Al-Qaeda's Future Operations in Saudi Arabia and Yemen

Recent violence in Yemen is the result of a decade’s long struggle between various factions that range from religious motivation to purely political struggles. It is this type of environment that al-Qaeda (and terrorists in general) likes to exploit to make reaching their goals much easier. The violence in Yemen between pro-government groups, anti-government groups, and the Shiite Muslim sect have made terrorist operations far simpler because of the preoccupation of the government to curb domestic political violence. The attack on the homes of U.S. oil experts is an attempt by the Yemeni al-Qaeda affiliate* to reestablish itself following counterinsurgent operations (as limited as they were) by the government. This violence could spill over into Saudi Arabia and possibly be a glimpse of al-Qaeda operations post-Iraq.

Saudi Arabia and Yemen have long been at odds over their common border. The first such contemporary instance took place back in the 1930’s and flared up once again following the unification of North Yemen and South Yemen in 1990. Originally the dispute was over the actual location of the border, which was settled with the 2000 Jeddah Treaty, while today tensions are primarily over the movement of Jihadists into Saudi Arabia. In an attempt to alleviate the problem, Saudi Arabia began work on a border fence that drew loud protests from the Yemeni government and several tribes that straddle the border. Saudi Arabia relented and suspended construction following mediation by Egypt and agreed to patrol the border jointly with the Yemeni military. This agreement has not solved the problem of cross border attacks against the Saudi government or foreigners in the country. It is highly likely that the al-Qaeda affiliate in Yemen will work with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to target Westerners and the Saudi government. Furthermore, recent protests in Yemen are likely to be infiltrated by al-Qaeda in an attempt to perpetuate violence and cause chaos.

The situation in Iraq also has an impact in Saudi Arabia. Most of the foreign fighters that fought under the al-Qaeda banner came from Saudi Arabia. This places the Saudis in a precarious situation, one that is not all that foreign to them. The Saudis and the Libyans in particular faced a crisis after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, which was what to do with the Jihadists returning home. Many of these fighters sought to overthrow their current regimes and replace them with more fundamentalist governments. The attempts to overthrow these governments failed and forced the Jihadists to remote parts of their home countries or seek to refuge in a foreign land. When the current generation of Jihadists return home they may not seek to target their government right away, but instead attempt to remove Western influence from their countries and attack Shiite minorities. Unfortunately this does not bode well in a Middle East that is witnessing an Iran that is becoming increasingly influential.

The Shiite minorities in Saudi Arabia primarily live in the oil rich regions in the east. This also happens to be the home to many Western oil companies as well as foreign military bases. The Sunni fighters are not alone in their militancy, however. The Saudi Hizballah has proven to be a force in Saudi Arabia and is very good at carrying out terrorist attacks. It was the Saudi Hizballah that attacked the Khobar Towers killing 19 U.S. servicemen. Currently the Saudi Hizballah does not seek to engage in violence for two reasons. The first is the current cooperation with the Saudi government (which is primarily for show so that the Saudi Hizballah can reconstitute). The second is Saudi Hizballah is taking a ‘wait and see’ approach to the situation in Iraq. If any violence between the Sunnis and the Shiites were to take place in Saudi Arabia, most of the fighting would be in the eastern provinces while terrorist attacks could occur nationwide. What is clear is that the al-Qaeda in Iraq will be forced out of the country with in the next 12 to 18 months as they have lost all local support and are completely dependant upon Iran for weapons and money. Those Jihadists returning home could complicate the delicate dance between the Sunni House of Saud and the Komeninist Shiites and shove the Middle East into tit for tat terror attacks among the two countries.

*The recent communiqués come from a group calling itself the Soldiers Brigade of Yemen. Other groups that have been identified as being apart of al-Qaeda proper in the Arabian Peninsula include the Islamic Army of Aden (IAA) and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Terrorist groups like to use several names to confuse intelligence and complicate counterinsurgency operations.

Here We Go Again

An article on the Jerusalem Post website states:

An upcoming joint US-Israel report on the September 6 IAF strike on a Syrian facility will claim that former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein transferred weapons of mass destruction to the country, Channel 2 stated Monday.

