the last few weeks because my father passed away. I have been working on another article that discusses the impact of oil prices on counterterrorism efforts and should have that up shortly.

Much has been written in the last few days with regards to the recent terrorist attack in Mumbai, so I will keep my comments brief. In my previous article I noted that the Pakistani government is weak and this attack will only add to the pressure they are facing, which in fact may have been part of the motivation to begin with. I will discuss that tactics of the operation later but first I would like to focus on the impending response by the Indian government.

India

India is one of the countries most brutalized by terrorism. In fact, according to an article in the Middle East Times, India has suffered well over 4,000 casualties from terrorism since 2004. Unfortunately that figure is about right. India is in the middle of a political campaign and the controlling party has been accused of being weak on terror, and as such faces a very real possibility of losing the upcoming elections, so a response is imminent.

Pakistan

With the government as weak as it is a coup is a very real possibility. The civilian government is out of money, has very little control over the country, and no control over the military. Speaking of a coup this early in the game is often times laughable, but with the dynamics that are in play Pakistan will inevitably get the shaft. Should India make any conventional incursions into Pakistan proper the military will be forced to respond and I doubt the civilian government can exercise any control over the decision making. If India faces little resistance the only way to stop an invasion would be the threat of using a nuclear weapon – Pakistan has nothing else.

Mumbai – A tactical perspective

The attacks that began Wednesday were carried out professionally, in a coordinated manner, and perhaps most stunningly, only required ten people. The Indian police have put the body count at almost 200 with hundreds more injured. The real story here is the target, however. Mumbai is a tourist destination and a large financial hub. By targeting Mumbai’s five-star hotels the attackers were sure to kill Westerners and hurt the city – and to a larger extent the country – financially.
The attackers only used small arms and explosives, a combination that works well when properly employed. This is the type of attack that keeps me up at night. For instance, think of an attack like this at an American mall or at Wal-Mart during black Friday. There is little that the targeted population can do to protect themselves and there is little the police or security forces can do to prevent it. If you can imagine a large crowd, probably numbering in the hundreds, gathering in the early morning waiting for the store to open when suddenly a suicide bomber detonates his vest – things get ugly really quick. So too did the attacks that struck Mumbai – only this attack is leading to a standoff between two nuclear powers.

Feeling the Squeeze

Since the ‘surge’ in Iraq has produced an improved security situation media reports have once again focused on the war in Afghanistan. These reports have painted the Afghan theater as a lost cause that cannot be won or even brought to a palatable conclusion. The media tends to take a one dimensional approach to news coverage and often overlooks the numerous dynamics that are in play. This doesn’t mean that the situation in Afghanistan is rosy however, but before an assessment can be made the situation must be dissected.

Afghanistan, Pakistan, the U.S., and the Taliban are suffering from a prolonged war that has gone on for seven years now. While at the onset of the war on terror 80 percent of al-Qaeda prime was destroyed the core leadership has managed to elude capture and the people in the regions that they are taking refuge are paying the price. Regardless of this success here is the current situation:

In the process of the war Afghanistan has gained a new government, but it is weak and unable to build a consensus among the numerous warlords that call the country home.

The U.S. is looking to draw down troops in Iraq and move several brigade combat teams to the Afghan theater, but troop strength alone will not be enough and the military command knows it.

Pakistan has lost significant influence in Afghanistan, is facing an insurgency at home, and India – their primary adversary – has moved troops and advanced aircraft into Kashmir. India has also invested significantly in Afghanistan thus expanding their influence on two of Pakistan’s borders. Additionally, China has moved troops into the Xinjiang province – which borders Pakistan – to crack down on the Muslim Uyghurs which Islamabad has supported in the past. Though Pakistan and China are occasional allies, China is not happy with the Washington – Islamabad alliance. All told Pakistan is not in good shape.

The Taliban have been getting hammered by the U.S. for seven years, but have managed to survive and occasionally regroup. The Taliban, it should be noted, are not a single homogenous group, but rather several Pashtun tribes that have embraced the Deobandi form of Islam that is the foundation of the Taliban ideology. In essence it would take the defeat or destruction of an entire ethnic group to claim victory over the Taliban. Simply put, that will not happen.