Furthermore, according to a report leaked to the TV channel, Syria has arrested 10 intelligence officials following the assassination of Hizbullah terror chief Imad Mughniyeh.

This report was requested by congress. Congress would not sign off on the intelligence budget without a report on the target of the September 6 raid. What will garner most of the attention however, is the statement that Saddam moved part of his chem/bio weapons arsenal to Syria. This is really no surprise and its nice that the intelligence community can finally put this information in the public domain. As far as I know information regarding what happened to the remnants of his stockpile are still classified although some information has made it into the media.

For those that don't remember, on September 6, 2007, Israeli fighters struck what appears to be a nuclear reactor in Syria. Israeli intelligence hacked the Syrian air defense network which allowed their fighters to penetrate undetected and strike the alleged reactor which was strikingly familiar to the one in North Korea. I mentioned in an earlier post that North Korean and Iranian military officials were working together to place a chemical warhead on a Syrian missile which prematurely detonated killing several people. This cooperation is not new.

As far as the Mughniyeh assassination goes the arrest of 10 intelligence officials in Syria makes sense. Here is what I know thus far:
1. The order for the assassination most likely came from Assad's brother-in-law who runs much of the intelligence apparatus - apparently bad blood existed between him and Mughniyeh.
2. The actual operation was probably carried out with the help of Israeli Mossad, although the level of cooperation from Israel and the level of complicity from Syria is still unknown.
3. Mughniyeh was tied to the Hariri assassination - Syria may have been trying to distance itself from the international inquiry which is likely to find Syria responsible for the assassination with Mughniyeh's minion(s) as the operator(s).
4. This purge may be the last effort to remove all individuals involved with Mughniyeh and the Hariri assassination.

Syria will still have to deal with the finding of the international investigation, but will have little recourse since it has either disappeared or killed all involved. Either way Syria will continue to 'influence' Lebanese politics.

The WMD's are another issue that could cause problems for Assad. Syria has long been suspected of having a large chem/bio weapons program without the aid of Assad's fellow baathist, Saddam Hussein. Perhaps this 'revelation' will force the international community to apply pressure to the Assad regime to open up Syria's weapons programs. So, here we go again, but maybe this time it will be a little more interesting.

Fitna the Movie Hits the Net

Netherlands PM Geert Wilders new movie "Fitna" has been posted on the live leak website. It is a movie that runs for fifteen minutes and shows various passages out of the Koran urging Muslims to commit acts of violence against non-believers. After watching the movie I found very little original material, in fact many of the clips can be found at memri.org or in the 2005 movie "Obsession." That being said I don't believe the purpose of the movie was to be a primer on the political philosophy of Islamism or the threat that ideology presents to all nations of the earth. What the movie does appear to be is volley directed at those who do not believe in Mr. Wilders version of the threat. I fully suspect the motivation behind this film is to provoke a violent reaction from Muslims worldwide similar to the riots that followed the Danish cartoon controversy and the false Newsweek article about U.S interrogators flushing the Koran. The only thing I find useful in this film is the inclusion of newspaper headlines that describe the problems the Netherlands and the rest of Europe are facing.

For those people that are interested in more academic material I recommend the following:

Sheikh Abdel‐Fatah Al‐Khalidi Revitalizes Sayid Qutb
The Ikhwan in North America: A Short History
“The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States: A Brief History”

I also recommend the blog run by Douglas Farah. He has done some of the best work I've seen on the Muslim Brotherhood and the influence it has on modern jihadist groups.

If anyone has specific questions just leave a comment and I will give you what information I have as well as some additional sources. I will also be updating my links list to include other sources that are relevant to the study of terrorism, cults, and other non-state actors.

Update: Mughniyah assassination

In my earlier statement I said that Mughniyah was the only occupant of the targeted vehicle. It now turns out that a deputy to Hezbollah General Secretary Hassan Nasrallah, Haj Hussein Khalil was also killed in the attack. While this assassination dealt a blow to Hezbollah's militia apparatus Hezbollah will retaliate as they always do. With the death of Khalil it becomes more apparent that this assassination was carried out by Israel (multiple sources now confirm this). Had the U.S. decided to carry out the attack it may have been postponed until Mughniyah was alone. By killing both men of high status within Hezbollah, the Israelis will see a retaliatory attack very shortly.