Each player in the Afghan theater is feeling the squeeze and something has to give – soon.

Taliban looking for peace?

Several news reports have claimed that a delegation of Afghan government officials and Afghan Taliban representatives met in Saudi Arabia to discuss the prospect of peace at the behest of Saudi King Abdullah. This comes on the heels of the Afghan president Karzai and some high ranking NATO officers calling for peace negotiations with the Taliban. In spite of the reports both the Afghan government and the Afghan Taliban have claimed that a meeting did occur, but there was no discussion of peace or national reconciliation. That being said I doubt that they met to discuss the weather.

Afghanistan needs forge a path towards national reconciliation and that includes that Taliban. Those that are loyal to the Taliban know that they cannot defeat the foreign forces in Afghanistan and waiting for the foreigners to leave while their people suffer from war is not an option either. The only available option is for the government and the Afghan Taliban to come to an accord whether it is politically palatable for the foreign forces or not.

It is interesting to note that the representatives of the Taliban that attended the meeting in Saudi Arabia are either no longer affiliated with the group or have been cast aside. This does not matter however, because the Afghan government and the Taliban have a problem that needs to be solved and a meeting with the most powerful nation in Sunni Islam is a good place to start. The Afghan government has been reaching out to the Saudi’s for some time now and will probably view the meeting as a short term victory – even if they do it silently.

Understandably the U.S. is not happy with the prospect of watching the Afghan government negotiate a peace deal with the faction the Karzai government replaced. While it may not be the best solution from Washington’s standpoint, it is a solution that may become more acceptable should the Taliban decide to split with al-Qaeda. The U.S. could extract itself from the Afghan theater if the top tear of al-Qaeda was killed or captured, but this will only happen when the local population turns against the foreigners.

Pakistan: The perils of a weak government

In my previous article I discussed the increase of U.S. raids into Pakistani territory. While the CIA and Special Forces have been doing this for years, it is only recently that conventional military forces have made incursions into the Tribal Areas of Pakistan. After seven years of the War on Terror, why is this only occurring now? A number of reasons immediately come to mind, such as the war in Iraq, the coming end to the Bush administration, poor intelligence, and perhaps the most overlooked reason – Pakistani politics.

Pakistan has survived so long as the Army survived. Prior to the ouster of President Musharraf, the Army and the government were one in the same and the country was ruled by a single homogonous entity. This is no longer the case. The change came when Western powers pressed Musharraf to give up his direct military role and hold open elections. Musharraf would eventually acquiesce thus pushing the country into chaos. The newly elected Parliament moved quickly to pressure Musharraf into resigning by threatening him with impeachment. This move did not fracture the government per se, but it did fracture the control of the country and has led to competing directives between the Army and the civilian government.

A prime example of this was the decision to bring the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) under the control civilian control by placing the organization under the Interior Ministry. Two days later the government was forced to recant this declaration claiming that the Army was not given a say in the matter, but the implication was clear – the Army wasn’t going to listen and the government couldn’t do anything about it. It now appears that the Army will make a move to put the government under military influence and not the other way around. It is a similar situation that led to Musharraf seizing control of the government in the first place.

The newly formed democratic government is already in trouble and near bankruptcy. Several countries and institutions have offered aid, but if it doesn’t come soon the government may face social unrest after only a few months in office. Perhaps the most difficult challenge that Pakistan faces is the Taliban insurgency. The Taliban is flush with cash from the poppy crop and has asserted itself more recently in areas of the country that have been traditionally more stable. With India spreading money and influence in Afghanistan and the U.S. engaging in missile strikes inside the FATA on a daily basis, Pakistan could be thrust further into turmoil.

What happens next?

Right now the next move will be made by the U.S., but probably not until the election is over. The U.S. military is planning on a winter offensive to take on Taliban and al-Qaeda that remain in the country during the winter months. Afghanistan is a mountainous country which makes combat during winter months very difficult for poorly equipped light infantry elements such as Taliban and AQ fighters. The U.S. is betting on this and going for the jugular so to speak. During the winter months all logistical support is scaled back because the mountains become impassable from the heavy snow fall. If the U.S. is successful in taking on those elements that do not winter in Pakistan the dynamic of the theater could change. The success of this offensive will not end the war, but it could bring the conclusion closer.

Counterintelligence Operations and the Recent Airstrikes in Pakistan

In late July of this year, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen traveled to Pakistan on an unannounced trip, where he presented Pakistani military officials with evidence of the Inter-Services Intelligence’s (ISI) involvement in attacks in Afghanistan. The most recent large scale attack that the ISI may have been involved in took place on July 7, and was against the Indian embassy in Kabul resulting in the deaths of at least 58 people and injured more than 140. Two high ranking diplomats, Indian Defense Attache Brig. Gen. Ravi Dutt Mehta and the embassy’s Political and Information Counselor Vadapalli Venkateswara Rao, were among those killed in the attack. This attack in particular has all the hallmarks of an assassination.

A U.S. military strike in Pakistan on September 8 resulted in the deaths of multiple civilians all from the same extended family. While the loss of civilian lives in combat is regrettable this airstrike was not an accident. The target of the attack was the home of a Taliban leader that was most likely responsible for the attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul with the assistance of the ISI. Unfortunately the target of the strike was not home at the time and may have actually been in Afghanistan participating in the insurgency, but that is not the focus of this article.

So what do these two events, along with the dramatic increase of U.S. airstrikes in Pakistan, have in common? In a word – counterintelligence or CI. Before we discuss the link between these two events we must first understand the many purposes of CI. If intelligence is gathering information then it would make sense that counterintelligence is the method that prevents adversaries from learning what you know, but not all CI operations are the same. For instance, the FBI is charged with CI operations in the U.S. and strives to prevent, and if necessary identify, foreign espionage and subversion. Ultimately the FBI’s goal is to disrupt the flow of information to American adversaries and prosecute those individual’s involved. The CIA on the other hand often takes a different approach depending on the circumstances.

The CIA, a foreign intelligence service of the U.S., also works to identify individuals involved in collecting sensitive information, but disruption is not always the goal. Once a subversive element is discovered, whether it is an individual or a group, the CIA strives to learn the entire communication chain the subversive element uses. This allows the Agency to plant disinformation that can be used in a future operation, or in the case of the War on Terrorism, locate an individual.

Using the ISI

Pakistan’s traditional adversary has been India and the War on Terrorism has not changed that. In much the same fashion as how Russian and the U.S. fought during the Cold War, Pakistan has been using militant Islamists to stir up trouble in India in an attempt to prevent the struggle between the two from becoming a larger conventional conflict or worse – a nuclear standoff. The ISI has been the front agency for cultivating these proxy fighters, but in the last few years the ISI’s creation has turned against its master. In fact, the Institute for Conflict Management notes that suicide bombings in Pakistan rose from seven in 2006 to 56 in 2007. Further compounding the problem is the high number of Islamist sympathizers within the Pakistani intelligence agency that have been working against both the U.S. and their own government.

On many fronts the ISI, or elements within the agency, has been compromising intelligence activities by warning the militant factions of military movements or pending intelligence operations. This, of course, has hampered the ability of the U.S., NATO, and the Afghan military to deal with the raging insurgency. However, oftentimes problems can become opportunities when handled correctly.

The use of Counterintelligence Operations

Information can flow both ways. If the ISI is funneling information to the Taliban then from a CI perspective the communications network can be uncovered and exploited. In regards to this most recent airstrike it appears that the U.S. managed to locate the home of Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani, a top Taliban leader with close ties to al-Qaeda, by using those elements of the ISI that are in contact with him. This seems likely for several reasons with the foremost reason being the Haqqani has been on the U.S. hit list for some time and the strike on his compound only coming recently means that its location was just discovered. Unfortunately for the U.S., it missed its target and ended up killing several civilians along with a few militants. This can happen if the intelligence only offers a small window of opportunity for a military strike to take place and the operation is rushed. This may not be what happened, but it is the theory that makes the most sense.