No Retirement Home for Terrorists

In the late evening of February 12, 2008, a car bomb exploded in a residential area of Damascus Syria killing the vehicles occupant and a passerby. The occupant of the vehicle was none other than Imad Mugniyah. I posted an article about the man back in October because of his reemergence in Lebanon training future jihadists for further attacks on Israel and possible attacks against U.S. targets should the U.S. engage Iran militarily. Currently the discussion of the Mugniyah assassination has turned to a classic game of ‘whodunit’.

Perhaps the most likely candidate, on the surface anyhow, would be Israel. While Mugniyah has killed many Israelis in the past it is more likely that Israel would have killed him to hinder the training effort currently underway by Hezbollah. The U.S. also had reasons for targeting Mugniyah, not the least of which was the 1983 attack in Beirut that killed 241 U.S. Marines. While some may argue that the U.S. is prevented from carrying out assassinations because of two executive orders signed by Presidents Ford and Reagan; the current authorization for the use of force passed by congress after the 9/11 attacks would give the President the leeway to pursue this action.

Two other possibilities also come to mind: France and Argentina. France is a possibility because they too lost 58 soldiers in the 1983 attack in Beirut and suffered additional attacks from Hezbollah within their borders. France has the connections in Syria as well as the moxie to pull off this type of attack. On the other hand Argentina also is a possible candidate, but in the end is unlikely. Mugniyah has been implicated in the AIMA attack in 1994 and the 1992 attack against the Israeli embassy in Argentina. Argentina recently released the final report on the AIMA bombing prompting Interpol to issue warrants for Mugniyah’s arrest as well as some Iranian intelligence operatives.

After the predator strike against al-Qaeda operatives that perpetrated the Cole bombing in Yemen, the U.S. is one of the more likely candidates. I currently do not have any evidence to support this, but it is possible that the assassination was orchestrated to put further pressure on Iran during ongoing talks over the future of Iraq. Regardless of who is responsible for this assassination one truth of terrorism still holds: There is no retirement home for terrorists.

The following is the October post on Mugniyah:

Back to the slaughter, Imad Mugniyah makes a comeback.

But did he ever really go away? Probably not, but the man has managed to keep a very low profile. Imad Mugniyah was mentioned in a previous posting as orchestrating the bombing of the Marine and the French Paratrooper barracks back in 1983, but he has done so much more. Mugniyah has been involved in the April 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon; the 1984 bombing of the U.S. Embassy annex in Lebanon; the 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847; numerous kidnappings of Westerners in Beirut throughout the 1980s; the 1992 and 1994 bombings of the Israeli Embassy and a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires; the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing; and the 2000 kidnappings of 3 Israeli soldiers in southern Lebanon and of Israeli Colonel Elchanan Tenenbaum, who was lured to Kuwait under false pretenses and then taken to the Hezbollah enclave in southern Lebanon. It is also possible that he was involved in the killing of U.S. Army Colonel William Buckley. My estimation is that he has been personally responsible for attacks killing over 480 people in his more high profile attacks. As such, he has been wanted by the FBI since 1985.

So why bring him up now? Unfortunately Mugniyah has shown up in Lebanon’s Bekaa valley training terrorists to strike at the U.S. should an attack on Iran take place. This man’s continued existence has bothered me for some time primarily because of the multiple Hezbollah cells that are present in the U.S., many of whom have more than likely been trained by Mugniyah. Mugniyah’s reemergence, if one can call it that, would prove to be a useful deterrent to a U.S. led attack on Iran. This man has managed to pull off difficult assignments in a short amount of time for both Hezbollah and Iranian intelligence, and a couple of suicide attacks in the U.S. would not be hard to imagine. In order to counter this move made by Iran it is necessary to once again directly target the man for assassination or capture. While this attempt may not be successful it could help disrupt the training of future jihadists. In fact, now would be a very good time since Hezbollah is still trying to rebuild its military wing that was severely hurt during the war with Israel just last year. In any case, it’s better late than never.

Analysis of Iran NIE

On December 3, the National Intelligence Council released a new National Intelligence Estimate regarding the nuclear intentions and capabilities of Iran. I have waited until now to comment on this estimate to better gauge the response by politicians, media, and other sources. Although I set my expectations low for an intelligent response to the new estimate I was still disappointed. The two most popular interpretations of the estimate include ‘Bush lied’ and ‘intelligence community undercuts Bush.’ While these responses were not surprising in the least; what I found truly confounding was the lack of an attempt to consult those familiar with intelligence to better explain the findings.

In sharp contrast to media reporting some folks who are familiar with NIE’s, and intelligence in general, attempted to make sense out of the recent finding. Although I disagree with some of their respective commentary it is nice to know that the capability for rational thought still exists. For the most part, the commentators that I respect asked questions surrounding the value of the new intelligence as well as the timing and the source. What I found to be lacking in the questions raised were questions about the motive of the White House to agree to declassify this NIE. More on this in a moment.

Here are some quick facts about the NIE:

The title of this NIE is Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities.

The document is over 150 pages, although only two and a half were declassified.

The NIE states that Iran suspended their nuclear weapon program in 2003.

The NIE states that the suspension was in response to international pressure.

The NIE believes that the Iranians abandoned the program because the costs outweighed the benefits.

Stephen Hadley, the National Security advisor to President Bush, and John Michael McConnell, the Director of National Intelligence, have made statements in the recent past stating that future NIE’s would not be declassified.

Here are some questions that I have about the NIE:

What international pressure was applied to Iran in 2003 that forced them to abandon their weapons program?

Why did the U.S. rely on recent intelligence that has been reportedly rejected by some of our European and Middle East allies?

If the Iranians abandoned their weapons program in 2003 why did the 2005 NIE report that the program was ongoing?

Why was this NIE declassified after Hadley and McConnell stated that future NIE’s would remain classified?

Why did the Iranians pursue a nuclear weapons program in the first place?

The NIE raises many other questions, but these are some of the most pressing questions that need to be addressed. Let’s explore these questions starting in reverse order.

Why did the Iranians pursue a nuclear weapons program in the first place?

Disregarding the insane ravings by Iranian President Ahmadinejad, it would seem that the possession of nuclear weapons would serve as a deterrent to outside invasion. I discount Ahmadinejad because the country of Iran is primarily run by the Supreme Leader and the Shura council who handle foreign affairs with the position of President handling many domestic affairs such as the economy. The Supreme Leader has the final say in most matters and serves as the Commander in Chief of the armed forces. That being said it is doubtful that the Iranians had planned to use these nuclear weapons for any forward deployment. If the Iranians did manage to develop a nuke it would be a crude weapon and could not be fixed to any missile in their arsenal. If we were to assume that the regime did manage to acquire a nuclear weapon with outside support the use of the weapon in conjunction with a missile to target Israel or the Europeans, it would put the revolutionary regime in the cross hairs of the U.S. and Israel. This is not the goal of Iran.

Why was this NIE declassified after Hadley and McConnell stated that future NIE’s would remain classified?

I believe that the NIE was declassified to send a message to the Iranians. First of all, if the Iranians were still pursuing a nuclear weapons program it would be years before they got close to producing a weapon and even longer before they could produce any meaningful arsenal. Secondly, if the Iranians have indeed suspended their program it would take even longer for weapons production. From the perspective of the United States, an Iranian nuclear weapons program serves as more of a long term national security challenge that can be dealt with at a later date, while finding a solution to the current situation in Iraq is a more pressing issue. By declassifying this document, the U.S. is telling Iran we do not have any desire to attack you militarily in the near future.

If the Iranians abandoned their weapons program in 2003 why did the 2005 NIE report that the program was ongoing?

Gathering intelligence inside Iran is a notoriously difficult challenge. Iran is a country that is primarily focused on internal security and the preservation of the revolution. As such, foreigners are difficult to get in country and getting the right individual that would understand what they are looking at is even harder. That being said, it is possible that the 2005 NIE was based on old intelligence or intelligence so ambiguous as to prevent the intelligence community from making a more accurate assessment.

Why did the U.S. rely on recent intelligence that has been reportedly rejected by some of our European and Middle East allies?