In the waning months of the Bush administration it is highly likely that constant airstrikes in Pakistan will continue. It is also likely that more counterintelligence operations will take place since as-Shahab, the propaganda wing of al-Qaeda, has promised to deliver addresses from al-Qaeda leadership on the anniversary of the 9/11 attack. CI operations are not constrained to the agencies of foreign governments, but the media outlets that happen to just “find” an al-Qaeda audio or video tape for publication are likely to be a prime target. All non-state actors need to communicate with the outside world and this is more often than not the weak link in their security. It is the vulnerability of communications networks that brought an end to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq; and Pablo Escobar, the notorious leader of the Medellin Cartel. So it begs the question, could bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, or Mullah Omar be next?

*The descriptions of intelligence and CI operations described above are an oversimplified account for the purpose of brevity.

Al-Assad Speaks – Nothing Changes

Please read my September 3 post, Syria's Last Strategic Option, and this post will make more sense.

Syrian President Bashir al-Assad presented to Turkey 6 points that detail his position of departure in the negotiations during a press conference today. But what has captured the headlines in the Israeli press is al-Assad’s declaration that he will not break off ties to Hezbollah and Palestinian militants. This would seem to contradict my earlier statements regarding Syria no longer wanting to be a rogue regime. On the contrary this statement by al-Assad only reinforces my analysis and represents Syria playing the only card it has in this deal with Tel Aviv – reining in militant factions that present a security threat to Israel.

Here’s how I got there. Syria has only one thing to offer Israel – dismantling Hezbollah and curtailing the activities of militant Palestinians. That being said it makes sense that al-Assad would trumpet this because it would play well in the Israeli press. Additionally, the other major players in this deal – France, Turkey, Egypt, and Qatar – would not want a peace deal that allowed a repeat of the Israeli-Hezbollah war of 2006. Such an allowance would make any peace deal ridiculous.

In the face of political problems in Israel it is still apparent that Tel Aviv holds the trump card – the Golan Heights. Israel would never agree to give up Golan without security assurances on its northern border. From Syria’s perspective the return of Golan is necessary for security since Damascus is a mere 30 miles from the current border with Israel.

I have stated before that one should never confuse rhetoric for policy. In this case al-Assad’s statement that he will continue to support Hezbollah and the militant Palestinian factions is an untenable position and he knows it. Damascus desperately needs this peace deal so it can tap into the global economy. Al-Assad needs to grow Syria’s economy so he can stay in power and clinging to the old habits of supporting terrorism would run counter to that goal. Al-Assad’s may be a young leader, but he is not stupid.

Syria’s Last Strategic Option

The last couple of years have been tough on the al-Assad regime in Syria. But before we can discuss the current realities faced by Damascus we first must understand the geography that influences the Middle East and the unstable politics that make the conflicts in the region what they are today. Syria has long been on the end of something I call rogue regime row which stretched from Afghanistan in the east across Iran and Iraq and finally ending with Syria bordering the Mediterranean in the west. Each of these nations contained dynamics that were opposed to their neighbors and thus created an environment that was made up of minor actors that could only antagonize each other through proxies without one ever coming out on top. This is one of the main reasons that the Middle East is a prime berthing ground for terrorism. The 9/11 attacks upset this strange balance.

With the ensuing occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq by the United States, Damascus was forced to find a large power to ensure their survival. The first option was Iran, but in the face of a stabilizing Iraq this arrangement became impossible. Further adding to the problems of the alliance was disagreements over Hezbollah and the large ideological divide between the two nations didn’t help either. Without a strong backer Syria became isolated.

Prior to the Iranian-Syrian alliance becoming strained was the boneheaded move by Damascus to assassinate former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. This move caused the major Western powers to respond by demanding a full withdrawal of all Syrian troops from Lebanon. Syria attempted to resist, but with the odds were greatly stacked against them. In the end Damascus was forced to move out and in the process lose their most promising economic interests. The weak alliance with Iran and the Hariri assassination brought international scrutiny in the face of declining oil revenues and surging economic problems. Syria is without the ability to remain a rogue regime and must join the international community if the Assad regime is to survive; it is Syria’s last remaining option.

Turkey and the Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks

Turkey has been playing the role of matchmaker in the preliminary talks between Syria and Israel for several reasons. Perhaps the most pressing is setting up a stable south when the U.S. completely pulls out of Iraq. Other than dealing with the militant Kurdish forces of Northern Iraq, Turkey also wants to create a stable region on the coast of the Mediterranean. Crafting a peace deal between Tel Aviv and Damascus would go a long way to accomplishing this. Turkey is also working out an energy deal with Syria that would help both countries economically and provide energy to Europe that would bypass a resurgent Russia. This is something the Europeans are desperate for and both Syria and Turkey are in prime position to offer this alternative.

The Israeli-Syrian talks have continued in fits and starts in the face of many challenges. Both nations have much to gain from a peace deal in the form of security for Israel and continuance of the Assad regime in Syria. As is usually the case with diplomatic talks the nations involved will work against and with each other behind the scenes to push negotiations in their favor. This is most likely what resulted in the Mugniyeh assassination. Needless to say Hezbollah was not pleased with the Syrian move and are worried that an Israeli-Syrian deal would mean the loss of Syria as a patron and the money and arms that go with it.

The moves that Syria had to undertake as a condition of talks with Israel did not bode well for the regime. Other than Hezbollah, Syria has also played host to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad and removing these elements is not something that is easily done. After the Mugniyeh assassination, the head of Syrian Intelligence and al-Assad’s brother-in-law, Asef Shawkat, was place under house arrest. It is believed that he was planning a coup and sought the help of the CIA after a meeting in Turkey. The CIA turned him down.

Al-Assad’s Attempt to Curry Russian Favor

Assad saw an opportunity in the Russian invasion of Georgia to curry favor with Moscow in an attempt to bolster its standing in the talks with Israel. Syria had offered to house Russian missiles to counter the missiles the U.S. was planning on placing in Poland and also a naval station in the Mediterranean. The Russian President, Dmitri Medvedev, turned him down on all counts most likely because the Israelis got there first. It appears that the Russian decision hinged on a deal with Israel that prevented the Israelis from selling weapons to Georgia as long as Russia did not sell weapons to Syria.

The Last Option

Syria has one move left – a peace deal with Israel. Since Russia isn’t interested and Iran is too far away to project any military power in defense of Damascus Syria is forced to play nice. However, not all is lost and the recent developments with Lebanon certainly help. Syria needs Lebanon far more that the other way around which is why the two nations have finally agreed to establish full diplomatic recognition. Damascus has long viewed Lebanon as a Syrian province so this move is significant.This gives the Syrians the ability to tap back into Lebanon economically while offering Beirut the ability to hurt Hezbollah. This is something that Israel wants and Lebanon could use. Hezbollah has brought nothing but misery to Lebanon and the Israeli-Syrian deal will hurt the terror organization significantly – not to mention Hamas and PIJ. Al-Assad seems to recognize the need to drop the rogue act and join in the international economy. Without significant foreign investment the Syrian economy will continue on its downward dive and the al-Assad regime days will be numbered.

Why are al-Qaeda’s Egyptians getting whacked?

Authors note: I was tired when I wrote this. If I get time later I'll revise and proofread.

In the last few weeks U.S. airstrikes carried out by drone aircraft have killed a number of al-Qaeda leaders and field commanders – all of them Egyptian. Here are the unlucky recipients of the Hellfire suppository:

Abu Khabab al-Masri (Midhat Mursi)
Abu Mohammed Ibrahim bin Abi Farag al-Masri
Abdul-Wahab al-Masri
Abu Islam al-Masri
Abu Saeed al-Masri

It is assumed that all of the aforementioned individuals are Egyptian since their names contain al-Masri which translates to ‘the Egyptian.’ Adding to the intrigue is the rumor that the Ayman al-Zawahiri was either killed or wounded in these attacks. This will be discussed later.