Once again it appears that the NIE was not only an intelligence estimate but a message to Iran that military action would not be taken in the near future. Irregardless of the current state of the Iranian nuclear weapons program, it would be some time before the country could produce anything meaningful. Additionally, the U.S. may want to talk with the Iranians about a solution for Iraq. It is in the interest of both nations that the Iraqi nation stabilizes in the near future. By the U.S. stating that it does not believe that Iran is working on a nuclear weapon; it takes away a possible bargaining chip that could be used by Iran in possible negotiations. It is worth restating that Iran was funding the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan along with the U.S. right through 9/11. The Iranians also cooperated with the Afghan invasion by sharing intelligence with the U.S. On the Iraqi front, Saddam Hussein was a significant national security challenge for the Iranians. Iran was devastated by the Iran-Iraq war and could only benefit by the U.S. invasion. By recognizing common interests, the U.S. and the Iranians could come to an accord, albeit quietly, over the situation in Iraq.

What international pressure was applied to Iran in 2003 that forced them to abandon their weapons program?

From 2002-2003, the U.S. was more involved with Afghanistan and preparing for the invasion of Iraq to put any meaningful pressure on the Iranians to end their nuclear ambitions. The Iranians may have been persuaded to end any WMD programs after the run up to the Iraqi invasion just as Muammar al-Gaddafi in Libya did. This is a real possibility given the cost-benefit statement in the NIE. Additionally, the leaders of Iran and North Korea went into hiding for several weeks during the initial invasion of Iraq because they feared the U.S. would move into their nations next.

Conclusion:

I believe that regardless of the current state of the Iranian nuclear weapons program it is irrelevant because of the time it would take for them to produce a weapon. I also believe that the latest NIE is more a message to Iran than an intelligence estimate that requires immediate attention. Given the behavior of the Iranian President it is understandable how an Iranian nuclear weapon could be perceived as an immediate danger, but the reality is very different. The Iranian regime may make overly eschatological statements, and their support for terrorism certainly doesn’t help, but it is a rational actor when it comes to the preservation of the revolutionary government. From this perspective it becomes clear why the White House would release this intelligence estimate in the face of its previous statements about Iran. I have little doubt that the U.S. is looking for regional actors to aid in the political stability of Iraq. The U.S. military has performed exceptionally well and has managed to keep the violence in Iraq relatively low, but this cannot last indefinitely without a political solution. Iran on the other hand desires a stable Iraq but cannot control the various Shi’ite factions in Iraq and it certainly cannot accept a predominately Sunni government. The cooperation between the U.S. and Iran may be the key.

The War over Fourth Generation Warfare (continued)

Areas of Agreement

The strangest thing about the argument over the validity of 4GW often deviates from the original points the authors were trying to get across; warfare is not only changing, but opening up new avenues for attack by use of modern technology. With the advent of the internet and subsequent advance of new communications that use internet technology it is now possible for very few people to wreak disproportionate havoc upon a stronger enemy.

Perhaps the single issue that turns most people off is the assertion by many proponents of 4GW is that warfare conducted with the use of airplanes, tanks, and battleships will be entirely replaced by low intensity and electronic warfare. Some military analysts have even gone further and attempted to make the point that electronic and information warfare, collectively referred to as netwar, will be the one and only form of warfare in the future. Unfortunately, this is a product of Western psychological projection and doesn’t consider the views of non-Western thought on warfare. For the most, part antiwar sentiment resides in the Western world and netwar may be conducive to crippling a more powerful enemy; however that does not mean that our adversaries will lose the desire to challenge the U.S. on the battlefield.

Another Interpretation

While breaking down past conflicts into generations in an attempt to better study the constantly changing face of warfare it is not completely necessary to interpret the new areas that warfare will inhabit. I usually describe warfare as being a spectrum; one without starting and endpoints, but a spectrum through which one player can attack another by various avenues. It is this realization that should be used to describe the attempts by various nations and non-state actors to target the U.S. electronically. The upside of this type of attack is the actions of a few people can cost the target billions of dollars in prevention methods and cleanup after a successful attack. Not only does the attack have a decent probability of success, but it allows the perpetrators to get away more often than not.

While the debate over 4GW is likely to continue for some time it is imperative that the West not become overly fixated on this type of warfare, but realize that the enemies of democracy will use any number of methods to undermine freedom.