The first individual to capture headlines with his death is Abu Khabab al-Masri whose real name is Midhat Mursi. Mursi was often described as a top chemical and explosives expert who spearheaded al-Qaeda’s research into chemical weapons. The now infamous video of al-Qaeda gassing a dog was one of Mursi’s experiments. Mursi is also believed to have had a hand in the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole by training the suicide bombers that carried out the attack. The martyrdom statement release by al-Qaeda was signed by Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, an aid to al-Zawahiri and bigwig in al-Qaeda, who would be killed a week later.

The second major strike took out the familiar face of Abu Saeed al-Masri who is also known as Mustafa Abu al-Yazid. I say familiar because he has become the face of the frequent videos released by al-Qaeda’s media wing As-Sahab since the disappearance of Azzam the American (Adam Gadahn). Al-Yazid was referred to as the Chief Financial Manager of al-Qaeda by the 9/11 commission and was possibly the third in command of the terror organization. Al-Yazid was known to be a close associate of al-Zawahiri for many years since they were imprisoned together after the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981.

CIA Planning For Al Qaeda 'Succession Crisis'

In late May of this year, the AP reported that the CIA was planning for a succession crisis among the leadership of al-Qaeda as mentioned by CIA Director Michael Hayden in an interview. According to Hayden, “A number of Egyptians are part of al Qaeda's top echelon and may struggle for power among themselves.” This of course assumes that bin Laden would either be killed or captured. The belief among many in the counterterrorism community is that al-Zawahiri would be the man that would replace bin Laden but there are others who may fight for the mantel in the event of his capture or death.

It is this uncertainty that makes this whole affair notable. Any one of these men could have been killed and it would have made headlines and been quickly forgotten, but when five men all from the same country get killed it is necessary to try to learn why. One possibility is that the CIA has managed to turn an al-Qaeda member to give up the locations of the senior leadership. Another possibility would be signs of internal strife, and finally an outside force may be trying to absorb the organization.

The possibility of the CIA turning someone is remote for several reasons, but not impossible. The regions of Pakistan that many al-Qaeda and Taliban have been operating from are isolated and not exactly conducive to this type of operation. Additionally, the operation would have to contend with the Pakistani ISI possibly relaying information about CIA operations to the Taliban.

Internal strife is a very real possibility – and one that is not foreign to al-Qaeda. Sheik Abdullah Azzam, a former leader of the Arab Afghans and one time spiritual leader to Usama bin Laden, was killed by a car bomb shortly after the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan. Many believe that bin Laden was behind the assassination since Azzam would have been far too influential in the al-Qaeda startup. The killing of the Egyptians may be nothing more than bin Laden trying to clean house, but his reliance on al-Zawahiri may cast doubt on this theory. It is possible that al-Zawahiri himself may well be a target of internal factions.

Since taking refuge in Pakistan, al-Qaeda has been working with several entities, many international, but mostly local Pashtuns. Mahmood Shah, a former security chief of Pakistan's northwestern ethnic Pastun tribal areas said, "Al Qaeda is the main machine behind the insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Taliban, the Chechens and the Uzbeks, are used as foot soldiers as cannon fodder but the actual machine is al Qaeda." Such a statement should not be taken lightly. If al-Qaeda has asserted itself in these regions the possibility of resentment would not be out of the question. Since the ouster of the Taliban in Afghanistan the tribal regions of Pakistan have become a nasty battlefield and civilians are paying the price.

Right now the circumstances that led to the deaths of the Egyptians are still a mystery and I doubt that it is merely a coincidence. The wildcard in this mess seems to be the condition of al-Zawahiri. I believe that he is still alive, but for confirmation he’ll need to release a video tape and discuss some current events. If he has been injured or killed we could see some drastic changes in the shape of al-Qaeda in Pakistan. For now all we can do is sit and wait.